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Abstract 
In this thesis, I examine the socio-cognitive processes of sensemaking in entrepreneurial 
ventures, through observing the language and behaviour of board directors in such 
ventures. Entrepreneurial ventures often require venture capital as a source of finance 
and the venture capitalist often places a non-executive director, termed an investor 
director, on the board of the venture to primarily look after their interests. Although there 
are many minor deviations from the business plan over time, substantial adverse 
deviations from plan also occur, which if not addressed, have the potential to jeopardise 
the survival of the business. These more substantial deviations from plan may invoke the 
investor directors to consider changing the direction of the venture, which is an ideal 
setting in which to study sensemaking because there is a need for the venture’s 
stakeholders, whom the board of directors represent, to seek new understanding of the 
change. Processes such as sensemaking and sensegiving involve observing and 
interpreting individuals and groups of homogeneous actors, and in the context of 
entrepreneurial ventures, this has yet to be considered involving the constructions and 
accounts of such actors constituting the board of directors. My study calls for a qualitative 
method, like previous studies in this area, with the potential to compare situations across 
similar case studies of comparable organisations, and hence I obtained longitudinal data 
through semi-structured interviews and desk research over thirteen years from archival, 
historical and real-time field observations from board directors to observe how board 
processes unfold over time. In total, six sensemaking episodes were selected where the 
companies adversely deviated substantially from the warranted business plan. The 
decisions that followed each sensemaking episode were varied; two episodes were 
followed by consensual board decisions, two episodes were followed by forced board 
decisions whereby some board members disagreed or agreed reluctantly to support the 
board decision, and two were followed by protracted indecision, resulting in board 
paralysis and eventual company failure. From this empirical study, I present new 
processes with discrete phases for both encapsulated and open sensemaking; the two 
types of sensemaking observed from the empirical data. I argue that the use of economic 
capital and power dynamics used during encapsulated sensemaking may be antagonistic 
to consensual decision-making and these findings run counter to the traditionally held 
view that sensemaking assists in moving chaotic situations to a more ordered 
environment and one in which sensemaking unfolds in a manner which progressively 
increases the likelihood of venture failure, suggesting that not all sensemaking is positive. 
In understanding the various phases, I present relationships between actors’ social 
positions and their sensemaking in entrepreneurial ventures and consider the effects of 
sensemaking, power and the mediation skills of the Chair on the strategic decision-
making outcomes of the sensemaking process.  
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Entrepreneurial ventures 
An entrepreneurial venture typically starts with a founder or founders who have an idea 
(Byers, Dorf & Nelson, 2010). During the initial stage of growth, founders either use their 
finance or may obtain finance from friends and family, and then seek external finance at 
a later stage in the form of venture capital (Cox, Katila & Eisenhardt, 2012). When 
external investment is obtained, boards appoint further directors to represent the interest 
of the new investors (Bagley & Dauchy, 2008). As the board size increases after 
progressive investment rounds, the proportion of outside directors also increases 
(Lerner, 1995). Although it is more usual for an outside investor to appoint an investor 
director, not all make such appointments (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2003) and further non-
executive directors (of which investor directors are a subclass) may be appointed due to 
their market, competitor or technical knowledge (Bagley & Dauchy, 2008). These boards 
include entrepreneurial managers (initially idea-conceiving founders and, later, owner 
managers), investor directors, possibly independent non-executive directors and the 
Chair. Such boards come together to work as effective teams, co-ordinating ideas, 
commercial goals and strategies, to make decisions that direct the company in achieving 
its vision, mission and goals. My research objectives and main motivation lie around how 
entrepreneurial ventures can effectively respond to partial failure, in the form of adverse 
deviations from the business plan. When external investors buy equity in a business, the 
entrepreneurial managers often have to provide assurances by warranting certain 
statements, for example that the intellectual property is owned by the company or that 
certain financial statements are reasonably stated, resulting in a warranted business 
plan. Adverse deviations occur when such warranties are breached. These adverse 
deviations, which if not addressed, have the potential to jeopardise the survival of the 
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business which could cause the investors, through the investor directors (their board 
proxies) to challenge the company direction, creating the need for the board directors, 
individually and as a board, to make sense out of the new situation. Sensemaking is the 
most appropriate theoretical lens to consider this research objective as an underlying 
theory and is further considered below. 
1.2 Sensemaking 
In this thesis, I seek to examine the socio-cognitive processes of sensemaking in 
entrepreneurial ventures. I do so because entrepreneurial ventures are characterized by 
uncertainty, promoting the need for the venture’s stakeholders to engage in sensemaking 
as a precursor to action. The specific aims of this research are to understand the 
individual phases of the sensemaking process, to assess the effect of faultline activation 
and strength on sensemaking and the subsequent establishment of patterns between 
sensemaking and outcomes in the form of decisions made or decisions delayed. In this 
Introduction, I consider the context of my work; gaps in the literature and a plan to 
address such gaps; the challenge of defining sensemaking and its components; and, 
finally, a structure of the thesis to provide an overview of the research.  
1.3 Context 
Sensemaking is context-specific (Weick, 1993) and my context is the observation of 
directors in the board meetings of entrepreneurial ventures where strategic decisions are 
considered. This research commences at the individual actor level with individual board 
members, and leads to the consideration of team dynamics within the board, with an 
emphasis on the influence of power and the role of mediation by the Chair of the board. 
I observe two types of sensemaking, encapsulated and open sensemaking, described in 
sections 1.5 and 1.6. This work is needed to both inform the existing sensemaking 
literature and to assist board members in making better and timely strategic board 
decisions.  
15 
 
1.4 Gaps in the literature 
In a review of the sensemaking literature, Maitlis & Christianson conclude: 
There are significant gaps in research at the team level, with fewer 
studies of team sensemaking in general, and especially research 
examining the relationship between sensemaking and key team 
processes, such as coordinating, decision-making and strategizing 
(2014, 108). 
This is directly relevant to my research within the context of venture capital backed 
entrepreneurial ventures which are governed by boards of directors (hereafter boards for 
short). While entrepreneurs and investors have received considerable research attention 
separately, limited research has considered them as subgroups comprising the decision-
making body of an entrepreneurial venture (Lim et al., 2013). There are further gaps in 
the literature, which this research aims to address.  
Firstly, the literature on sensemaking and failure has tended to focus on entrepreneurs’ 
sensemaking about failure. In doing so, the focus has been on sensemaking after the 
terminal failure. I consider sensemaking and failure by looking at adverse deviations from 
the business plans, with the hope of mitigating the risk of failure. Such deviations are part 
of the journey of the entrepreneurial team and are downside surprises akin to an 
unexpected drop in sales, which the investors have the right to investigate and, if they 
wish, respond to by making changes to the company. These deviations can be business 
critical and if left unchallenged, may result in partial or total failure. I observe the board 
dynamics through the period of deviation by interviewing directors, observing board 
meetings and considering the decision-making process as mediated through the Chair 
of the board.  
Secondly, the existing literature does not address the sensemaking of a broader range 
of stakeholders. To address this gap, I examine sensemaking from the perspective of 
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different stakeholders, both internal and external to the venture. The literature on 
sensemaking fails to address the socially negotiated processes of sensemaking, and how 
they may shape the unfolding of an event. By drawing on the work of Maitlis (2005) and 
others around the social processes of sensemaking, I explore these social dynamics and 
how they unfold in practice, in the context of venture capital backed entrepreneurial 
ventures. In particular I consider the heterogeneity of actors and whether they can be 
grouped to form subgroups that may act in concert to make sense out of often ambiguous 
and equivocal situations. In clarifying the sensemaking process, I also seek to address 
several issues raised by Sandberg & Tsoukas (2015) in their critique of the sensemaking 
literature. The widely-held view that sensemaking is social, retrospective, grounded in 
identity, ongoing and enacted, with the aim of reaching plausible accounts has remained 
largely unchallenged. Sandberg & Tsoukas (2015) level several criticisms at the extant 
sensemaking literature due to their treatment of or lack of consideration given to such 
issues. I concentrate on those issues that are relevant in answering the research 
question: How does the negotiated process of social interaction shape either the 
encapsulated or open sensemaking process in entrepreneurial ventures?, namely 
context, language, behaviour, politics and power. In doing so, I seek to understand the 
phases of the sensemaking process observed during the board meetings of 
entrepreneurial ventures, and the temporal relationships between these phases. 
Thirdly, the literature on sensemaking has tended to be overly agentic, abstracting away 
from issues associated with the social structures that shape an actor’s context. The 
literature on sensemaking fails to deal with the issue of context in terms of how it shapes 
stakeholders’ cognitions. Drawing on the work of field theory, and particularly the work of 
Bourdieu (1977,1986,1988,1989,1990); I address this gap by exploring how the content 
of stakeholders’ cognitions is shaped by their social position in a field. The use of 
encapsulated or open sensemaking may influence decision-making by boards in 
17 
 
entrepreneurial ventures (considered in Chapter 6) following numerous equivocal 
outcomes, hence it is appropriate to consider these forms of sensemaking in the context 
of this research, and the relationship of sensemaking to faultline activation and strength. 
In this regard, I am interested in the research questions: What is the nature of faultlines 
in entrepreneurial venture boards? And how do these faultlines affect the sensemaking 
processes? The inductive analysis of three entrepreneurial ventures suggests that the 
presence and nature (activation and strength) of faultlines may influence the type of 
sensemaking engaged by entrepreneurial venture boards. Faultlines are hypothetical 
dividing lines that split a group into two or more subgroups based on one or more 
individual attributes (Lau & Murnighan, 1998; Bezrukova et al., 2009). However, in their 
review of the existing literature on faultlines, Thatcher & Patel suggest that:  
One aspect of the original faultline conception that has largely been 
absent from the literature on faultlines is the idea of sensemaking. It is 
unclear how the sensemaking process is developed, reinforced or 
weakened through subgroup and group-level routines and exchanges 
(Thatcher & Patel, 2012 993).  
An understanding of the formation and nature of faultlines, and their relationship to 
sensemaking processes, may help address the above gap in the literature. In Chapter 5 
where faultlines are considered, I explain why it is necessary to use the three theories of 
sensemaking, faultlines and Bourdieu’s theory of practice. 
Fourthly, the literature on sensemaking does not address the issue of power in an explicit 
sense. In this research, I link dimensions of power to sensemaking components. Can 
encapsulated sensemaking become open sensemaking or can encapsulated 
sensemaking be averted at all through the control of power?  If the Chair can control the 
use of power game initiatives and prohibit the negative progression of sensemaking 
components, this intervention may decrease the probability of failure. 
18 
 
Finally, the literature on sensemaking fails to address the socially negotiated processes 
of sensemaking, and how actors may shape the unfolding of a failure event. Drawing on 
the work of Mailtis(2005) and Maitlis & Lawrence (2007) around the social processes of 
sensemaking, I explore the social dynamics and how they unfold. 
In the context of my work, Maitlis & Lawrence note (2007 58): “Sensegiving has also 
been shown to be an important activity of board directors who shape both the content of 
company strategy and the processes through which it evolves, through such sensegiving 
activities as testing ideas, raising issues, and questioning assumptions” (quoting McNulty 
& Pettigrew, 1999). I seek to understand how the homogeneous subgroups within a 
board context shape sense through sensegiving and come to an agreed course of action, 
or fail to reach a strategic decision.  
I believe that in order to give due consideration to such issues, I need to thoroughly 
consider the effect of the process itself, with a focus on understanding the temporality of 
phases of the sensemaking process (Chapter 4); individual actors’ capital and disposition 
and the emergence of faultlines (Chapter 5); and finally, the outcomes of the process, as 
decision, indecision or no decision, with a focus on the influence of power, and the 
mediation role of the Chair (Chapter 6). I then condense my findings from the empirical 
data in Chapter 7.  
1.5 Definition of sensemaking 
A challenge for sensemaking scholars in researching research gaps is the proliferation 
of sensemaking components and the numerous definitions attached to these 
components. To meet this challenge, I consider these definitions.  
Not only is there not a single definition of sensemaking, there is no single theory of 
sensemaking, which causes potential confusion if the terms are not appropriately defined 
within the research context considered. Sensemaking has grown in interest to scholars 
over the last two decades, stemming from the seminal work of Weick (1995) outlined in 
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his book “Sensemaking in Organisations”. Since that time, differing contexts and 
methodologies have not only added significantly to the literature, but have also led to 
differing opinions as to what sensemaking encompasses, how it is accomplished, its 
temporal orientation and the degree to which it is shared (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014).  
Differing contextualisation has led to differing definitions and emphasis; e.g. some 
scholars, including Weick himself, view the process as inherently social, discursive and 
retrospective (Weick, 1995; Maitlis, 2005; Weick et al., 2005), whilst others consider it a 
more individualistic cognitive process (Louis, 1980; Starbuck & Milliken, 1988; Klein, 
Moon & Hoffman, 2006). This is further exemplified by the management-related database 
(ProQuest) identifying four thousand scholarly journal articles containing the word 
“sensemaking”, hence it is hardly surprising scholars use the term differently in different 
contexts.  
Selected definitions of sensemaking (fifteen in total) are tabled in Maitlis & Christianson 
(2014 63-65), which illustrates the depth and breadth of the sensemaking literature 
reviewed in Chapter 2. These definitions can be differentiated as to whether 
sensemaking takes place within or between individuals, and whether sensemaking is 
more about developing frameworks allowing for definitions such as “how people develop 
a vision or mental model of how the environment works” (Hill & Levenhagen, 1995 1057) 
or, in contrast, whether “sensemaking is a social process that unfolds in the social context 
of other actors” (Weick et al., 2005 409). Maitlis & Christianson (2014) argue for the 
derivation of an integrated definition which is also best suited to my research as it applies 
well to the context: 
A process prompted by violated expectations, that involves attending to 
bracketing cues in the environment, creating intersubjective meaning 
through cycles of interpretation and action and thereby enacting a more 
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ordered environment from which further cues can be drawn (Maitlis & 
Christianson, 2014 11). 
This definition is applicable because firstly, sensemaking is captured as a process 
unfolding as a sequence (Weick, 1995; Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Cornelissen, 2012). 
This is my observation induced from the empirical data and is further set out in Chapter 
4, which explores the process of sensemaking. Secondly, the sensemaking process is 
triggered by cues in the form of violated expectations, which can be interpreted and 
explained from their environment (Maitlis, 2005). As stated earlier, in my research, such 
cues are adverse deviations from the business plan. Thirdly, sensemaking is social and 
attempts to “produce, negotiate and sustain a shared sense of meaning” (Gephart et al., 
2010 285). This aspect is seen in my research through actors negotiating to gain a 
consensus regarding their specific viewpoint in order to make a strategic decision during 
a period of uncertainty. Finally, the context includes an environment where “sensemaking 
creates rational accounts of the world that enable action” (Maitlis, 2005 21). In the context 
of my research, action is required to produce a new company direction with regained goal 
congruence. 
1.6 Sensemaking components 
The ability to make sense of adverse deviations from the business plan and take 
appropriate subsequent decisions are further complicated in venture capital backed 
entrepreneurial ventures due to the existence of multiple actors around the board table, 
whose interests may not be fully aligned and who may be associated with differing 
sensemaking accounts of the same event. Within the board, investor directors are often 
appointed by the investor to look after their interests. Entrepreneurial managers, who are 
senior managers within the company and who have the primary focus of adding value to 
the company, are appointed to the same board. The objectives of the investor directors 
may not always be aligned with those of the entrepreneurial managers where the investor 
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directors require an exit to realise their investment. This scenario has the potential to 
cause friction between the subgroups when they look to find meaning from their own 
group instead of searching for meaning from all subgroups, a process also known as 
members’ encapsulation, which is typically defined as “the process whereby group 
members are kept separate from non-members” (Pratt, 2000 473). Sensemaking is a 
social process (Weick, 1993) and within the context of teams, members’ encapsulation 
may occur due to presence of strong in-group bonds (Pratt, 2000).  
When sensemaking is encapsulated, members engage with other members in the same 
subgroup to construct frameworks that they use to understand social stimuli.  Such 
encapsulation can provide protection by buffering members from other members who do 
not join in with or who challenge their sensemaking of the environment (Griel & Ruby, 
1983). In contrast to encapsulated sensemaking, open sensemaking occurs when there 
is little or no evidence of encapsulation, where subgroups of actors interact with other 
subgroups in their search for meaning. The use of encapsulated or open sensemaking 
may influence decision-making by boards in entrepreneurial ventures following 
numerous equivocal outcomes, and hence it is appropriate to consider these forms of 
sensemaking in the context of this research. As I am considering differing components 
of the sensemaking process, it is important to clearly state the components that have 
already been identified and use these consistently and as already defined in the extant 
literature. 
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Sensemaking 
component 
Definition 
    
Sensebreaking The destruction or breaking down of meaning (Pratt, 2000   464)  
    
Sensedemanding 
Strenuous efforts to acquire and process information so as to 
establish “a workable level of uncertainty” and equivocality 
(Weick, 1969   40; Vlaar, van Fenema, & Tiwari, 2008   240) 
    
Sense 
exchanging 
Different conceptions of organization are negotiated to socially 
construct the identity of an organization (Ran & Golden, 2011   
421) 
    
Sensegiving 
Attempting to influence the sensemaking and meaning 
construction of others toward a preferred redefinition of 
organizational reality (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991   442) 
    
Sensehiding 
Discourse can be mobilizing in terms of promoting a specific 
kind of thinking and action or manipulative in terms of hiding 
particular ideas (Vaara & Monin, 2010 6) or silencing alternative 
senses of integration or marginalization of particular voices 
(Monin et al., 2013   262) 
    
Sense 
specification 
Specification of explicit or implicit norms, coining of principles, 
exemplary decisions and actions, symbolization, and 
quantification (Monin et al., 2013   262) 
 
Source – Maitlis & Christianson (2014 69) and Glossary (appendix 1) 
    Table 1.1: Definitions of sensemaking components in the extant literature 
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I specifically use the components of sensebreaking, sensegiving, and sensehiding in my 
research and accordingly use the definitions above. However, these components also 
require further consideration to place them in the context of use. 
1.6.1 Sensegiving 
Gioia & Chittipeddi define “sensegiving” as “a process of attempting to influence the 
sensemaking and meaning construction of others towards a preferred redefinition of 
organisational reality” (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991 442). There are many forms of 
sensegiving, ranging from the use of persuasive or evocative language (Dunford & 
Jones, 2000; Snell, 2002) to strategic conversations and storytelling. It may be that 
sensegiving is generalizable across other contexts and the sensegiving dynamics of 
directors on the board are observed in these case studies. Sensegiving can be triggered 
by the perception or anticipation of a gap in organizational sensemaking processes 
(Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007). Homogeneous groups of actors do not necessarily engage 
in sensegiving even around significant matters (Maitlis 2005) and before the work of 
Maitlis & Lawrence (2007), no research had been undertaken on the triggers of such 
sensegiving processes. In the context of my work, Maitlis & Lawrence (quoting McNulty 
& Pettigrew, 1999) note:  
Sensegiving has also been shown to be an important activity of board 
directors who shape both the content of company strategy and the 
processes through which it evolves, through such sensegiving activities 
as testing ideas, raising issues, and questioning assumptions (2007   
58). 
I seek to understand how subgroups within a board context shape sense through 
sensegiving and arrive at an agreed course of action.  
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1.6.2 Sensebreaking 
This sensemaking component has been defined as “the destruction and breaking down 
of meaning” (Pratt, 2000 464). Whilst this area has received less scholarly attention, it is 
nevertheless important because it can motivate actors to re-consider their sense, to 
question underlying assumptions and to re-examine courses of action. It is frequently 
seen as a precursor to sensegiving (although as an attempt to influence, may be within 
the definition of sensegiving), in which actors find meaning by filling a meaning void, 
created after breaking down meaning prior to this part of the process (Pratt 2000). 
The intent of sensebreaking is to create a meaning void in the recipient, and to disrupt 
an individual’s sense of self. An example of this may occur in the training schemes of 
medical doctors or academics, where the initial years of training aim to demonstrate how 
little they know. Once they have been beaten down (Pratt, 2000 486), new sense is then 
introduced to them via new working practices.  
It has been argued that organisational sensebreaking provides a complement to the 
concept of sensegiving and assists in the capturing of the destructive concepts of 
reorganising, which may have connections with unfreezing (Lewin, 1951) and unlearning 
theories (Pratt & Barnett, 1977). However, no work has been carried out on whether 
sensebreaking has the same effects if it is used intentionally compared to being used 
unintentionally. Pratt (2000) sets out a model of managing identification in which he 
suggests sensemaking is motivated through the use of sensebreaking tactics to create a 
meaning void. If members are not seeking (meaning), then they will either fail to identify 
or will ultimately de-identify with the organisation. Organisations can engage in a wide 
variety of sensebreaking procedures, namely practices identified in theories of 
socialisation (Van Maanen & Schein, 1979), commitment (Kanter, 1968), social influence 
(Cialdini, 1993) and identity conversion (Griel & Ruby, 1983); all of which attempt to affect 
members’ self-evaluation. In my study, I observe powerful board members e.g. investor 
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directors attempting to sensebreak after the trigger point of an adverse deviation through 
the discrediting of opinion from directors outside the investor director subgroup. 
1.6.3 Sensehiding  
In the study of mergers, Vaara & Monin (2010) show how the bigger picture become 
distorted or manipulated through holding back particular aspects of mergers, and they 
term this activity “sensehiding” (6). They link sensehiding to legitimation, suggesting 
mobilisation by promoting a specific kind of thinking in terms of hiding ideas. Such 
legitimation processes take place in numerous social contexts, e.g. experts playing a role 
in merger and acquisition justification or journalists reinforcing ideas or interpretation. In 
such activities sensehiding can play a pivotal and persuasive role. 
In supplementing the above-mentioned sensemaking components, I introduce new 
components from my empirical work and include the components noted above in new 
processes to describe the sensemaking processes observed in my research.  
1.7 Structure of thesis 
1.7.1 Research project chronology and sequencing 
I possess over three decades of experience at board level in the biotechnology industry, 
as CFO, CEO, Chair and non-executive director; and through this experience and board 
level access, I was able to source rich data, through interview and observation from all 
board members around the board table (considered further in Chapter 3). In order to 
consider the research questions in a scholarly context, whilst collecting the data and 
especially before further clarification of interviewee comments, I considered the extant 
literature and used an inductive-deductive loop, moving between data and literature 
numerous times. This loop methodology allowed me to gain an understanding of the gaps 
which were evident between the empirical observations and extant literature; and allowed 
me to seek answers to complete these gaps by aligning patterns and themes from the 
data to the literature or to inform the literature of new processes or models.  
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The thesis employs sensemaking theory throughout and all empirical Chapters consider 
research questions where sensemaking is promoted (Chapter 4 – the process of 
sensemaking in entrepreneurial ventures, Chapter 5 – sensemaking and faultlines in 
entrepreneurial ventures, and Chapter 6 – board outcomes from sensemaking within 
entrepreneurial ventures). In addition, each empirical Chapter employs supplementary 
theory which is relevant in order to answer the research questions considered in that 
Chapter (e.g. Chapter 5 employs faultline theory and Bourdieu’s theory of practice, in 
addition to sensemaking theory, to consider the effect of faultlines on sensemaking in the 
context of entrepreneurial ventures). I have considered the supplementary theories which 
are relevant to a particular empirical Chapter within that Chapter, and sensemaking 
theory which is generic to the overall thesis within the literature review of Chapter 2. I 
have taken the same approach to my methodology. I have included specific 
methodology, pertinent to answering the research questions considered in each empirical 
Chapter, within the empirical Chapters themselves; and only generic methodology, 
pertinent to the thesis as a whole, within the methodology section of Chapter 3. I adopted 
this approach for ease of reading and to align methodologies with the data which were 
generated through the methodology, including the data coding tables for each data set. 
This further allowed for the iterative relationship between data and theory employing the 
inductive-deductive loop as outlined above. 
I order my empirical Chapters in a manner that allows for the knowledge and data 
presented in the earlier Chapters to be made available to later Chapters. This is 
necessary in providing a framework on which to build the story. My first empirical Chapter 
considers the processes of sensemaking in the context of entrepreneurial ventures, 
which need to be unpacked, prior to the consideration where any antecedents or 
outcomes are considered. The relationship of antecedents and outcomes to the 
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processes can then be sought, which I consider in Chapter 5 (antecedents) and Chapter 
6 (outcomes) respectively. 
1.7.2 The overall structure of the thesis 
In Chapter 2, I review the literature relating to sensemaking and then focus on the 
literature that applies sensemaking to entrepreneurial ventures. In Chapter 3, I outline 
the empirical context of the study, the biotechnology industry, and explain its suitability 
for a study of entrepreneurial sensemaking. I then continue to outline my method and 
data collection strategy. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, I present my empirical analysis, which is 
centred around three main theoretical ideas. In Chapter 4, I examine how the negotiated 
process of social interaction between actors is shaped by either an encapsulated or open 
sensemaking process. In so doing, I explore how differences in social position affect the 
sensemaking process and consider the flow of information in shaping that process, which 
leads to new process schematics.   In Chapter 5, I explore the relationship between an 
actor’s social position and their sensemaking in entrepreneurial ventures. I build on 
faultlines work and show how context is shaped by the socio-cognitive processes of 
sensemaking. In Chapter 6, I examine how the sensemaking process in entrepreneurial 
ventures may lead to terminal failure. In contrast to the literature on entrepreneurial 
sensemaking that has examined the effects of failure on sensemaking, I look at the 
reverse, and consider the effect of sensemaking on the outcomes of the process. I 
consider two influences on the sensemaking process that may affect the speed of 
decision-making, that of the mediation of the Chair of the board and the influence of 
power. Finally, in Chapter 7, I synthesize the findings of the three empirical Chapters and 
explain my contribution. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ON SENSEMAKING 
In this Chapter, I review the literature relating to sensemaking, and then focus down on 
the literature that applies sensemaking to entrepreneurial ventures. In doing so, I explore 
the main issues in sensemaking, and the gaps in our knowledge. 
2.1 Sensemaking theory 
Sensemaking can be traced back to the end of the 19th century (James, 1890) and has 
remained dominant in the organisational literature after becoming an accepted topic in 
the 1960’s (Garfinkel, 1967; Weick, 1969). Garfinkel used an ethnomethodological 
approach to consider how actors account for their sense of reality (Garfinkel, 1967) and 
Weick used rich case studies of crises to gain understanding of the assembling of order 
from chaotic catastrophic events (Weick, 1990, 1993). As well as positive sensemaking, 
the concept of negative sensemaking (sensemaking that even precipitates crises) has 
also been put forward in the mainstream literature (Abolafia & Kilduff, 1988; Weick, 
1988). The ideas that inform sensemaking theory are rooted in social psychology (e.g. 
Festinger) micro-sociology (e.g. Goffman) ethnomethodology (e.g. Garfinkel) social 
constructionism (e.g. Berger & Luckman) and cultural anthropology (e.g. Geertz) all taken 
from the Sage Directory of Qualitative Management Research edited by Thorpe & Holt 
(2008). In the business world, the ideas provided a counter to the earlier prevailing 
assumption associated with the positivist orthodoxy in the field, challenging, among other 
things, the goal orientation of businesses, by suggesting organisational plans were 
retrospective reconstructions of elapsed actions. Sensemaking has now found its way 
into the more mainstream study of organisations, addressing issues such as middle 
management change as opposed to studies of more esoteric contexts such as fire-
fighting and airplane flight decks. Weick suggests: “What is unusual about the topic of 
sensemaking is that it is grounded as much in deductions from well-articulated theories, 
noting ethnomethodology and dissonance theory as it is in inductions from specific cases 
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of struggles to reduce ambiguity” (Weick, 1995 13). I hope to inform the theory through 
collecting and analysing case study data from boards of entrepreneurial ventures. 
As stated in the Introduction, I employ a broad definition throughout this thesis: “A 
process prompted by violated expectations, that involves attending to bracketing cues in 
the environment creating intersubjective meaning through cycles of interpretation and 
action and thereby enacting a more ordered environment from which further cues can be 
drawn” (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014 11). I adopt this definition because it allows for 
sensemaking that is triggered by adverse deviations, under the defined term “violated 
expectations” and allows for the observation of groups of heterogeneous actors who may 
be bracketing cues in differing ways. The recent review of sensemaking (Sandberg & 
Tsoukas, 2015) suggests that there has been surprisingly little critique of the 
sensemaking process.  They point out that only a few researchers have critically engaged 
with the sensemaking process, to map its uses, inconsistencies, omissions and confusion 
(Gioia & Mehra, 1996; Engwall & Westling, 2004; Costanzo & MacKay, 2009). This 
review paper adopts the following definition of sensemaking: “Sensemaking is now seen 
as a constructive process, which includes how people concerned with identity in the 
social context of other actors, engage ongoing events from which they extract cues and 
make plausible sense retrospectively while enacting more or less order into these 
ongoing events” (Weick, 2001 463). This may ultimately be a better definition for the 
sensemaking observed in this study, however the above definition by Weick includes a 
process prompted by violated expectations, which relates well to adverse deviations from 
plan.  
The view that sensemaking is social, retrospective, grounded in identity, ongoing, 
enacted and seeks to reach plausible accounts has been held for several years. A critique 
of some of these aspects is undertaken in the review (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015) and I 
refer to this review throughout the relevant sections of the literature review.  
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Sandberg & Tsoukas (2015) sets out the major constituents of sensemaking as viewed 
in 2015 summarised in Table 2.1, and further critique the commonly held views, 
addressed later in this Chapter. In the context of my study, adverse deviations that are 
business critical clearly would be major unplanned events (unplanned to the extent that 
they are not expected to happen) and it is these triggers I am looking for in my empirical 
data to commence mapping the process of sensemaking. Although Sandberg & Tsoukas 
define the process as creation, interpretation and enactment; earlier scholars map the 
process as scanning, interpretation and learning, resulting in action. These mapping 
techniques appear very similar in that scanning is a mechanism to create, interpretation 
is common to both maps and enactment and learning resulting in action relate to changes 
in ongoing practices. The outcomes of the process allow for all eventualities which 
indicate sensemaking may be not just around positive outcomes and the creation of order 
could create nonsense or no restored action. Certain factors influencing sensemaking 
may be more relevant than others in the context of entrepreneurial ventures, and I review 
these later as part of the literature review.  
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Events that trigger 
sensemaking 
Process of 
sensemaking 
Outcomes 
Factors influencing 
sensemaking 
Major planned events Creation Restored sense Contexts 
Major unplanned events Interpretation Restored action Language 
Minor planned events Enactment Nonsense Identity 
Minor unplanned events   
No restored 
action 
Cognitive frames 
Hybrid of events     Emotion 
      Politics 
      Technology 
 
Table 2.1:  Major constituents of the sensemaking process 
My study does not concentrate on the triggers themselves but on the process, 
antecedents and outcomes. I now consider the sensemaking process itself. 
2.2  The sensemaking process 
The sensemaking process is facilitated by the placement of stimuli (information) into 
sensemaking frameworks (schemata or knowledge structures), that reduces the 
complexity of the information (Sackmann, 1992; Walsh, 1995) and allow its association 
with past actions and meanings (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988; Weick, 1995). Sensemaking 
can be viewed as both an individual based and/or a corporate and collective based 
methodology (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). Through the process of sensemaking, people 
enact and create the social world, through negotiated conversation, although there is a 
body of literature that suggests a more cognitive/individual approach to sensemaking, 
considered later in this Chapter. 
Sensemaking can be constructed retrospectively, yet used prospectively, through the 
capturing of thoughts and emotions that may be useful to assist the interpretation of future 
events (Brown, Stacey & Nandhakumar, 2008). The sensemaking process consists of 
the dynamics of scanning, interpretation and learning (Weick, 1979; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 
1991), and has been depicted as follows: 
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Figure 2.1: The sensemaking process 
Scanning dynamics refers to the selective attention to, and collection of, information that 
might be important in the sensemaking process. Interpretation dynamics refers to the 
development of ways of comprehending the meaning of information into structures 
suitable for understanding and learning dynamics refer to any significant changes in 
ongoing practices through action. 
2.2.1 Scanning dynamics 
Scanning involves information gathering. Decision-makers typically have access to far 
more information than they need or can use (Mintzberg, 1983), so they need to be 
selective (Huber & Daft, 1987). Scanning is a search of the external environment in the 
attempt to identify anything that may affect an organisation (Daft & Weick, 1984) or the 
internal environment which may have an impact on future performance (Cowan, 2013). 
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2.2.2 Interpretation dynamics 
Interpretation involves taking the scanned information and fitting it into some 
understanding through structure (Gioia, 1986). Some researchers have viewed this as a 
process that individuals use to ascribe meaning, whereas others view this on a collective 
basis (Bartunek, 1984). Meanings are often categorised into recognised labels, e.g. 
opportunities and threats (Dutton & Duncan, 1987). These labels could be broadly 
differentiated through the evaluation of an issue in positive or negative terms, whether it 
represents a gain or loss for an organisation and whether it is controllable or 
uncontrollable (Jackson & Dutton, 1988). The interpretation label often produces a 
direction of action (Dutton, Fahey & Narayanan, 1987) and this can affect risk levels, 
commitment and enactment. Extant research suggests even when exposed to identical 
stimuli, top managers in different organisations often construct different interpretations of 
the same issue (Lawrence & Dyer, 1983; Meyer, 1997). There has been debate whether 
interpretation is the appropriate process between scanning and learning dynamics 
(Weick, 1995 13). Weick points out: “Sensemaking is clearly about an activity or a 
process, whereas interpretation can be a process, but is just as likely to describe a 
product. It is common to hear that someone made an interpretation, but we seldom hear 
that someone made a sensemaking. We hear, instead, that people make sense of 
something, but even then, the activity rather than the outcome is in the foreground” (1995 
13). 
2.2.3 Learning dynamics 
It is acknowledged that scanning strategies and subsequent interpretation of strategic 
information are pivotal precursors to actions taken, whether change actions or 
confirmatory actions (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Such changes can be minimal, for 
example the change of the service of a product, or more significant, for example the 
change of overall business strategy. 
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2.3 Sensemaking properties and forms 
Weick (1995 17-62) discusses in detail the seven properties of sensemaking in an 
organisational setting. These can be summarised as follows: social context (influenced 
by the actual, implied or imagined presence of others); personal identity (a person’s 
sense of who he or she is in a setting); retrospect (perceived world is past hence things 
are visualised and seen before they are conceptualized); salent cues (picking up prompts 
from the surrounding environment); ongoing (experience is continuous however 
interruptions happen when sensemaking episodes are triggered); plausibility (sense 
constrained by agreement with others and consistent with one’s own views) and 
enactment (action stemming from the sensemaking). 
From my empirical work, I observed that in some episodes, all actors were fully engaged 
in the social context, whereas in other episodes, certain groups of actors formed their 
own social network, excluding others. I subsequently sought literature that would assist 
in forming a theoretical understanding and background to these observations. Where the 
social network was free and open to all the actors, I have deemed this type of 
sensemaking as “open sensemaking”, as all actors are open to receive and give sense 
to each other. In contrast, there is a form of sensemaking that captures the restriction of 
social interaction to individual subgroups of actors, entitled “encapsulated sensemaking”.  
The extant literature (Pratt, 2000) suggests that within the context of teams, social 
encapsulation results directly from the creation of strong in-group bonds in the presence 
of like-minded others at functions or in meetings. Members’ encapsulation is typically 
defined as “the process whereby group members are kept separate from non-members” 
(473). When sensemaking is encapsulated, members engage with other members in the 
same subgroup to construct frameworks that they use to understand social stimuli. There 
are numerous ways that organisations can promote encapsulated sensemaking among 
members. The organisations attempt to manage intragroup relations through the 
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development of strong bonds between individuals and organisations (Lofland & Stark, 
1965; Griel & Ruby, 1983), through mentoring (Hunt & Michael, 1983; Kram, 1983) and 
through organisational commitment (Buchanan, 1974). 
Sensemaking forms can also be influenced by emotions (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014).  
Positive emotions are more likely to lead towards generative sensemaking; negative 
emotions are more likely to lead towards integrative sensemaking; self-conscious 
emotions such as pride and guilt lead towards social sensemaking and self-conscious 
emotions such as hubris and shame lead towards solitary sensemaking. These forms 
are compared by Maitlis, Vogus & Lawrence (2013) as follows: Firstly, “generative 
sensemaking which involves a process in which relationships among cues and frames 
are constructed flexibly and creatively to allow for the development of new accounts”(9). 
Secondly, “integrative sensemaking is characterised by a heightened sensitivity to 
whether new cues are consistent or inconsistent with the emerging account of a situation, 
such that accounts are continuously and critically evaluated with respect to 
plausibility”(9). Thirdly, social sensemaking relates to a person drawing on and engaging 
with others. “We agree that sensemaking always occurs in a social context, affected by 
the rules and resources that define that context”(12). Finally, solitary sensemaking 
precedes as solo activities, intentionally or unintentionally distanced from the 
sensemakers’ social context. “The individual works to interpret and react to a 
sensemaking trigger largely alone or with an imagined other”(12). 
Sensemaking forms can also be defined by observing the dynamic between the leader 
and the stakeholders. Maitlis (2005) compared processes in which leaders were more 
and less active, to distinguish four different forms of organisational sensemaking 
processes: Firstly, “guided sensemaking occurs when leaders are very energetic in 
constructing and promoting understandings and explanations of events, and 
stakeholders are also actively engaged in attempting to shape beliefs about certain 
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elements of the issues”(35). Secondly, “fragmented sensemaking processes emerge 
when stakeholders raise issues, generate accounts of a situation, and argue for potential 
solutions in the context of leaders who do not try to organize or control discussions”(36). 
Thirdly, “restricted sensemaking results from leaders promoting overarching accounts of 
issues they encounter which stakeholders tend to accept with relatively few attempts to 
provide alternative understanding”(39). Finally, “a minimal sensemaking process is 
followed when both leaders and stakeholders await others’ interpretations of and 
reactions to an issue, which typically come in response to some external trigger”(42). 
A further form of sensemaking is considered in 2016 where a multi-case analysis of nine 
“most trusted advisors” in six family run businesses is used to introduce “mediated 
sensemaking” – that is the social position, orientation, and actions used by mediators to 
facilitate adaptive sensemaking that unfolds when someone begins to doubt the sense 
already made (Strike & Rerup, 2016   880). This may be useful when I consider the Chair 
as a mediator in Chapter 6, and I further consider this literature in that Chapter. 
It may be difficult to consider sensemaking in isolation of sensegiving, as the pattern of 
leader and stakeholder sensegiving in combination has been shown to shape the 
processes and outcomes of organizational sensemaking, or the process of social 
construction in which individuals attempt to interpret and explain sets of cues from their 
environments (Maitlis, 2005). Furthermore, sensegiving can be triggered by the 
perception or anticipation of a gap in organizational sensemaking processes (Maitlis & 
Lawrence, 2007). Homogeneous groups of actors do not necessarily engage in 
sensegiving even around significant matters (Maitlis, 2005) so that is why I have an 
interest in sensegiving as I am considering how heterogenous groups of actors sensegive 
in their attempt to influence other groups of actors (e.g. investor directors and 
entrepreneurial managers). 
 
37 
 
2.4 Sensegiving 
As stated in the Introduction, Gioia & Chittipeddi define sensegiving as “a process of 
attempting to influence the sensemaking and meaning construction of others towards a 
preferred redefinition of organisational reality” (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991 442). Research 
has observed sensegiving in the context of managers and staff in organisational contexts, 
where communication of new beliefs and meaning has been defined as sensegiving 
(Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia et al., 1994; Labianaca, Gary & Brass, 2000; Fiss & 
Zajac, 2006). In the case of change management, managers embark on sensegiving 
either as a planned process (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991) or in response to sensegiving 
imperatives on occasions where staff relies on management to provide meaning during 
meaning voids (Corley & Gioia, 2004). It may be that sensegiving is generalisable across 
other contexts and the sensegiving dynamics of investor directors and other directors on 
the board are observed in this case study. Managerial sensegiving is deemed successful 
when its recipients are deemed to have constructed a shared interpretive scheme 
congruent with the goals of the manager, and this interpretation is transferable to the 
specifics of this case study where sensegiving would mean the board has constructed a 
shared interpretive scheme congruent with the goals of the investors. 
A major limitation in the critique of sensemaking (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015) is that it 
does not allow for an investigation of differing kinds of prospective sensemaking, such 
as sensegiving which is deemed to be prospective (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). Sandberg 
& Tsoukas (2015) point out two main problems: 
The first problem is: “Sensegiving is couched in terms of the conduit metaphor of 
communication whereby sense is something that is first made and then given to someone 
else” (Lakoff, 1995 116). They contend that “sense is not an object to be passed on but 
a skilful activity to be engaged in. A sensemaker and sensegiver are intertwined and a 
change agent who gives sense to employees has made sense out of sense given to him 
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by other actors” (Lakoff, 1995 116). This suggests that sensemaking and sensegiving 
are so intertwined that one cannot be understood without the other. In this work, I have 
interest in observing from the empirical data the richness and depth of sensegiving as a 
fundamental part of understanding the sensemaking process and to consider how 
intertwined the processes are – are they in effect the same process? 
The second problem is: “Adding the notion of sensegiving to the existing sensemaking 
process does not seem enough to enable the investigation of more genuine forms of 
prospective sensemaking, such as strategic discussions about the future” (Tsoukas & 
Shepherd, 2004; Stigliani & Ravasi, 2012; Kaplan & Orlikowski, 2013) or “various forms 
of anticipation actors experience, while carrying out ongoing organisational activities” 
(Bolander & Sandberg, 2013). The challenge thrown out by the authors in the review 
article (Sandberg & Tsoukas 2015) is that sensemaking processes’ retrospective nature 
may be somewhat limiting to further advancing sensemaking theory through including 
more genuine forms of prospective sensemaking. In this study, by empirically observing 
unfolding sensemaking episodes, it is hoped that further light can be shed on this 
important aspect of sensemaking theory. 
In considering sensegiving, Sandberg & Tsoukas raise situational factors that do not 
merely happen to influence sensemaking efforts, but they in many cases are consciously 
used as resources to influence sensemaking. This has been shown to be the case in 
leadership studies (Smircich & Morgan, 1982; Pye, 2005) and in the areas of strategy 
and organisational change (Dunford & Jones, 2000). I now consider these factors and 
their relevance to my study. 
Context:  In particular in this empirical work, social context is considered using Bourdieu’s 
theory of practice, which seeks to unpack the social context in which individual actors 
come to the board table. The critique of Sandberg & Tsoukas (2015) concludes that 
further work is required on process as the notion remains vague, the concept of sense is 
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insufficiently developed, sensemaking overlooks larger contexts in which it takes place 
and sensemaking reduces reality to subjective understanding. This study takes these 
views into account when considering the empirical setting and in researching the process 
and outcomes of the sensemaking process. 
Language: These linguistic features include discourse, narrative, rhetoric and storytelling 
(Morgan, 1980; 1986; 1993; Brown, 2005; Oswick & Christensen, 2008; Boudes & 
Laroche, 2009; Abolafia, 2010; Cornelissen, Heracleous & Jacobs, 2011; Cornelissen, 
2012). The sensegiving in these initiatives enable actors to attempt at organising 
confusing cues and to give them some arrangement into more holistic and coherent 
interpretations of the episode. Metaphors connect human experience and guide 
interpretations. There may be an argument to suggest that the presentation of 
sensemaking episodes, if packaged through storytelling language, may assist both 
sensegiving and the attitudes of stakeholders. One of the assumptions of sensemaking 
theory is that the individuals, and in particular experts, are faced with copious information, 
making the world feel inherently complex and ambiguous. Some scholars have observed 
leader sensegiving as storytelling. Dunford & Jones (2000) observed senior managers 
narrating strategic change events in three organisations and Snell (2002) observed the 
president of an organisation used narrative to attempt a move to a learning organisation. 
Brown et al. (2008 1031) argue that the analysis of stories allows us to identify and to 
analyse what people agree on and where understandings differ. Narrative theorists argue 
that in order to counter ambiguity, stories are a fundamental tool by which humans 
communicate their insight to others and hence make sense of ambiguous situations, and 
act as both sensemaking and sensegiving devices to link cause and effect, both within 
and between different parts of the narrative (Gabriel & Bowling, 2004). Storytelling has a 
potential to aid the explanation of failure events, making any underlying actions at least 
understandable and at best maybe even favourable. Gabriel & Bowling (2004 64) assert 
40 
 
stories do more than just present facts as information. By presenting facts as part of a 
complex whole, not only are organisational stories more easily learned and remembered, 
a more comprehensive and memorable identity can be ascribed to firms. Gabriel & 
Bowling contend that this is likely to involve temporal sequencing and this can reposition 
the sensemaking episode and potentially help overcome any information asymmetry and 
uncertainty, helping to sort out ambiguity. Such ambiguity and uncertainty is not helpful 
in reducing the level of perceived risk to stakeholders after failure events. This form of 
sensegiving may be relevant to this study as adverse deviations are partial failure events, 
which bring ambiguity and uncertainty. 
Identity: Actors make sense of interrupted events through the influence of the identity 
that they have developed (Weick, 1995 18-24). Many sensemaking studies to date have 
concentrated on how identity is constructed through sensemaking, opposed to how 
identities influence sensemaking. 
There are identified influences on sensemaking which are important as they may 
enhance or distort sensemaking. Brown, Stacey & Nandhakumar (2008) argue that 
sensemaking should be seen in the context of an individual’s efforts at identity 
construction (refer to Table 2.1). This may produce heterogeneity in sensemaking 
through the operation of ego defences (e.g. denial, rationalisation and fantasy), meaning 
people make sense under the influence of their individual specific needs for self-esteem, 
self-efficacy and self-consistency (Erez & Earley, 1993). Influences of these types may 
have an impact on how the individual views sensemaking which then feeds into the social 
interaction to glean sense from each other. This may explain the differences of 
interpretation in a sensemaking scenario when several people view the same episode 
and make sense of the outcomes differently and then act differently based on their 
individual sensemaking. This view contrasts to the earlier held view that organized 
actions are merely the consensual product among a group (Louis, 1980, 1983; Pfeffer, 
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1981; Smircich & Morgan, 1982). An alternate position recognises that a minimal shared 
understanding is sufficient to produce common action (Weick, 1979, 1995; Weick et al., 
2005). Sensemaking and action are related in a complex process in which meanings are 
continually constructed and destroyed as more sensemaking communication occurs and 
new actions are taken. Although there is literature that suggests sensemaking is linked 
to identity generation and maintenance, (Brown, 2000; Patriotta, 2003a; Patriotta, 2003b) 
this may be contradictory to the above views where both consensus and minimal shared 
understanding produces common action. There may be conflict between personal 
identity generation and maintenance and obtaining consensus or a minimal shared 
understanding. Brown, Stacey & Nandhakumar (2008) pursue this line and present 
potential reasoning why sensemaking can differ from one person to another having 
experienced the same situation. This may be useful in this research as failure may be 
interpreted as success and vice versa if sensemaking does not produce consistent 
results. Impression management and attributional egotism relate to identity in that 
impression management relates to the way individuals present themselves and 
attributional egotism relates to a tendency of attributing outcome to self. 
Impression management relates to the way individuals present themselves in influencing 
the perception others have of them (Schlenker, 1980; Tedeschi, 1981). This may 
influence the connection between sensemaking and the associated future actions. In the 
context of failure, this may be used as a defensive mechanism in diverting failure away 
from an individual to other factors, and may lead to denial that either a failure has 
occurred or that or a failure has occurred but is in no way connected to the person in 
question. 
Attributional egotism can be defined as the tendency of individuals to attribute favourable 
outcomes to self and unfavourable outcomes to external factors (Bradley, 1978; Staw, 
1980; Bettman & Weitz, 1983). This is aligned to impression management in that it may 
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produce denial of failure, or even attempt to substitute failure for a perceived success. 
Brown et al. (2008) argue that the concepts of impression management and attributional 
egotism need to be more effectively integrated into mainstream theorizing on 
sensemaking to explain more fully how people understand and read meaning into their 
work and actions. By observing individual differences in sensemaking, we may ultimately 
be better placed to explain how order emerges from dissensus, ambiguity and 
disagreement.  
Cognitive frameworks: These frameworks influence the cues that actors notice and 
extract from the episode. Sometimes such frameworks are specific and sometimes 
general.  Examples of general frameworks include cultural (corporate, regional etc.) and 
ideological (professional, gender, political etc.) frameworks. Examples of specific 
frameworks include the National Health Service and Academia where there is history of 
“how we do it here”. 
Emotions: A poorly examined facet of sensemaking is the role of emotion in the process 
(Gioia & Mehra, 1996; Magala, 1997). Emotion can be defined as “a transient feeling 
state with an identified cause or target that can be expressed verbally or not verbally”   
(Russell & Barrett, 1999; Grandey, 2008). Emotions may be an important element in 
sensemaking (Maitlis et al., 2014) through a critical role in detecting and attending to 
anomalies (Adler & Obstfeld, 2007). Emotion has been shown to direct attention towards 
certain cues (Ohman, Flykt & Esteves, 2001), and to alert actors to possible unexpected 
events. Emotion has been acknowledged as to how events are interpreted, including the 
making of strategic decisions (Forgas, 1995). 
Sensemaking traditionally was considered as a natural reaction to interruptions, but more 
current thinking (Maitlis et al., 2014), reframes sensemaking as an effortful and potentially 
negative experience that individuals may avoid, and hence the onset requires 
explanation. Maitlis et al. argue that the emotional reaction provides energy to sustain 
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actors throughout the sensemaking process. Certain emotions are more likely to provide 
this compared to other emotions and intense negative emotions may prevent 
sensemaking. The following differing emotions are proposed to impact the sensemaking 
process differently as follows: Positive emotions are more likely to lead to generative 
sensemaking; negative emotions are more likely to lead to integrative sensemaking; self-
conscious emotions such as pride and guilt lead to social sensemaking and self-
conscious emotions such as hubris and shame lead to solitary sensemaking. Maitlis et 
al. (2014) postulate that sensemakers create accounts and accept or reject them based 
on the degree to which interpretation, action orientation and felt emotion cohere.  Emotion 
has a place in sensemaking and further research is needed to unpack this important 
multifaceted role in triggering, shaping and concluding sensemaking processes. Until 
recently, emotion was reduced to the autonomic arousal experienced when an 
unexpected interruption occurred, and was viewed detrimentally (Weick, 1995). Recently 
emotions have been given more attention at both the individual level and team level. 
Maitlis & Christianson (2014) has set forth a model illustrating that differing emotions can 
be cues to energise the sensemaking process, sometimes in a negative or conversely in 
a positive way. At the team level, Rafaeli, Ravid & Cheshin (2009) argue that team 
emotions lead to higher quality team mental models, such a model is supported by Liu & 
Maitlis’ empirical study (2014) where they found that positively valenced emotional 
dynamics enable discussions in which actors engage in deeper levels of sensemaking. 
Although there is not a large body of work in this area, emotions are seen to be an integral 
part of the sensemaking process, influencing the type, depth and accomplishment of the 
sensemaking process. Emotion is considered as further work (Chapter 7) and outside 
the scope of this thesis. 
Politics and power: Maitlis & Sonenshein (2010  571) point out that “quite overlooked are 
the social, cultural, economic and political forces that shape what groups notice, how 
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they can act and with whom they interact” (571). This omission could refer to the 
individuals that make up the group or at a group or company or industry level. I consider 
further the use of politics and power both within the context of the sensemaking process 
(Chapter 4) and as an influence on outcomes (Chapter 6). 
The next few sections consider sensemaking and failure, as all sensemaking episodes 
from my empirical work commence with partial failure with the resultant need for the 
board to make sense of the new circumstances. I consider failure further in Chapter 6. 
2.5 Failure and sensemaking 
There is little point in sensemaking from failure, other than maybe making the individual 
feel better about the failure, if either s/he is unable to make sense or cannot transport 
that sensemaking to a further venture. Cannon (1999) concludes that individuals 
reflecting on past failures are primarily motivated by the need to reduce anxiety resulting 
from review of the painful events, which could be a powerful influence on sensemaking. 
In contrast to attributional theory which is preoccupied with the causes of failure, Cannon 
proposes that sensemaking from failure may energise individuals towards future goals. 
This appears to be a critical step in positioning the entrepreneur to make sense of the 
failure; along with all the other elements of sensemaking including enactment, capacity 
and expectation through the setting of earlier goals by the organisational heads or 
entrepreneurs themselves.  
2.5.1 Grief and sensemaking in business failure  
Shepherd (2007) uses micro theories of grief to consider the recovery process from 
business failure and hence the grief process may have a positive influence on the 
sensemaking process. Shepherd examines family influences on the ability of the failed 
business person to recover, and concludes that resources available from the family can 
be drawn on and effectively used for further business ventures, and that family members 
with greater emotional intelligence are more effective at knowing where to find such 
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resources. It is possible that business mentors can be a surrogate to a family member as 
described in Shepherd’s research using a combination of grief counselling tools and 
emotional intelligence. Tools from grief counselling consist of loss orientation (Shepherd, 
2003) defined as: “The process of constructing a series of accounts about the loss 
gradually provides the loss with the meaning and eventually produces a changed 
viewpoint of self and the world”; and restoration orientation (Shepherd, 2003) defined as: 
“The suppression of feelings of loss and getting on with one’s life may be an alternative 
approach to loss orientation”. Shepherd states that oscillation between the loss and 
restoration dynamics enables a person to obtain the benefits from both techniques and 
collectively may reduce the time needed before psychologically the entrepreneur is next 
venture ready. By contrast he notes that the excessive use of a sole technique may inhibit 
the entrepreneur from returning to a further venture in an expedient manner. An 
emotional intelligent individual is more likely to be able to make a judgement call when 
to switch between counselling modes. 
Partial failure is triggered by a significant adverse event from the business plan. As this 
often has potential downside consequences to board directors, such adverse events can 
often create a crisis environment, hence I consider the literature around sensemaking in 
crisis conditions  
2.5.2 Sensemaking in crisis conditions  
Weick (1988) states that sensemaking in crisis conditions is made more difficult because 
action that is instrumental to understanding the crisis often intensifies the crisis. He 
proposes the core concepts of enactment (a potentially significant influence on the 
sensemaking process) may comprise an ideology that reduces the likelihood of crisis. 
Weick argues that all crises have an enacted quality once a person takes a first action. 
To become part of the problem means that people enact some of the environment they 
face. The first action leads to opportunities and constraints, and a different first action 
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would no doubt lead to different opportunities and constraints. The link with failure is 
reported by Weick that crisis can have small, volitional beginnings in human action. Small 
events are carried forward, cumulate with other events, and over time systematically 
construct an environment that is a rare combination of unexpected simultaneous failures. 
These factors are important when considering how differing types of entrepreneurs 
initially react to failure and subsequent actions and reactions after the initial enactment. 
Weick refers to the work of Perrow (1984), in which enactment themes are considered. 
A conclusion is drawn that enactment has most effect on those portions of a crisis which 
are loosely coupled, where procedures are not standardised and supervision may not 
exist or is patchy. Enactment is thought to affect crisis management by inducing 
increased stress levels, resulting in speed of interactions and ideology, and a relatively 
coherent set of beliefs that bind people together and explain their worlds in terms of cause 
and effect relations.  
2.5.3 Communication and meaning construction in failure  
A further consequence of failure events (which tend to be disruptive) is the requirement 
to communicate and to construct meaning. This element of sensemaking will be 
considered in this study to investigate how communication and meaning construction is 
characterised in the unfolding of sensemaking episodes and subsequent actions as 
outputs from the process. Cannon (1999) notes that the human concepts of failure are 
learned, from the observation that babies experiment and learn through trial and error 
and integrate into later life the values the social system imparts to the baby (Degeus, 
1988), quickly learning to link failure with the negative emotions of being a bad child 
(Erikson, 1950; Tangney, 1995). 
2.6 Time and sensemaking in failure events 
Cannon (1999) considers the impact of time on sensemaking.  He comments that past 
research before 1999 has concentrated on responses to failure, compared to reflection 
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on failure. Research concentrating on the reflection of failure sensemaking is able to 
address such research questions around the relative importance of response behaviours 
after a negative outcome over time. There are obvious challenges in attempting to 
consider time, including the distortion of truth due to memory changes or a more 
conscious decision to rewrite history. This may have a significant impact on the future 
decisions of entrepreneurs including both the appetite to commence new ventures and 
decisions made within the context of a new venture. Shepherd & Cardon (2009) discuss 
possible reasons why some people are better able to regulate their emotions throughout 
time during and after a failure event. It is put forward that such negative emotions can 
lead entrepreneurs to overestimate the likelihood of negative outcomes and to 
underestimate the likelihood of positive outcomes for subsequent ventures, which may 
have an impact on lowering or increasing the probability of future failures or successes. 
Hence there have been research angles on influences on sensemaking, however it is 
likely that such a search for influences has not been exhausted. 
2.7        Sensemaking within entrepreneurial ventures 
There has been little scholarly work of note that specifically addresses sensemaking 
within entrepreneurial ventures where the unit of analysis tends to be an individual 
himself, opposed to a team. This more individualistic approach to sensemaking is 
typically grounded in the social cognition literature and uses frameworks such as 
schemata, mental maps and interpretive schemes on which individuals make sense of 
situations (Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Kaplan, 2008; Bingham & Kahl, 2013). This approach 
places an emphasis on how individuals interpret and respond to sensemaking. Table 2.2 
summarises key sensemaking studies where the unit of analysis is the individual actor. 
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Unit of 
analysis 
Link to theory Literature 
Methods/data 
capture 
Individual 
actor 
Attributional 
sensemaking 
    
Weiner 
1974,1985 
Conceptual 
    
Wong and 
Weiner 1981 
Questionnaire and 
casual dimension 
analysis 
    
  
Self regulating 
behavior 
Bandura 1991 
  
Individual 
actor 
Conceptual 
    
Individual 
actor 
Identity construction 
Brown Stacey 
& 
Nandhakumar 
2008 
Conceptual 
Individual 
actor 
Impression 
management 
    
Schlenker 
1980 
Conceptual 
Tedeschi 1981   
Individual 
actor 
Attributional egotism 
Bettman & 
Weitz 1983 
Review of annual 
reports narrowed 
to shareholder 
letters 
Individual 
actor 
Enactment, 
commitment and 
capacity 
Salancik 1977 
Sampling and 
correlation 
analysis 
(Quantitative) 
Individual 
actor 
Psychological 
approaches 
Shepherd & 
Cardon 2009 
Conceptual 
   
Shepherd 
2007 
Conceptual 
   
Mitchell, 
Mitchell & 
Smith 2008 
Focused 
interviews to 
selected 
population 
       Table 2.2: Sensemaking studies from an individual perspective 
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The contrast to this approach is the social constructionist approach which is involved in 
discursive analyses of organisations, and is considered above under organisational 
sensemaking. Cunliffe & Coupland (2012) argue that sensemaking starts with individuals 
making sense of themselves first through felt bodily experiences and a sensing of their 
surroundings, emphasizing sense through the totality of experience, on top of the more 
traditional line that locates sensemaking in the mind or language. 
There is room to use both areas when considering entrepreneurial ventures. 
Sensemaking effectively takes place in a person’s head and actors influence each other 
based on their personal understanding; or conversely there is collective sensemaking 
which comes to a temporary halt when enough members engage in a discourse that 
allows them to act together. Both approaches may have relevance within an 
entrepreneurial context. Board members of entrepreneurial ventures must deal with 
equivocal, often confusing, information that often has less historical context than in larger 
corporate environments where boards tend to deal more with corporate governance 
issues. In an entrepreneurial venture environment, decisions are required to be made 
from this chaotic environment and order needs to be restored, such as during periods of 
adverse deviations from the business plan, as acknowledged by at least one investor 
director. These periods of divergence away from an agreed course of action to a tipping 
point resulting in convergence towards an agreed course of action, or alternatively failing 
to reach a consensus, are periods where sensemaking dynamics are likely to be an 
engaged process and would accord with the description of sensemaking as follows: 
“Sensemaking allows people to deal with uncertainty and ambiguity by creating rational 
accounts of the world that enable action. Sensemaking thus both precedes decision-
making and follows it providing the clear questions and clear answer that feed decision-
making and decision-making often stimulates the surprises and confusion that create 
occasions for sensemaking” (Weick, 1993 636). 
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In entrepreneurial ventures, there are likely to be many unexpected events although 
these episodes do not necessarily trigger sensemaking. The key to the trigger is whether 
the experience is of sufficient magnitude and importance to cause individuals and groups 
to commence the “search for meaning”. There is often subjectivity in this judgement call 
and the importance is driven by several factors, namely impact on individual, social and 
organisational identity (Corley & Gioia, 2004), personal and strategic goals (Balogun & 
Johnson, 2004) and group norms (Vaughan, 1996; Dunbar & Garud, 2009). 
So sensemaking can be triggered at varying points in an unfolding episode in an 
entrepreneurial venture, and the actors pick up often disparate cues, some of which are 
discarded and replaced by further cues, often generated through their own actions and 
inactions, prompting the search for meaning. Ravasi & Turati (2005) have studied a group 
of entrepreneurs and found that sensemaking directly plays a vital role in the learning 
process that underpins innovation in technology ventures. If the entrepreneurs had prior 
knowledge, they were better able to make sense of the problems and challenges, which 
suggests that sensemaking is critical in entrepreneurial environments where there is high 
ambiguity. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH SETTING, METHOD, CASE SELECTION, DATA SOURCES 
AND ANALYSIS 
 
3.1 Research setting 
In this Chapter, I outline the rationale for choosing the biotechnology industry as the 
empirical setting for my research. I require a model industry in which I can observe 
sensemaking in entrepreneurial ventures and as stated in Chapter 1, my research 
objectives and main motivation lie around how entrepreneurial ventures can effectively 
respond to partial failure, in the form of adverse deviations from the business plan. The 
model industry needs to satisfy the requirement of being an entrepreneurial venture; as 
well as a suitable environment to observe sensemaking from a trigger or cue of partial 
failure evidenced by an adverse deviation from the business plan. I initially consider 
whether the biotechnology industry contains entrepreneurial ventures.  
3.1.1 Entrepreneurial ventures 
Biotechnology products need to be innovative to have the potential to take globally 
leading positions required by a purchaser of the product – the larger pharmaceutical 
industry. Risk needs to be taken and this environment inherently attracts entrepreneurs, 
often frustrated in the larger pharmaceutical industry which is risk averse. The 
biotechnology industry has gone through much change over the last few decades. Much 
of this change has been driven by the challenges faced by the larger pharmaceutical 
companies, which have become hungry for new biotechnology products to boost flagging 
product pipelines. This can be demonstrated by examining 2004, which was a difficult 
year for the pharmaceutical industry. There were heavier demands for fuller disclosure 
of clinical trial data by the FDA, accusations of collusions between regulatory agencies 
and companies compromising drug safety and recalls for major products, namely Vioxx 
and Celebrex: “These challenges are further compounded in large pharmaceutical 
companies by weakening product pipelines, escalating costs and generic competition 
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eating away at price on products that have come off patent” (PricewaterhouseCoopers 
2004). Despite these problems, there are huge unmet medical problems, increasing age 
demographic and emerging geographical markets (particularly China and India) which all 
lead to an increased and sustainable need for new proprietary product. This is clearly 
demonstrated by the extent to which US pharmaceuticals come off patent from 2004 – 
2011 on the top ten selling drugs in 2004, shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
    Figure 3.1:  The top ten pharmaceuticals (by sales) coming off patent between 2004 and 2011 
 
Gassmann & Reepmeyer (2005) suggest innovation is a key success factor in the 
pharmaceutical industry (of which the biotechnology industry is a subclass), which aligns 
with the need for entrepreneurship. They state that: “Few other industries are as driven 
by science, research and development as much as the pharmaceutical industry, however 
we are still a long way from solid guidelines for the manageability of pharmaceutical 
innovation” (233). This is evidenced by the fact that in 2003, the major US and European 
pharmaceutical companies invested more than US$33 billion in research and 
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development, at a higher R & D to sales ratio than virtually any other industry including 
electronics, aerospace and computers (PhRMA 2004). This aligns the key success factor 
(innovation) to one of the required attributes of an entrepreneur (the ability to identify and 
exploit opportunities). Hence it is reasonable to conclude entrepreneurial ventures would 
be commonplace in the biotechnology industry. I next consider whether such a model 
may be suitable to observe sensemaking episodes. 
3.1.2 Biotechnology ventures and sensemaking 
Movements in the share price in the biotechnology industry suggest that it is highly 
volatile and hence a setting where adverse deviations from plans are more likely. Figure 
3.2 following shows the volatility of share price from the major European biotechnology 
companies during 2008. Share price volatility occurs due to the uncertainty of the 
business plan which often is out of date within weeks of being written. I have invested 
more than three decades in the biotechnology industry, resulting in the acquisition of in-
depth knowledge and access to data, which is beneficial in both planning and interpreting 
this study; and never been involved in a venture that has held to the business plan for 
more than three months. As such the business plan represents an idealized journey that 
can resemble a work of fiction; seldom does a business plan fully hold when put into 
practice. Deviations from the business plan signal that something has gone wrong, 
however, such deviations represent equivocal outcomes that are open to multiple 
interpretations and lend themselves to sensemaking (Maitlis, 2005). Hence it is 
reasonable to assume this model industry may be a sensible choice to observe 
sensemaking. 
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Figure 3.2: Volatility in share price in the biotechnology industry (Europe 2008) 
 
 
Source: Datastream Source: Datastream 
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3.1.3 Failure within the biotechnology industry 
The extant literature describes the extent of failures in the biotechnology industry. 
Biotechnology organisations are highly dependent upon the creation of new drugs 
(Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), “while a typical R and D process lasts up to thirteen years, 
only one out of ten thousand substances become a marketable product” (Gassmann & 
Reepmeyer, 2005 233). The percentage of new chemical entities that fail along the drug 
development pathway are the highest in the preclinical phase (60.2%), and this reduces 
as the drug candidate moves into the human clinical phase. Once a new drug candidate 
has been submitted to the appropriate regulatory authority, the attrition rate is noted to 
decrease to 10% (Buchanan, 2002). Cannon & Edmondson (2005) give examples of 
failure in the biotechnology industry. They conclude : 
90% of newly developed drugs fail in the experimental stage, and thus drug 
companies have plenty of opportunities to analyze failures. Firms that are 
creative in analyzing failure benefit in two ways. First analyzing a failed drug 
sometimes reveals that the drug may have a viable alternate use. For 
example, Pfizer’s Viagra was originally designed to be a treatment for 
angina, or Eli Lilly discovering a failed contraceptive drug could treat 
osteoporosis and a failed antidepressant could be an effective treatment for 
ADD (attention deficit disorder). Second, probing analysis can sometimes 
save a failed drug, a good example being Eli Lilly’s Alimta which failed in 
clinical trials, and after a thorough investigation of the reason for failure by 
investigating patient notes, it was discovered that the patients who suffered 
negative effects from Alimta had a deficiency in folic acid. By combining folic 
acid with Alimta, the treatment worked! (308). 
So partial or total failure is commonplace within the biotechnology industry, due to 
engagement in developing risky products, involving innovation and change. Shepherd 
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(2003) comments that a vast array of exploratory and inventive organisational activities, 
which includes drug development, involve high base rates of failure and they call for 
highly resilient entrepreneurs who must valiantly persevere for eventual success. 
The potential for failure is also heightened in the biotechnology industry because of the 
risk of being unable to sustain the cash burn requirements; effectively running out of cash 
and failing to raise the next round of finance. The Ernst & Young survival index (Table 
3.1) shows that in both the US and Europe in both 2011 and 2012, around one third of 
biotechnology companies held less than twelve months of cash reserves, and this was 
substantially more in Canada. 
 
Years of cash left            US      Europe        Canada 
  2012      2011 2012      2011   2012      2011 
      %              %        %            %      %           % 
>5 YEARS 22             24 36           27 16           13 
3-5 YEARS 8              8 6            10 5             7 
2-3 YEARS 15             11 11           10 8             9 
1-2 YEARS 21             20              16           20 18            22 
<1 YEAR 33             37              31           33 53            48 
 
Source: Ernst & Young beyond borders 2013 
                        Table 3.1:  Ernst & Young survival index 2011-2012 
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Figure 3.3:   The biotechnology venture life cycle 
The venture life cycle, as depicted by Figure 3.3, shows the diversity and change the 
venture must progress through as the venture progresses. The entrepreneur builds the 
business in the earlier days until value reflection points and enterprise value becomes 
firmly expected. Missing some time points of projected value inflection may be 
considered as “small failures” whereas missing significant value reflection points may be 
considered as moving more towards the catastrophic scenario. When significant value 
reflection points are missed in entrepreneurial ventures, if venture capital backed, often 
this triggers an adverse deviation which may form a trigger for the commencement of the 
sensemaking process. 
3.1.4 The role of venture capitalists in biotechnology  
I  place emphasis on funders, notably venture capitalists, as they form a significant 
element in the financing of biotechnology companies and their founders (entrepreneurial 
managers). A broader thesis considering further stakeholders would require substantive 
work and the primary aim of the research is to consider sensemaking within 
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entrepreneurial ventures, which often take investment in the form of venture capital, 
hence I now consider the venture capital investment in the biotechnology industry.  
Venture capitalists  
Because true venture capitalists who invest in early stage risky investments, 
distinguished from the leveraged buy-out investors who invest in later stage less riskier 
investments, expect failure as part of their business model, such failure is priced into the 
cost of the equity at entry and there is acknowledgement that failure is endemic: “Such a 
playing field is littered with the remains of failed companies” (Gorman & Sahlman,1989  
237). Although there appears to be dispute over the exact failure rate of venture capital 
funded ventures, several studies have reported that over 40% of venture capital 
investments either become living dead losers or mega-losers (Ruhnka, Feldman & Dean 
1992; Smart, 1999). 
Scholars have noted that venture capitalists recognise the valuable learning that may 
accrue from failure (Cardon & McGarth, 1999). It is recognised that the failure stems from 
both internal and external factors (Zacharakis, Meyer & Decastro 1999). There are 
several reasons for such failure (Ruhnka, Feldman & Dean 1992). Such reasons include 
consequential uncertainties and the limited resources typical in venture capital backed 
businesses which means unexpected snags can be extremely damaging, along with 
market problems, and the quality of the management may not be up to the demands of 
the marketplace (Ruhnka, Feldman  & Dean 1992). 
3.1.5 Differences in venture capital in the USA and UK 
There is an important contrast to the view taken in the USA and the UK.  Cope, Cave & 
Eccles (2004) report the following observations. American venture capitalists are more 
tolerant and pragmatic about failure and expect entrepreneurs to have two or three 
failures before they succeed, and they have a better understanding of the entrepreneurial 
process, making them more supportive and sympathetic of entrepreneurs and 
59 
 
entrepreneurial activity in general. In contrast, British venture capitalists work on the 
presumption of guilt that the management team are always deficient, and hence they 
rarely invest in the failed entrepreneur a second or subsequent time, and they tend to 
adhere to stereotypical cultural differences to failure. This is important as this research 
will use the European biotechnology sector and its entrepreneurs to gain further insight 
into sensemaking, and venture capitalists and their representatives on the board of 
directors (investor directors) are invariably an important influential stakeholder in these 
ventures. I believe it difficult to research this topic without consideration of the influence 
of this group of stakeholders on the entrepreneur. US venture capitalists are often 
interested in entrepreneurs who have a range of experiences, rather than merely 
investing in people who have a history of success. Venture capitalists may not 
necessarily fixate on the entrepreneurs’ past successes. Zacharakis & Meyer (1998) 
consider that the US venture capitalists’ decision to invest is not negatively affected to 
any significant degree by a previous experience of failure. Although this may be affected 
if the entrepreneur has experienced multiple failures with very little success then this 
seriously brings into question the entrepreneur’s ability. The context of the failure is also 
of importance, e.g. if the entrepreneur had achieved an exit in times of market decline, 
then although the investors may have recorded a book loss, this may be indeed an 
achievement of which both the entrepreneur and investor can celebrate. 
Cope, Cave & Eccles (2004) reported the views of a small number of venture capitalists 
towards venture failure. They concluded the following:  
There are other factors, other than failure that shape the investment 
decision and the quality of the concept or opportunity has a strong 
impact on the decision to impact, along with the ability of the 
entrepreneur to step out of the CEO position; when the business has 
reached a certain stage, and maybe step away from management 
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absolutely. An important aspect of venture capital investment is the 
previous start-up experience, whether good or bad, and failure combined 
with success is most favourable, if the entrepreneur has not continually 
experienced failure. The nature of the failure itself and the perceived 
level of personal culpability of the entrepreneur affects the investment 
decision along with a recognition that failure has an element of both luck 
and timing. 
There are opposing views to the conclusions drawn above. Rea (1989) argues that 
entrepreneurs or management teams perceived as potentially marginal are considered 
as a recipe for failure even in strong market conditions, and the quality of the 
entrepreneurial managers is of paramount importance in the venture capitalists’ decision 
to invest (Goslin & Barge, 1986; Roberts, 1991; Sapienza, 1992; Shepherd, Douglas  & 
Shanley 2000). Zecharakis & Meyer (1998) take a middle position and argue that when 
venture capitalists are uncertain about a certain market, then the entrepreneur becomes 
a more critical factor in the due diligence. 
3.1.6 Overall use of the biotechnology industry model 
The debate in this Chapter leads to the conclusion that the use of the biotechnology 
industry should be a good model to show that adverse deviations from plans are likely 
and these outcomes are likely to be equivocal leading to the promotion of sensemaking. 
The presence of investor directors on the board, representing the investor; and the 
entrepreneurial managers, representing the founders and staff makes this an ideal 
setting to study the social aspects of sensemaking. 
3.2 Research context  
Board decisions are critical to the success and failure of a company. A longitudinal study 
observing the interactions of board members over thirteen years of three venture capital 
backed biotechnology businesses appeared appropriate for the following purpose of 
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meeting the specific aims of this research as follows:  To understand the individual 
phases of the sensemaking process; to assess the effect of faultline activation and 
strength on the promotion of sensemaking and to observe outcomes in the form of 
decisions made or decisions delayed, through the role of the Chair.  I sought to gain a 
rich understanding of the board directors’ strategic decisions, and interactions between 
board members which affects board decision outcomes and processes as well as the 
sensemaking process involved in decision-making. To balance the need for depth and 
some breadth, I chose three cases. The close similarity of the three companies allow for 
the meaningful comparison of processes; they are all from the same industry, founded 
during the same year, and all raised multiple rounds of venture capital funding to build 
their businesses in medical markets. The board members represented several 
stakeholders, in particular entrepreneurial managers and investor directors, providing the 
environment to observe responses and interactions of individual board members, and 
director subgroups when presented with adverse deviations from warranted business 
plans.  
In each case, I identified two episodes of sensemaking following an identified adverse 
deviation. The episodes start with a business-critical issue which requires a change in 
strategic direction and a new set of objectives. Such deviations are part of the journey of 
an entrepreneurial venture and are often in response to downside surprises, such as an 
unexpected drop in sales, which the investors have the right to investigate with a view to 
making changes to the company. These deviations are deemed of such severity that they 
may, if left unchallenged, result in failure. In each such episode, after the cue of the 
adverse deviation (the sensemaking trigger), I observe sensemaking as a process 
shaped by context, language and behaviour as well as power and politics. Hence six 
episodes were selected when the companies deviated substantially from plan, two 
episodes reaching a consensual board decision, two episodes reaching a forced board 
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decision in which some board members disagreed or agreed reluctantly to support the 
board decision, and two episodes where consensus was never attained.  Although there  
were many minor deviations, these periods represent adverse deviations, which if not  
addressed, had the potential to become catastrophic failures. 
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         Table 3.2:  A description and duration of the six sensemaking episodes 
Several stakeholder groups (entrepreneurial managers, investor directors and investors, 
and independent director groups) make the environment suitable for sensemaking and 
sensegiving behaviours, especially where the groups can attempt to gain influence in 
numbers (Allmendinger & Hackman, 1996). The board members were observed 
throughout the lives of the companies and interviewed during periods of adverse 
Company 
sensemaking 
episode 
number  
Episode 
length 
Sensemaking 
trigger (Adverse 
deviation) 
Sensemaking 
episode 
(Description of 
the journey) 
Final board 
decision 
Medco (1) 21 months 
Missing a key 
revenue target 
which was called 
for by the 
warranted 
business plan 
Time between 
rejected 
acquisition, 
through a period of 
missed sales 
targets to change 
of board 
Forced 
decision 
Medco (2) 48 months 
Missing further 
key revenue 
targets called for 
by the warranted 
business plan 
Lack of sales 
leading to 
administration 
No decision /  
Indecision 
Pharmadev (1) 9 months 
Did not meet its 
breakeven point 
at the agreed 
time 
No commercial 
traction, leading to 
new team and 
strategy 
Consensual 
decision 
Pharmadev (2) 36 months 
Insufficient 
growth 
demonstrated by 
a missed revenue 
target. The 
company put up 
for sale 
Scientists 
excluded from 
commercial 
negotiations and 
eventually possible 
sale collapsed 
No decision /  
Indecision 
Drugtech (1) 2 months 
Toxicology result 
not expected 
Change of 
administration of 
drug from systemic 
to a topical route 
Consensual 
decision 
Drugtech (2) 36 months 
Unexpected 
board meeting 
pronouncement 
by investor 
directors 
Cessation of 
clinical trial leading 
to sales process 
Forced 
decision 
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deviations agreed by at least one subgroup of directors or one investor director. 
Subsequently board decisions were made as a unified course of action, a forced course 
of action, or not made, ending in terminal failure. These periods of divergence away from 
an agreed course of action to a tipping point resulting in convergence towards an agreed 
course of action, or alternatively failing to reach a consensus, are periods where 
sensemaking is likely to be considered as an engaged process. The studies of processes 
such as sensemaking and sensegiving involve observing and interpreting individuals and 
groups of actors’ constructions and accounts. This calls for a qualitative method (Isabella, 
1990; Gioia & Thomas, 1996) with the potential to compare situations across similar case 
studies of comparable organisations. This study meets these criteria where both 
retrospective and real time sensemaking dynamics are observed.  
3.3 Method 
3.3.1 Case study design 
I include an outline of each of the case studies later in this Chapter. I take my lead in 
choosing a multiple case design from the text – Case Study Research Design and 
Methods (4th edition, Robert K Yin – Sage, 2009).  “The rationale for multi-case designs 
derives directly from an understanding of literal and theoretical replications. The simplest 
multi-case design would be the selection of two or more cases that are believed to be 
literal replications, such as a set of cases with exemplary outcomes in relation to research 
questions asking how and why. Selecting such cases require prior knowledge of the 
outcomes, with the multiple case inquiry focussing on how and why the exemplary 
outcomes might have occurred and hoping for literal replications of these conditions from 
case to case” (59). I use inductive analysis because of my aim to “systematically generate 
theory grounded in specific instances of empirical observation” (112). This contrasts to 
the mainstream methodology stemming from Popper’s (1968) critical realism theory 
where “inductive verification of theory is disrupted” (112). I concur with the argument 
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presented by Johnson & Duberley (2003) to combat Popper’s critique in that the 
deductive testing of theoretical prediction requires that the researcher possesses a priori 
both the conceptualization and operationalization of the behaviour of actors. To do this, 
researchers need empirical evidence. I believe after considering other methodologies, 
that this method is the most useful to answer the research questions posed earlier. 
Having spent thirty years in this industry, I had already identified that decision-making 
takes longer when there is dissention between board subgroups. This may seem 
obvious, but what is not obvious are whether there are discrete phases that the board 
progresses through to reach paralysis of decision-making or indecision.  
As well as employing a multiple-case design, I seek multiple sources of evidence (see 
Table 3.3) as this allows for the addressing of a broader range of historical and 
behavioural issues (115-116). The most important advantage presented by using multiple 
sources of evidence is the development of “converging lines of inquiry in a process of 
triangulation and corroboration” (116). By seeking multiple sources of evidence from 
multiple sources, the following applies: “Any findings or conclusions from case studies 
are likely to be more convincing and accurate if based on several different sources of 
information following a corroboratory mode” (116). 
Patton (2002) discusses the benefits of both data and investigator triangulation. Data 
triangulation encourages the collection of information from multiple sources aimed at 
corroborating the same fact or phenomenon and overcomes the potential problem of 
construct validity because the multiple sources of evidence essentially provide multiple 
measures of the same phenomenon (116-117), which applies in this study. A case study 
investigator needs to know how to carry out the full variety of data collection techniques 
(e.g. archival, semi-structured interviews, case study design etc.) and in this case as I 
have been the only investigator, there is no variance in technique. I also take a 
longitudinal approach to inform how certain conditions change over time. 
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3.3.2 Reflexive methodology 
I am not isolated from the research design and methodology, in that over three decades 
I have observed and been curious around questions concerning board composition and 
board dynamics, which has assisted the design of the research study in this thesis. I have 
made these observations from a privileged position of board membership, sometimes as 
CFO, CEO, Chair and non-executive director, representing both an industrial expert and 
the investor. These positions have enabled the observation of both behaviour and 
language in varying board scenarios, where failure has commenced through the 
triggering of an adverse deviation from the written and adopted business plan. I would 
argue that this element of autoethnography is beneficial to conducting this research, 
through the access to rich data from semi-structured interviews from board directors, 
which would not be available to the general public through archival material alone. I have 
understood the culture of the environment in which the research is conducted and bring 
all of this understanding and experience to bear in designing and conducting this 
research. I am aware of potential bias, and have ensured that interviews and archival 
data are taken from differing subgroups of board directors; the entrepreneurial managers, 
the investor directors, the Chairs and on occasion, the investors themselves. I concur 
with the view presented by Ellis, Adams & Bocher (2011): 
Autoethnographers recognise the innumerable ways personal 
experience influences the research process. For instance, a researcher 
decides who, what, when, where and how research decisions 
necessarily tie to institutional requirements, resources and personal 
circumstance. A researcher may also change names and places for 
protection (Fine, 1993), compress years of research into a single text 
and construct a study in a pre-determined way. Autoethnography is one 
of the approaches that acknowledges and accommodates subjectivity, 
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emotionality, and the researcher’s influence on research, rather than 
hiding from these matters or assuming they don’t exist 
In adopting such a reflexive approach to the methodology in this thesis, I trade access to 
influential board members and their views with their requirement for confidentiality and 
anonymity whilst ensuring any patterns and themes are exhibited across all the case 
studies. I obtain rich data and often inaccessible data to unconnected researchers, with 
which to draw conclusions that are useful in informing the extant literature and assisting 
practitioners in managing the board process. These data sources are included in Table 
3.3, along with the companies from where the data are extracted from director language 
and behaviour, during and outside of board meetings. 
I add further detail of my methodology by including the adopted semi-structured interview 
protocol and a sample interview transcript within Appendix 2. The interviewee who gave 
the sample interview has sanctioned the use of the semi-structured interview for this 
purpose. The use of semi-structured interviews allows for deviation from the protocol 
where the interviewee desires to elaborate on issues which they consider worthy of 
further comment. This enables the capture of rich data, which provides for more informed 
discussion and conclusions.   
3.4     Case selection 
I purposefully chose biotechnology case studies in which adverse deviations had been 
identified, with both entrepreneurial managers and investor directors as board members. 
I noticed that some of the sensemaking episodes ended more swiftly than others with 
more consensual decision-making, whilst other sensemaking episodes were more 
protracted and resulted in indecision or a forced decision (see Glossary for definitions). 
The following narrative gives a summary of the chosen case studies. 
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3.4.1    Drugtech 
Drugtech was established in 2000 to develop pharmaceutical medicines for the CNS 
(Central Nervous System) market to meet unmet medical needs. The Company 
commenced with two founding scientists. The board, which included entrepreneurial 
managers and investor directors from its first seed capital funding, and management 
team were assembled as the company matured from a drug discovery company into a 
development company conducting clinical trials. Drugtech operated through a virtual 
business model and employed between one to twelve staff depending whether it was 
conducting human clinical trials. Drugtech had received four rounds of private funding in 
the form of seed, angel, venture and institutional investment. They conducted six clinical 
trials in total and eventually sold their patents and clinical data in 2015. The CEO, CSO, 
non-executive director, business development director and Chair were all interviewed 
during 2009 and the Chair interviewed again during 2010. All interview transcripts were 
shown to interviewees to agree the accuracy of the transcriptions and all were 
interviewed by the author of the thesis. Names of both the individuals and the Company 
have been changed to maintain anonymity. 
3.4.2     Medco 
Medco was established by two professors from a leading UK University with the goal of 
providing cost-effective treatments within their therapeutic areas. Medco raised 
investment of over £5 million in venture finance, enabling the company to establish 
operations, to trial and launch their first product in the UK and acquire a pipeline of 
innovative and high potential products. Evidence supporting its market potential included 
positive responses from clinicians and patients as well as the supply of the first product 
to clinicians in multiple therapeutic areas.  
Five years after its inception, Medco’s management team completed the acquisition of 
an international biopharmaceutical company. Through the transaction, Medco acquired 
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the assets of the target company including the rights to commercialise its product and 
intellectual property portfolio. The integration of these therapies provided Medco with a 
strengthened capability to take a distinct, multi-stream approach to this therapeutic area.  
The entrepreneurial managers wanted to pursue further acquisitions, but could not gain 
board support. To exploit the new and existing IP, Medco was set for an IPO but due to 
the downturn in the global financial markets was unable to raise further finance and went 
into administration. The assets have subsequently been taken over and the facility 
remains intact. The CEO, Chair, two investor directors and the COO were all interviewed 
during 2013. All interview transcripts were shown to interviewees to agree the accuracy 
of the transcriptions and all were interviewed by the author of the thesis. Names of both 
the individual and the Company have been changed to maintain anonymity.  
3.4.3     Pharmadev 
Pharmadev was formed to commercialise multiple new drug candidates identified in a 
UK university which had the potential to dramatically impact a specific therapeutic area. 
Early funding was used to demonstrate the likely efficacy of the technology and a further 
investment was used to develop the pipeline and to continue to protect the assets.  
Pharmadev always intended to raise further monies for the later more expensive clinical 
trials, their preference being to sell the Company to one buyer, maximising value and 
dovetailing resource with the acquirer. Pharmadev was eventually put up for sale, 
however a transaction did not materialise. The University which founded the Company 
acquired the total shareholding of Pharmadev, to ensure legacy shareholders were fully 
satisfied. The CEO, ex-Chair and CSO were all interviewed during 2012 and the investor 
director during 2013. All interview transcripts were shown to interviewees to agree the 
accuracy of the transcriptions and all were interviewed by the author of the thesis. Names 
of both the individual and the Company have been changed to maintain anonymity. 
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3.4.4      Choice of sensemaking episodes 
All sensemaking episodes commence with an adverse deviation from plan triggered by 
a specific event (Table 3.2). All deviations are substantial and have the potential to cause 
partial or total failure to the Company. At the stage of the trigger, it is not known how the 
actors will play out the episode and observing the episodes may inform new sensemaking 
processes or confirm existing processes. 
Drugtech 
The first sensemaking episode concluded in a change of strategy of drug administration 
from systemic to topical administration triggered by an unexpected toxicological result 
suggesting that there was too great a personal risk to the entrepreneurial managers in 
moving from animal testing to administering the drug candidate via systemic injection into 
humans for the first time. This led to a swift consensual decision (two months from the 
sensemaking trigger to the end of the episode). The second sensemaking episode 
commenced several years later when the board was divided on whether to proceed with 
further drug development. The sensemaking trigger was an unexpected board meeting 
pronouncement by investor directors to stop all drug development. This decision 
eventually led to the suspension of operations and the Company being put up for sale.   
Medco 
The first sensemaking episode was triggered by the Company missing a revenue target 
at an appointed time point which was a critical milestone for the investors. Some actors 
believed that the business should be built through sensible acquisitions which would 
enhance the revenue and potentially make up the deficit, whilst others wanting to forge 
an exit. Although this first sensemaking episode was protracted (twenty-one months in 
duration), it eventually ended with the forced decision that no further acquisitions (after 
the initial acquisition) were necessary, as growth should be attainable from the existing 
operational base. The second sensemaking episode was triggered by a further missed 
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revenue target. This sales decline continued for four years, until the Company eventually 
went into administration.  Multiple enduring interpretations of the reason for the adverse 
deviation in sales ensued, resulting in a protracted period of indecision.  
Pharmadev 
The first sensemaking episode was triggered by the Company not meeting its breakeven 
point at an agreed timepoint in the business plan. From this point the Company was not 
sustainable with its remaining cash reserves and was forced after a period of nine months 
to return to shareholders with a request to recapitalise the company. This aim was 
achieved but not without removing the Chair and the CEO. The second sensemaking 
episode occurred over thirty-six months of duration where there was a belief that 
Pharmadev would be acquired but the purchaser pulled out of the sale leaving 
Pharmadev with legacy creditors that were cleaned up by the original shareholders. The 
trigger for sensemaking in this episode was the point at which the Company missed a 
revenue target at an agreed time, and the Company was put up for sale. During these 
thirty-six months, the scientists were excluded from board discussions and the board was 
unable to reach a decision on how to proceed following the failure of the sale. Pharmadev 
was eventually forced into administration. 
3.5 Data sources 
The research is based on observations over thirteen years of three biotechnology 
companies in the UK.  Names and product have been changed to maintain anonymity. 
The core data was collected from field work over five years from 2009 – 2013. In this 
period, I conducted fifty-eight semi-structured interviews, including six focus groups from 
half an hour to two hours in duration. Around these interviews, I collected documentation 
for each longitudinal case study comprising day books, where I supplemented the 
interviews with observational notes, minutes of board meetings, marketing literature, 
power point documents, clinical trial protocols, emails and meeting minutes. All interviews 
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were recorded and transcribed, and information from field notes, transcripts, archival 
material and other supporting documentation was used to construct the episode timeline 
and in particular, the varying interpretations by the actors of the same episodes. In total, 
six sensemaking episodes were selected where the companies adversely deviated 
substantially from the warranted business plan. They were substantial in that if not dealt 
with, had the potential to cause partial or total failure. The decisions that followed each 
sensemaking episode were varied; two episodes were followed by consensual board 
decisions, two episodes were followed by forced board decisions whereby some board 
members disagreed but agreed reluctantly to support the board decision, and two were 
followed by protracted indecision, resulting in board paralysis and eventual company 
failure. These decisions are presented in Table 3.2, presented earlier along with the 
source of data from all case studies presented in Table 3.3. 
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Data sources 
          14 semi-structured interviews 
          4 external marketing documents 
Medco 
Interviews 
4 2 2 6 
>15 informal non-transcribed 
interviews 
          Ad hoc reports 
          Technical product bulletins 
          PowerPoint presentations 
          3 clinical trial protocols 
            
          9 semi-structured interviews 
          4 external marketing documents 
Pharmadev 
Interviews 
1 1 4 3 
>15 informal non-transcribed 
interviews 
          Ad hoc reports 
          Technical product bulletins 
          PowerPoint presentations 
          4 clinical trial protocols 
            
          13 semi-structured interviews 
          
2 emails between investors and 
management team 
Drugtech 
Interviews 
1 2 2 8 
10 years of management 
accounts 
          10 years of daily dairies 
          10 years of statutory accounts 
          Ad hoc reports 
          
>50 informal non-transcribed 
interviews 
          
10 external marketing 
documents 
          Technical product bulletins 
          Board meeting minutes 
          5 clinical trial protocols 
            
            
Others   16 semi-structured interviews   
            
            
Scoping 
Interviews 
  6 scoping 
interviews 
   
            
Table 3.3: Data sources 
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3.6 Analysis 
In performing the analysis, I consulted the Sage Dictionary of Qualitative Management 
Research (Editors: Thorpe & Holt, 2008). After reading the varying analyses, I chose an 
analysis that fits the purpose of answering my research questions posed earlier and the 
following extracts serve to support this decision.   
I initially considered “sensitizing concepts which give the user a general sense of 
reference in which to look” (112). I carried out six scoping interviews (Table 3.3) to 
consider whether sensemaking episodes may follow adverse deviations (as defined in 
the Glossary) which was deducted from the literature: 
A process prompted by violated expectations, that involves attending to 
bracketing cues in the environment, creating intersubjective meaning 
through cycles of interpretation and action and thereby enacting a more 
ordered environment from which further cues can be drawn (Maitlis & 
Christianson, 2014 11). 
The violated expectation appears to be the adverse deviation and after adverse 
deviations, there is a need for the board directors to make sense of the situation. Although 
the environment may be more ordered, that does not necessarily mean a positive 
outcome, which I saw in some cases and not in others. These sensitizing concepts gave 
me the confidence that I may be able to use adverse deviations from business plans to 
look for sensemaking process patterns after the occurrence. The aim of this is to identify 
variances in the phenomenon of interest.  
In my study, I then identified key actors who around the board table made contributions` 
and were from the subgroups identified from the faultline literature (introduced in Chapter 
5) of entrepreneurial manager, investor director and Chair. I subsequently identified 
adverse deviations and the following sensemaking episodes after the deviation (see 
Table 3.2). 
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I created a provisional list of case features, common to each identified category, whose 
differences between categories might be used to explain variation. I include the data 
coding and methods within each of the empirical Chapters as each Chapter is aimed at 
distinct segments of this research.  
The last stage is to go around an inductive-deductive loop between data collection, 
analysis and the literature to ensure no additional data are being found to amend 
relationships or temporal differences in process models (Glaser & Strauss 1967). I 
unwrap each of the case studies as I move through the empirical Chapters, as follows: 
Chapter 4 (Process), where I elaborate the process itself, and the temporality of the 
phases introducing new components, as well as positioning established components 
mentioned in the extant literature. 
Chapter 5 (Antecedents), where I introduce the individual actors, their capital and 
dispositions and explain how the individuals align into groups to sensemake and how 
faultline activation and strength promotes types of sensemaking.  
Chapter 6 (Outcomes), where I consider the outcomes as the strategic decision-making 
process of the board, and hence introduce the decisions or indecision, with an evaluation 
of the impact of sensemaking on such decision-making, with consideration of the role of 
the mediation skills of the Chair and the ability to control powerful actors. 
Chapter 7 (Consolidation of findings), where I pull the findings together, and consider the 
scholarly and practitioner implications. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE PROCESS OF SENSEMAKING IN ENTREPRENEURIAL 
VENTURES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter, I examine how the negotiated process of social interaction shapes 
sensemaking among actors. My interest in investigating phases of sensemaking makes 
process research appropriate for this study because such an approach incorporates 
temporal progressions of activities as elements of explanation and understanding 
(Langley et al., 2013 1). In addition to advancing scholarly knowledge on the nature of 
sensemaking in entrepreneurial venture boards, a better understanding of board 
sensemaking processes should be valuable to the practitioner community. 
Entrepreneurship is characterized by equivocality (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). The 
business plan at the launch of an entrepreneurial venture represents an idealized journey 
that can be likened to a work of fiction. Seldom is the venture able to implement its original 
business plan with adverse (or positive) deviations from the business plan being 
commonplace, leading to this uncertainty. However, such adverse deviations are 
equivocal outcomes that are open to multiple interpretations and that lend themselves to 
sensemaking (Maitlis, 2005).  
The focus of this Chapter is to understand the phases of the sensemaking process by 
observing board meetings in entrepreneurial ventures, and the temporal nature of these 
phases. Because better than expected performance rarely concerns stakeholders, 
positive deviations are less likely to generate a need for sensemaking. In contrast, board 
members need to make sense of any negative deviations to re-orientate the business to 
accepted goals. When the deviations are adverse, the directors comprising the board 
have a duty to seek out and agree a path to reverse the adversity and guide the company 
back on track.  
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Venture capital backed entrepreneurial ventures are often comprised of two subgroups 
of directors: Investor directors and entrepreneurial managers (Lim et al., 2013). The 
debates between differing subgroups with differing opinions can result in multiple 
interpretations of the same event and can subsequently lead to equivocal outcomes. I 
examine these subgroups in further detail in Chapter 5. As such, venture capital backed 
entrepreneurial ventures represent an ideal research setting in which to consider how 
social interaction between actors shapes the sensemaking process in entrepreneurial 
venture boards. In considering the issue, I explore how different phases emerge 
throughout the sensemaking process and consider the influence of powerful actors in 
shaping the views of directors, whilst sensegiving.    
I structure the Chapter as follows: Firstly, I consider the theoretical background, along 
with a critique of sensemaking theory; secondly, I present the methodology and thirdly, I 
present the findings, by initially presenting new process models of sensemaking prior to 
presenting illustrative evidence of the components of each phase. Finally, I discuss the 
findings and connect the findings back to the theory of sensemaking presented below. 
4.2 Theoretical background 
In Chapter 1, I defined sensemaking as: “A process prompted by violated expectations, 
that involves attending to bracketing cues in the environment creating intersubjective 
meaning through cycles of interpretation and action and thereby enacting a more ordered 
environment from which further cues can be drawn” (Maitlis & Christianson, 2014 11). 
Such a definition can be traced back to the seminal work of Weick (1995), as described 
in Chapter 2. To date sensemaking studies tend to examine the move from a somewhat 
chaotic environment towards a more ordered one. However, there may be contexts such 
as during entrepreneurial venture board meetings when directors may inadvertently 
make decisions that move the environment towards a less ordered set of activities. This 
may form an alternate position to the traditional view of sensemaking, and one in which 
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sensemaking unfolds in a manner which progressively increases the likelihood of venture 
failure. Further empirical work would assist in enhancing understanding of the process of 
sensemaking since only a few researchers have critically engaged with the sensemaking 
process (Gioia & Mehra, 1996; Engwall & Westling, 2004; Costanzo & MacKay, 2009). 
Sandberg & Tsoukas (2015 15) explain the sensemaking process as involving the 
“creation of the account”, that is the initial sense of a disrupted activity; “the interpretation 
of the account”, that is a clearer assessment of the initial sense made; and “acting from 
the account to attempt to restore order”, i.e. the action taken on the interpretation made. 
At the same time, Sandberg & Tsoukas (2015 20) suggest a number of general critiques 
of sensemaking, including “the concept of sense is insufficiently developed, sensemaking 
overlooks the larger context in which it takes place, sensemaking reduces reality to 
subjective understanding” and “the notion of the sensemaking process remains relatively 
vague” as put forward by a number of scholars such as Gioia & Mehra (1996), Magala 
(1997), Decker (1998), O’Connell (1998), Mills & Weatherbee (2006), and Hong-Sang & 
Brower (2008), and I hope to offer greater clarity around the sensemaking process by 
elaborating the individual phases of certain sensemaking processes. 
In clarifying the sensemaking process, I also seek to address several issues raised by 
Sandberg & Tsoukas (2015) in their critique of the sensemaking literature. The widely-
held view that sensemaking is social, retrospective, grounded in identity, ongoing and 
enacted, with the aim of reaching plausible accounts has remained largely unchallenged. 
Sandberg & Tsoukas (2015) level several criticisms at the extant sensemaking literature 
due to their treatment of or lack of consideration given to several issues. I concentrate 
on those issues that are relevant in answering the research questions: How does 
sensemaking unfold in entrepreneurial ventures? And how do encapsulated and open 
sensemaking processes differ?, namely context, language, behaviour, politics and 
power; each of which I will now explain in turn. I include the issues below also within the 
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literature review, however in the following sections, I relate the relevant issues to the 
process of sensemaking and the research question considered in this Chapter. 
4.2.1 Context 
Firstly, the importance of better understanding the role of context in the sensemaking 
process is evident from Sandberg & Tsoukas’ (2015) review of one hundred and forty-
seven articles of which only 46% accounted explicitly for context. The authors suggest 
that very few studies have empirically investigated how the broader institutional contexts 
(historical, cultural, epistemic, industrial etc.) influence sensemaking efforts. 
Sensemaking never takes place in isolation, so context is important. In my study, the 
empirical context involves the board of directors of entrepreneurial ventures which 
include sensemaking episodes where actors may employ one of two types of 
sensemaking – encapsulated or open sensemaking – each involving differing 
sensemaking processes. These differing types of sensemaking are explained in Chapter 
1 of this thesis. In the context of my study, encapsulation can occur when there is a 
subgroup of directors (investor directors) who have a primary role of protecting their 
investment and another subgroup of directors (entrepreneurial managers) who are 
primarily concerned with growing the enterprise value of the business. In contrast to 
encapsulated sensemaking, open sensemaking occurs where subgroups of actors 
interact freely with other subgroups in their search for meaning (i.e. there is little or no 
evidence of encapsulation). The use of encapsulated or open sensemaking may 
influence decision-making in entrepreneurial ventures, (the latter is examined in Chapter 
6) especially as numerous equivocal outcomes may require consideration by the board 
of directors of such ventures. Here, however, I seek to understand, examine and contrast 
these sensemaking processes, by observing them over a period of between two and 
forty-eight months (Table 3.2). 
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4.2.2 Language 
Secondly, Sandberg & Tsoukas consider the issue of language, including the linguistic 
features of discourse, narrative, rhetoric, metaphors and storytelling (Morgan, 1980; 
1986; 1993; Brown, 2005; Cornelissen, Oswick & Christensen, 2008; Boudes & Laroche, 
2009; Abolafia, 2010; Heracleous & Jacobs, 2011; Cornelissen, 2012). Only 25% of the 
one hundred and forty-seven studies reviewed by Sandberg and Tsoukas considers the 
role of language in sensemaking. Language, along with behaviour, is important because 
both can influence actors’ attempts at organising confusing cues and to arrange them 
into more holistic and coherent interpretations of an episode requiring sensemaking. 
Language is also especially significant where there are subgroups of actors who use 
differing language (e.g. entrepreneurial managers versus investor directors) and/or 
actors who change their language due to their prior experience (e.g. investor directors 
who have prior entrepreneurial experience). The language of seasoned investor directors 
can be alien to the entrepreneurial managers, with terms such as ratchets, down rounds 
and preference shares, often used in describing investment structures. 
4.2.3    Politics and power 
Thirdly, there is the issue of politics and power. Actors at different levels in organisations 
often view the same episode differently due to varying levels of political knowledge and 
the level of pressure exerted by top management (Weick, 1995 53); e.g. Balogun & 
Johnson (2004) show how different departments in an organization attempt to control 
and direct sensemaking efforts through power. The existing literature on change shows 
that top managers try to control managers further down the chain of command (Maitlis & 
Sonenshein, 2010  571). Sandberg & Tsoukas (2015) report that only 4% of sensemaking 
articles from the major journals consider such political and power issues. Drori & Ellis 
(2011) depicted how conflict and power relations are ubiquitous to sensemaking and note 
that “multiple uses of sensegiving may well serve the interests of a management that 
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pursues an inertial strategic path bolstered by internal hegemony and interests, even at 
the expense of better business practices and strategies” (15). My empirical work 
examines such positions of inertia and supplements Drori & Ellis’ study, as I provide 
further context and empirical studies to inform the scenario where conflict and power 
cause inertia. Drori & Ellis call for further work to examine the power game initiatives 
used to erode structures of control by bypassing or ignoring managerial decisions. 
Interestingly, I observe how power game initiatives re-enforce structures of power and 
control through sensegiving initiatives that can destroy healthy board debate. This 
behaviour may be damaging, as there may be no turning back to an effective and efficient 
board structure, due to a permanent loss of trust. I believe that my empirical setting is 
conducive to studying these power games because, as stated by Drori & Ellis (2011 3 
quoting Crozier), power game initiatives are always contextual and contested where 
actors are faced with uncertainties within the power structure of the entity. These 
uncertainties differ between subgroups of actors; in that entrepreneurial managers tend 
to have more detailed knowledge of the business, whereas the investor directors possess 
more economic power producing more certainty in relation to these aspects of the 
sensemaking episodes. 
4.2.4 Limitations of sensemaking 
Finally, Sandberg & Tsoukas (2015) also suggest that a major limitation of extant 
theorizing of sensemaking is that it does not allow for prospective sensemaking. 
Sensemaking is deemed to be retrospective (Weick, 1995) whilst sensegiving is deemed 
to be prospective (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). Sandberg & Tsoukas (2015) point out two 
main problems: Firstly, “sensegiving is couched in terms of the conduit metaphor of 
communication whereby sense is something that is first made and then given to someone 
else” (Lakoff, 1995 116) and secondly that “sense is not an object to be passed on but a 
skilful activity to be engaged in. A sensemaker and sensegiver are intertwined and a 
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change agent who gives sense to employees has made sense out of sense given to him 
by other actors” (Sandberg & Tsoukas 2015 25). This suggests that maybe sensemaking 
and sensegiving are so interdependent that one cannot be understood without the other. 
I hope to shed further light on this important aspect of sensemaking to enable the 
investigation of more genuine forms of prospective sensemaking, such as strategic 
discussions about the future (Tsoukas & Shepherd, 2004; Stigliani & Ravasi, 2012) or 
the various forms of anticipation experienced by actors while carrying out ongoing 
organisational activities (Bolander & Sandberg, 2013). This view suggests that the 
retrospective approach to viewing sensemaking processes may be somewhat limiting to 
further advancing sensemaking theory. I therefore respond to Sandberg & Tsoukas’ 
(2015) call for exploring prospective sensemaking.  
4.2.5 Sensemaking as a socially negotiated process 
In my analysis of six sensemaking episodes, I seek to better understand sensemaking 
as a socially negotiated process and in so doing address the criticisms discussed above. 
The episodes (Table 3.2) start with a business-critical issue (an adverse deviation as 
described in Chapter 1) which require a change in strategic direction and a new set of 
objectives. Such deviations are part of the journey of the entrepreneurial team and are 
often in response to downside surprises, such as an unexpected drop in sales, which the 
investors have the right to investigate with a view to making changes to the company. 
These deviations are deemed of such severity that they may, if left unchallenged, result 
in venture failure. In each such episode, after the cue of the adverse deviation (termed 
the sensemaking trigger), I observe sensemaking as a process shaped by context, 
language as well as behaviours shaped by power. 
4.3     Methods 
Certain sensemaking components, already defined in the literature, are used in this 
Chapter. These specific components, such as sensegiving, sensebreaking and 
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sensehiding were discussed in the Introduction to the thesis and are also defined in the 
Glossary.   
To further investigate the components of sensemaking, my analysis is based on data 
from three companies, Drugtech, Pharmadev and Medco, each associated with two 
sensemaking episodes (either encapsulated or open sensemaking episodes). The first 
sensemaking episode observed in Medco commences with a period of open 
sensemaking but then moves into encapsulated sensemaking. I am therefore able to 
analyse four episodes of encapsulated sensemaking and three episodes of open 
sensemaking in total. The data sources are presented in Table 3.3. 
4.3.1    Data collection 
Disclosing the identity of both the case and the individuals is desirable to ensure data 
transparency, however, anonymity is necessary on some occasions, to preserve 
commercial confidentiality where interviews are only possible if anonymity is offered in 
exchange for often rich data. In this case, such assurances were given. Interviewees 
were contacted after the interview to ensure the accuracy of the transcripts of their 
interviews.  I present the backgrounds to the case studies in Chapter 3, to enable the 
reader to understand the context in reading the later illustrative quotes and narrative of 
the sensemaking episodes. 
4.3.2    Research participants 
The views and experiences of the board members of the three case companies were 
recorded over thirteen years. There were a different stakeholder groups: Entrepreneurial 
managers, investor directors representing investors, and Chairs which made the 
environment suitable for sensemaking behaviour, especially given that the subgroups 
could attempt to gain influence in numbers (Allmendinger & Hackman, 1996). The board 
members represented stakeholders, providing the environment to observe the responses 
of and interactions among individual board members and director groups when presented 
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with adverse deviations from warranted business plans. The board members were 
interviewed during periods of adverse deviations from a business plan that had been 
agreed by at least one subgroup. Some board members were also interviewed 
subsequently, either when regrouping to enable a board decision to be made as a unified 
course of action or when failing to make a board decision, often ending in terminal failure. 
4.3.3 Data analysis 
To study people, subject matter and their context in meaningful ways, Collins (2004) 
argues that researchers need to acquire interactional expertise, which he defines as “the 
ability to converse expertly about a practical skill or expertise but without being able to 
practise it, learned through linguistic socialisation among the practitioner” (125). I have 
worked in this field for thirty years prior to commencing this research and I was part of 
the culture and norms of the industry which provided an in depth understanding of the 
research. In their review of process models, Langley et al. (2013) suggest “research 
questions that focus on how processes themselves (citing sensemaking and decision-
making) emerge, develop, grow and decline are compatible with a process metaphysics 
in which the focus is on how processes (rather than things) unfold over time” (6). I have 
used both longitudinal interview data and archival data. These sources are deemed 
“necessary and suitable” respectively by Langley et al. (6) in process research:  
Longitudinal data (whether obtained with archival, historical or real-time 
field observations) are necessary to observe how processes unfold over 
time. Archival data are particularly suitable for tracing event 
chronologies, meanings and discourses over long or very long periods 
of time. 
The appropriate sample size for a process study is not the number of sensemaking 
episodes, but the number of temporal observations made within all the sensemaking 
episodes (Langley 2013 7). I have presented the evidence in the coding Tables 4.1 & 4.2 
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following, demonstrating that the new phases suggested later in the Chapter are 
evidenced multiple times. 
Researchers rely on more integrative forms of “temporal bracketing” or “decomposition” 
(Langley 1999) to identify comparative units of analysis with a stream of longitudinal data. 
These temporal brackets (which generally unfold sequentially over time) are constructed 
as progressions of events and activities separated by identifiable discontinuities in the 
temporal flow. This permits the replication of ideas stemming from the empirical data in 
successive time periods. The sub processes that are elaborated in this Chapter are 
formed by using such bracketing. The four sequential brackets for both encapsulated and 
open sensemaking are examined in the sequential order that they were observed from 
the empirical data.  
The data was analysed as outlined below using the methodology described by Strauss 
& Corbin (1990) and Miles & Huberman (1994). I created a list of first order codes from 
case history evidence and then employed an inductive-deductive loop process, moving 
from the concepts and constructs of the literature to assist in seeking an explanation of 
the observations from the empirical data. As I observed power game initiatives through 
conflict becoming more prevalent, more commonplace and potentially of greater 
significance in the empirical data, I introduced literature drawing on power (Drori & Ellis, 
2011), and further consider the influence of power in Chapter 6. 
The analysis involved three steps, covered below, in which I move from raw data to 
consolidated empirical themes, and then move from these themes to aggregate 
theoretical dimensions that explain the processes of encapsulated and open 
sensemaking (Pratt, Rockmann & Kaufmann, 2006).  
The first step involves grouping the empirical data into statements about issues that lead 
to the second step, the identification of a theoretical category. The theoretical categories 
then lead to an aggregate theoretical dimension that can be aligned with the literature as 
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the third step. This process involves moving backwards and forwards through the steps 
to achieve an appropriate coding structure that allows for interpretation of the empirical 
data through literature based theory. An example of this process is as follows: 
Statements around interviews and archival data around discrediting positions, 
disagreeing, and adding contradictory data as the first step lead to sensebreaking as a 
theoretical category. Sensebreaking, as the second step, along with other theoretical 
categories, sensefreezing, senseforcing and sensehiding lead to the third step, the build-
up of the phases of sensemaking, which is the aggregate theoretical dimension. 
Step one 
I built an initial list of themes and codes based on what I observed from the data, which I 
read multiple times to generate any further coding. As themes became clear, I compared 
them across the source documents and sought to refine the boundaries between each 
theme. The views of different stakeholders were integrated by using interviews, public 
documents, emails and other sources of relevance. The richness of the data allowed for 
triangulation between these various documents to allow for refinement, critique and 
further interviewing if it became evident that further clarification and explanation were 
needed to piece together the chain of events. 
Step two 
The second round of analysis involved axial coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), which is a 
practice of structuring data into aggregate dimensions (Corley & Gioia, 2004). During this 
stage of analysis, the emphasis tended more towards the theory, teasing out theoretical 
contributions contained in the empirical results. Tables 4.1 & 4.2 below detail the data 
coding and structure employed in moving from the first order codes to the aggregate 
theoretical dimensions. The sensemaking processes for encapsulated and open 
sensemaking were clearly distinct and therefore separate coding and analysis were 
needed for each process. 
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Table 4.1:   Encapsulated sensemaking data coding 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Evidence       
Medco 
(1)  
Medco 
(2) 
Pharmadev 
(2) 
Drug
tech 
(2) 
First Order Codes 
Theoretical 
Categories 
Aggregate 
Theoretical 
Dimensions 
Ab A Ab AB 
Discrediting positions                               
Disagreeing                                                     
Adding contradictory data 
  
Phases of 
sensemaking 
A A A AB Sensebreaking 
Ab A A A   
a 
a AB A Withholding information                                   
Refusing to debate on certain issues  
Sensefreezing 
a AB Ab 
        
Achieving aims without consensus         Using 
outside parties overtly to gain undue influence 
  
A Ab AB AB 
Senseforcing 
  a AB AB 
      
  
Giving misleading or false messages knowingly                                               
Using outside parties covertly to gain undue 
influence 
  
Ab Ab AB 
Sensehiding 
Ab Ab AB 
        Looking for options to move away from a more 
ordered environment and moving away from 
accepted goals and direction 
Losing goal 
congruence 
  
A Ab Ab AB   
        
Pulling away from open dialogue in the pursuit of 
accepted goals 
Disengaging 
  
A A A Ab   
A A A Ab 
Being in a one-sided dialogue with one position 
dominating at the expense of suppressing of 
others 
Forced to 
engage 
Board 
dynamics 
  
A Ab A A 
No opportunity of presenting a position due to 
other actors refusing to debate                                                 
Chair not effective at translating messages                                                
Extreme mistrust leading to inability to engage 
No choice of
engaging
  
  
  
        
Subgroups attempting to reach a plausible 
position across the board table 
Communication 
among both 
subgroups 
Flow of 
information 
a Ab Ab Ab 
        Statements leading to the paralysis of decision-
making overtly using power with both subgroups 
involved, but mainly dictatorial from the investor 
directors  
Communication 
predominantly 
from the investor 
director group 
ab ab Ab AB 
        Statements entirely from one subgroup (investor 
directors) demonstrating overtly the use of power                                                   
Forcing a position through power outside of the 
board room 
Communication 
totally from the
investor director 
group 
Ab ab Ab AB 
A ab AB AB 
 Hiding of facts or pertinent data knowingly and 
with an intent to manipulate 
Hidden  
communication 
kept apart from 
subgroups 
a a A A 
Behaviour or language that is conflicting and 
throws into question existing positions 
Disbelief            
Confusion 
Language & 
interpretive 
tasks 
A A A A 
Condensing down larger fluxes of information 
into smaller digestible portions 
Bracketing of 
valued elements 
A a A A 
The abandonment of tasks due to one subgroup 
refusing to partake in or dominating an activity or 
conversation 
Paralysis 
  A A A 
Comments from outside the board urging the 
board to look for consensus 
Evaluation of 
trust 
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                           Table 4.2:   Open sensemaking data coding 
Key to Tables 4.1 & 4.2: 
A = Evidence from 4+ interviews, a = Evidence from 2-3 interviews 
B =Evidence from 4 + archival sources, b = Evidence from 2-3 archival sources   
A AB Ab
Reaching a consensus as to a 
definition of the problem w ith 
other actors and subgroups, 
enabling common ground to 
commence the process.
Accommodating
A AB AB
Understanding the component 
parts of the solution w ith other 
actors and subgroups, enabling 
common ground to commence 
the process.
Comprehending
A AB AB
Statements that lead to an 
acceptable version of the 
solution overall
Positioning
A AB AB
Adopting new  objectives or 
accepting current objectives 
during a sensemaking episode
Accepting
A AB AB
Communication betw een all 
directors to comprehend
Understanding from 
cues
ab AB Ab
Communication w ith other actors 
to w rite an interpretation of a 
sensemaking episode
Interpretation through 
communication
A AB AB
Communication betw een actors 
informing an interpretation of a 
sensemaking episode
Erasing anomalies 
and contradiction
A AB Ab
 Arriving at a consensus through 
communication
Agreeing f inal 
narrative
A AB A
Statements indicating pleasant, 
friendly or supportive behaviour 
betw een subgroups
Pleasant / friendly / 
supportive behaviour
A AB A
Statements expressing the 
helpful behaviour or language 
across subgroups
Helpful
A AB A
Statements expressing the 
mutual respect across 
subgroups
Mutual respect
A AB A
Statements expressing the non-
combative nature of behaviour or 
language betw een subgroups
Non-combative
a A a Questioning of the situation Disbelief
A A A
Condensing dow n larger f luxes 
of information into smaller 
digestible portions
Bracketing
A A A
Socially constructing identity 
labels
Labelling
Drug
tech 
(1)
Pharmadev 
(1) 
First order data
Theoretical 
categories
Aggregate 
theoretical 
dimensions
 Evidence                                         
Language & 
interpretive tasks
Medco 
(1)
A A
Statements expressing 
satisfaction w ith resultant 
explanation
Blameless                      
Praise w orthiness
Board dynamics
Flow  of 
information
Phases of 
sensemaking
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Step three 
I then considered the role the conceptual categories played in the development of 
encapsulated and open sensemaking. Approaching the data from this perspective, two 
starting points were observed: The first involved the move away from considering the 
views of all directors (encapsulated sensemaking) and a second where all views of 
directors were seen to be considered (open sensemaking) in debating a sensemaking 
trigger. In the third round of analysis, therefore, I aggregated conceptual categories into 
a model that represented a new process. Although there can be many interpretations of 
events (Van Maanan, 1988), the exercise that was followed helped to avoid fitting the 
data to illustrate a theory (Wodak, 2004 200), along with constantly interrogating the 
theory along with the data throughout the process (Locke, 1996). As is often the case in 
process studies (Van de Ven, 2007) the processes were not always entirely linear in 
nature; however, the second order codes were depicted in the process model in a 
temporal sequence that corresponds with the order in which they generally emerge from 
the empirical data. Since Yin (2003) recommends that the analysis of case studies 
includes chains of evidence, I have included such evidence in Tables 4.1 & 4.2 where I 
illustrate that all first order codes were supported by at least two or more interviews and 
archival sources from each of the cases for both encapsulated and open sensemaking. I 
then focused on observations of constant elements (i.e. information flow in one direction) 
which form a more solid basis for a process model within a multi-case sample 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Van de Ven, 2007).  
4.4 Findings  
I consider the findings in relation to encapsulated and open sensemaking, and then 
consider a comparison of both processes. I present the respective process models 
(Figures 4.1 & 4.2) before I elaborate each of the processes to enable the reader to refer 
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to the models when reading and considering each individual phase. Tables 4.4 - 4.7 
provide illustrative quotations for the phases of encapsulated sensemaking and Tables 
4.9 - 4.11 provide illustrative quotations for the phases of open sensemaking. The 
components, illustrative quotations and phases are further elaborated upon in the 
interpretation and discussion that follows the Tables of illustrative quotations. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: A process model of encapsulated sensemaking in entrepreneurial       
ventures 
  
  
 
 
Sensebreaking 
 
 
 
 
 
Sensefreezing 
 
 
 
 
 
Senseforcing 
 
 
 
Sensehiding 
         
Board dynamics  
Guarded 
interaction 
between 
subgroups to 
attempt to 
reconcile 
 
Little or no 
meaningful 
interaction 
between 
subgroups 
 
No 
interaction 
between 
subgroups    
Decisions 
imposed on 
managers 
 
Subgroups 
interact either 
among 
themselves or 
with external 
parties 
outside the 
board 
         
Information flow  
Information flow 
among both 
subgroups starts 
to become 
restricted with 
the presentation 
of selective data 
from the investor 
directors 
 
Information flow 
predominantly 
from the 
investor director 
group to the rest 
of the board 
 
Information 
flow totally 
from the 
investor 
director 
group to the 
managers 
 Information 
flow minimal 
         
Language & 
interpretive tasks 
 Disbelief        
Confusion 
 
Bracketing of 
valued elements 
by subgroups 
 None - tasks 
paralysed  
 
Attempt to 
repair 
mistrust 
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4.5 Encapsulated sensemaking 
The phases of encapsulated sensemaking were observed in all contested episodes (the 
episodes noted in Table 4.3 below): 
  
 Drugtech Pharmadev Medco Medco 
 Episode 2 Episode 2 Episode 1 Episode 2 
Sensebreaking Boards 1 & 2 Boards 1 & 2 Boards 1 & 2 Boards 1 & 2 
Sensefreezing Boards 3 & 4 Board 3 Boards 3 & 4 Boards 3 & 4 
Senseforcing Boards 5 & 6 Board 4 Board 5 Board 5 
Sensehiding Boards >6 Board 5 Board 6 Board 6 
 
 Note: The term “Board” is short for board meeting   
Table 4.3: Timing of encapsulated sensemaking phases 
 
I present Tables 4.4 – 4.7 following to provide illustrative quotations around the differing 
phases of encapsulated sensemaking and provide more context and discussion of these 
quotations in the narrative after these Tables. The triggers for the encapsulated 
sensemaking episodes are missing revenue targets at a time point agreed by all directors 
in the original business plan (Medco, first and second episodes and Pharmadev, second 
episode) and an unexpected board meeting pronouncement by the investor directors that 
drug development should cease and the company should be sold (Drugtech, second 
episode).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
92 
 
       Dimension Illustrative Quotations 
Sensebreaking  
(1st & 2nd 
boards) 
“He {an investor director} was opposed to this course; we must finish 
what we were doing as quickly as possible” NED (Independent)  
    
Information flow 
“The investor directors stemmed the information flow to the 
entrepreneurial managers” Chair 
    
Language & 
interpretive tasks 
“It caused dysfunction within the board” Chair 
    
Board dynamics 
“The board became a less happy place. I think people were more 
guarded about what they said and what they thought” NED 
(Independent) 
Sensefreezing 
(3rd & 4th 
boards) 
“The investor directors had become stuck in their own views” NED 
(Independent) 
    
Information flow 
“The flow of dialogue changed because the investor directors imposed 
the flow” Chair 
    
Language & 
interpretive tasks 
“The investor directors considered elements of value very different to 
the other board members” CEO 
    
Board dynamics “I observed a polarisation of positions” Chair 
Senseforcing    
(5th and 6th 
boards) 
“And since he {an investor director} was certainly rhetorically very 
skilled- it was quite difficult for the rest of the board to stand up to this” 
NED (Independent) 
    
Information flow 
“The investor directors seemed to get new information from the investor 
that they represented” Chair 
    
Language & 
interpretive tasks 
“Tasks became paralysed” Chair 
    
Board dynamics “Actions were imposed on the entrepreneurial managers” Chair 
Sensehiding    
(After the 6th 
board) 
“Different activity took place outside the board meetings, including a 
review of the legal documentation” Chair 
    
Information flow 
“Well Mr A used to make suggestions of the kind that the rest of us had 
been ganging up together to propose this behind his back. The investor 
directors claimed that they had the backing of the investors” NED 
(Independent) 
    
Language & 
interpretive tasks 
“Can we ever trust the investor directors?” CEO 
    
Board dynamics 
“Our position is to encourage the board to look for a compromise that 
everyone can get behind” Investor 
 
           Table 4.4: Illustrative evidence-Drugtech second sensemaking episode 
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Dimension Illustrative Quotations 
Sensebreaking  
(1st & 2nd 
boards) 
“The experiments, after direction from the investor directors, were getting us 
nowhere” CSO 
    
Information flow 
“I did not believe in the sector specialists because their ideas were old ideas and 
we had to maintain ourselves” CEO  
    
Language & 
interpretive tasks 
“And we had a clear scientific plan which we wanted to execute, but were persuaded 
to procrastinate” CSO 
    
Board dynamics 
“The interference and agenda setting appeared inconducive to building the 
company we wanted to build” CSO 
Sensefreezing 
(3rd & 4th boards) 
“The new Board did not want to hear what was going on in the basic research lab” 
CSO 
    
Information flow 
“The Kingmaker also started to dictate what sort of science the CSO should be doing” 
Ex Chair 
    
Language & 
interpretive tasks 
“They insisted on the right to appoint a director at this time and this meant 
important elements of the business were not shared” Ex Chair 
    
Board dynamics 
“She’d still come along {a board observer of the investor} and be difficult and 
obnoxious and paralysing working together” CSO 
Senseforcing    
(5th and 6th 
boards) 
“They could simply do what they always did through force” CSO 
    
Information flow “You will do it the way I want it done or you won’t get the money” Inv Dir 
    
Language & 
interpretive tasks 
“Tasks that had been agreed were abandoned and language became guarded” Ex 
Chair 
    
Board dynamics “Actions were imposed and not shared” CSO 
Sensehiding    
(After the 6th 
board) 
“Yes, there were hidden agendas everywhere” CSO 
    
Information flow 
“Accept one of our nominees. This produced suspicion and lack of willingness to 
pass data and information” CSO 
    
Language & 
interpretive tasks 
“All sorts of different people with mysterious agendas were suddenly starting to turn 
up talking to the company” CSO 
    
Board dynamics 
“I had concerns that the investor director, representing the business angel in 
question, also misrepresented the investor” CFO 
     
            Table 4.5: Illustrative evidence-Pharmadev second sensemaking episode       
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Dimension Illustrative Quotations 
Sensefreezing 
(3rd & 4th 
boards) 
“We actually could have done a deal with a group of investors with a company in a 
similar space to ours, but could not gain any traction” CEO 
    
Information flow 
“I just think it was as though we were all a little bit unable to act and reticent to 
speak” CEO 
    
Language & 
interpretive tasks 
“Conversation became laboured and language became guarded between 
subgroups” Chair 
    
Board dynamics 
“The Investor Directors wanted a swift exit, so the last thing they wanted was a 
destabilised board” Chair 
Senseforcing    
(5th and 6th 
boards) 
“I do remember a board where one individual very eloquently and argued why we 
shouldn’t merge with another company” Inv Dir 
    
Information flow “Dictates were one way from the investor directors to the entrepreneurial  
  managers” CEO 
Language & 
interpretive tasks 
“Conversation became forced and superficial with little real activity” CEO 
    
Board dynamics “The entrepreneurial investors became very subdued and passive” Chair 
Sensehiding    
(After the 6th 
board) 
“It got worse over time as information became power” CEO 
    
Information flow 
“Certain directors were influencing other directors” Inv Dir (referring to within 
subgroups) 
    
Language & 
interpretive tasks 
“The management team became somewhat disappointed and lost trust, that was 
going to be difficult to ever trust again” CEO 
    
Board dynamics 
“It all became a little suspicious outside of the board room with little activity in the 
board room “(during board meetings) CEO 
 
              Table 4.6: Illustrative evidence-Medco first sensemaking episode 
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Dimension Illustrative Quotations 
Sensebreaking  
(1st & 2nd boards) 
“I think the institutional board members tended to follow each other” COO 
    
Information flow “The investor directors used data in a restricted manner” CSO 
    
Language & 
interpretive tasks 
“Directors were confused and this led to confusion of tasks” CSO 
    
Board dynamics 
“The CEO had less time to be concerned about board issues, as she was diverted   to 
the needs of the shareholders” CSO 
Sensefreezing 
(3rd & 4th boards) 
“None could follow their money, which meant we needed to sell the company” Inv Dir 
    
Information flow “That gave a little bit of paralysis” Inv Dir 
    
Language & 
interpretive tasks 
“We sort of went through the motions of trying to make things better by assessing 
certain items of value” CEO 
    
Board dynamics “Let’s make X and Y redundant and the board just procrastinated” CEO 
Senseforcing    
(5th and 6th 
boards) 
“Once the largest two investors decided they wanted to exit, they convinced the other 
investors” CEO 
    
Information flow 
“Once the investors had come to a settled opinion that they wanted an exit, they forced 
their position on the entrepreneurial managers” CEO 
    
Language & 
interpretive tasks 
“No communal consensual tasks took place” CEO 
    
Board dynamics 
“Any conversations were led by the investor directors and ultimately finished with the 
message, we need to exit” CEO 
Sensehiding    
(After the 6th 
board) 
“Do we need to change the board? This conversation obviously excludes the other 
directors”. Inv Dir 
    
Information flow “Certain directors were influencing in an underhand manner” COO 
    
Language & 
interpretive tasks 
“Can we ever trust any of the investor directors again” CEO 
    
Board dynamics “Strategic conversations were held outside of the board room” CEO 
 
Table 4.7: Illustrative evidence-Medco second sensemaking episode 
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4.5.1 Sensebreaking 
Sensebreaking has been defined as “the destruction or breaking down of meaning” 
(Pratt, 2000   464) (see thesis Introduction and Glossary). Sensebreaking commences 
whilst there is still frank and open debate across the board table, albeit with disagreement 
and posturing for position. This is effectively observed within the accommodating phase 
of open sensemaking, explained later in this Chapter. However sensebreaking moves 
from accommodating to one subgroup (in my study, the investor directors) attempting to 
influence the other subgroup (the entrepreneurial managers) through undermining trust. 
Sensebreaking differs from accommodation through moving from a open, free critical 
assessment of the problem to an assessment of the problem only through the lens of 
often the more powerful subgroup.  It involves challenging both the positions of others 
and external information through the suggestion that these positions are nonsensical or 
do not inform the overall meaning of the discussion (creating mistrust), so are therefore 
irrelevant or detrimental to the argument.  
Sensebreaking is the first sensegiving initiatives observed in all encapsulated episodes 
during the first and second board meetings (see Table 4.3 above). In all encapsulated 
cases, the sensebreaking is driven by the investor director group on each board. The 
status quo is the current defined strategic direction as proffered by the business plan or 
prior board direction. I initially consider the encapsulated episodes within Drugtech, 
followed by Pharmadev and Medco.  
Within the second sensemaking episode at Drugtech, whilst the current course is to 
continue with the development of the drug, the investor directors unexpectedly 
announced that they wish to terminate any drug development. The announcement, made 
by an investor director during the first and re-iterated in the second board meeting of the 
episode, is that the company should abandon such a course and immediately move 
towards selling the assets. This investor director is opposed to the original course: “We 
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must find a buyer” (NED, Drugtech, second episode 2009, referring to a statement made 
by an investor director). This creates a situation where each subgroup looks to their own 
subgroup for sense, those subgroups being the investor directors and the entrepreneurial 
managers, even though there is still interaction between the subgroups at board level. 
Sensebreaking, once past the accommodating phase, initiates the move away from 
shared interpretive tasks around the board table to sharing the tasks intra-subgroup. 
During this early part of the encapsulated process, the use of power game initiatives is 
observed with the overt use of power across the board table, observed through language, 
still with the intention of trying to create the dominant frame (defined in the Glossary). In 
this instance, the stronger economic power possessed by the investor directors, 
(because they act as a proxy for the economically powerful investors), is used over the 
economically weaker entrepreneurial managers (further discussed in Chapter 5). The 
Chair succinctly states: “The investor directors then added to the complexity of the debate 
by aligning their position with the investor” (Chair, Drugtech, second episode 2010). This 
is a power game initiative, and at that time, as the investor was not contactable, the 
investor director effectively stood in the shoes of the investor, affording him the power of 
the investor himself. Through the destroying of existing meaning, which is the originally 
agreed course of action (Pratt 2000 464), interpretive tasks become less ordered and 
more problematic: “It caused confusion within the board” (Chair, Drugtech second 
episode 2010). The environment subsequently changes from a harmonious board to 
subgroups protecting their retrospective positions, the investor directors wanting to sell 
the assets, whilst the entrepreneurial managers wanting to continue to grow the business 
through the continuation of drug development.  
In comparing the second sensemaking episode of both Pharmadev and Medco, the same 
components are observed. In the case of the second sensemaking episode at 
Pharmadev, a new board is constituted and the new directors, parachuted in by the 
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investors as managers of change, already have their own sense of what change is 
required without feeling the need or desire to consult with the old guard. The CSO sums 
up this position referring to the scientists as follows: “For three months, they {the 
scientists} were doing repetitive meaningless experiments” (CSO, Pharmadev second 
episode 2012). The use of power is overt at this stage, with the parachuted directors 
possessing the proxy power of the investors and using that power to influence the 
entrepreneurial managers, however information flow is still strong between investor 
directors and entrepreneurial managers in both directions. The CSO outlined this position 
as follows: “So the change in direction was indeed driven by the VC funder and the idea 
behind this was to bring in sector specialists” (CSO, Pharmadev, second episode 2012). 
Interpretive tasks move from the execution of a clearly defined strategy to a period of 
uncertain direction: “So the change in direction was difficult to believe and caused 
confusion” (CSO, Pharmadev, second episode 2012). Board actions move to a 
suspension of pursuing the original scientific plan, with a direct impact on the business 
building capability of the entrepreneurial managers. The CSO concluded: “The 
interference prohibited us from business building” (CSO, Pharmadev, second episode 
2012). 
Within the second sensemaking episode at Medco, there is a clear split in the espoused 
direction for the business. The investor directors are on a different path to the 
entrepreneurial managers: “I think the institutional board members ignored the feelings 
of the management team” (COO, Medco, second episode 2013). The use of economic 
power again is evident as decisions are made by the investor directors that are aligned 
first and foremost to the fund objectives. These are closed-end funds, which mean that 
the requirement to generate an exit takes precedent to business building as summarised 
by the CEO: “There were quite a few people that were looking after the fund that they 
were involved with and used that to influence” (CEO, Medco, second episode 2013). 
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Information flow at this stage remains strong between both subgroups of investor 
directors and entrepreneurial managers. As in all other encapsulated episodes, tasks are 
interrupted as not all understood what the plan is, as summarised by the COO: “Because 
I had full awareness of what was going on, I was able to plan for that and prepare for it. 
But others were confused” (COO, Medco, second episode 2013). And such actions move 
away from business building to managing the investors and their push for an exit. In this 
case as the entrepreneurial managers are not experienced, they tend to spend more time 
in attempting to keep the peace, albeit not accepting the position. The CEO becomes 
diverted from running the business: “The CEO devoted 70-80% of her time to managing 
the shareholders” (COO, Medco, second episode 2013). 
Across all encapsulated sensemaking episodes, within the phase of sensebreaking (see 
Figure 4.1), I observe the same pattern as follows:  
Board dynamics 
I observe the subgroups of actors moving from the exchange of pleasant and open 
interactions (agreement, reinforcing positions and validating positions) to disagreement, 
attempting to dismantle the views of other subgroups, and seeking to discredit the 
opposing subgroup by attempting to undermine their proffered account. There are strong 
and engaged interactions between subgroups, as they attempt to tease out their 
respective positions. However, although they are doing similar things, these actions are 
not for the collective good. This results in a tense and combative environment around the 
board table. As already stated, the first stage of encapsulated sensemaking 
(sensebreaking) also commences with the same activity as observed in accommodating, 
the accommodation of multiple views to diagnose a problem. As soon as trust is lost and 
the presentation of material from one subgroup cannot be reconciled to the view of the 
world by another subgroup, then sensebreaking moves from accommodating to an 
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attempt to create a void of meaning through no longer considering sense other from their 
own subgroup. (refer to section 4.6.1). 
Information flow 
Information flow continues to be between all board members, irrespective of subgroup, 
albeit the information passed from the investor directors to the entrepreneurial managers 
tends to be more selective as the phase progresses, while interpretive tasks move from 
a collective approach involving all directors to tasks within either the investor director 
subgroup or the entrepreneurial manager subgroup. All sensebreaking appears to take 
place early in the encapsulated episodes, being observable during the first and/or second 
board meetings in the encapsulated sensemaking episode. In all the encapsulated 
episodes, I observe the emergence of multiple accounts of the sensemaking trigger. Due 
to varying interpretation of the reason why the sensemaking trigger occurred, 
encapsulated sensemaking is unlikely to occur when there is a unitary account of the 
sensemaking trigger because there is no need to compete and all actors are more likely 
to accept the same view of the world. 
Language and interpretive tasks  
Language becomes more guarded and there are similar interpretive tasks as those seen 
in open sensemaking (elaborated later in the Chapter), including working through 
disbelief, in response to the sensemaking trigger. However, unlike the process of open 
sensemaking, where clarity and meaning is sought by all actors which is attempted at the 
start of the sensebreaking phase, in this encapsulated process there is the progressive 
destroying of each subgroup’s sense (i.e. their offered views) and a working through of 
confusing scenarios, which becomes a more difficult, and sometimes impossible, 
interpretive task. 
Whilst in sensebreaking, meaning is broken down: “The investor directors started to 
communicate more with the investors” (Chair, Drugtech, second episode 2010); there is 
101 
 
no active prevention of sensemaking between all actors. Strong positions are taken, but 
during the sensebreaking phase, there is still active debate between subgroups in the 
hope of reaching a consensual decision, although sense accepting by one subgroup 
becomes more limited as the phase progresses. Once the next phase of sensefreezing 
is reached, considered next, I observed efforts that prevent sensemaking. 
4.5.2 Sensefreezing 
The notion of sensefreezing emerges inductively from my data. As a variant of 
sensegiving I define sensefreezing as: Sensegiving efforts which knowingly or 
unknowingly prevent sensemaking and/or search for meaning and associated action. 
This component emerges after observing initial attempts by both subgroups of actors to 
discredit alternative positions (sensebreaking), and then paralyse the ability of a 
subgroup (sensefreezing) to present their case by attempting to render the opponent’s 
case the only plausible alternative.  
In the second sensemaking episode at Drugtech, the investor directors take such a 
polarised position that they refuse to accept explanations from the entrepreneurial 
managers: “The investor directors refused to move their position” (NED, Drugtech, 
second episode 2009). There is a continual use of power from the earlier sensebreaking 
phase, which results in the information flow moving predominantly from investor director 
to entrepreneurial manager. Due to the imposing of differing objectives, such viewpoints 
become subgroup specific with little interaction between subgroups: “The investor 
directors considered very different routes compared to the other board members” (CEO, 
Drugtech, second episode 2009). Such viewpoints have the potential to lead to paralysis 
between subgroups: “I struggled to align opposing views” (Chair, Drugtech, second 
episode 2010). 
Whereas in sensebreaking, there is an attempt to combat the power play by both 
subgroups through further debate. Once sensefreezing is reached the power play 
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becomes almost entirely one-sided in the domain of the investor directors, as viewed by 
the ex-Chair, when describing a new investor director that had been forced onto the board 
by the investor, who he calls “The Kingmaker”: “The Kingmaker also started to dictate to 
the CSO which led to a combative environment” (Ex-Chair, Pharmadev, second episode 
2012). The ex-Chair also observes that such tasks became more subgroup-centric with 
fewer or no interpretive tasks undertaken by the entrepreneurial managers, as the 
investor insisted on the right to appoint a director at the time. This is an attempt to 
dominate the board even more so by the investor directors: “She’s {an observer to the 
board at the request of an investor} not even on the board but she attempted to paralyse 
the debate” (CSO, Pharmadev, second episode 2012). 
In the case of Medco, in the first sensemaking episode where the sensemaking trigger 
involves missing a key revenue target which was called for by the warranted business 
plan, while sensemaking starts as open sensemaking (covered later), it swiftly moves to 
encapsulated sensemaking by the third board meeting where there appears to be 
sufficient apathy around the board table to reject further mergers. This apathy is a form 
of sensefreezing generated by the lack of desire of one subgroup, the investor directors, 
to engage in meaningful board discussion around the subject matter: “Nobody else on 
the board seemed interested in doing that [referring to a further acquisition] and as a 
result, it was a no go” (CEO, Medco, first episode 2013). Tasks are becoming paralysed 
at this time, although there is still activity that keeps things looking like they were in 
motion: “I just think it was as though we were a little bit unable to act, a type of paralysis” 
(CEO, Medco, first episode 2013). This is still maintained as the investor directors are 
keen for the outside world to see a functional board: “The investor directors decided that 
they did not want to rock the boat, so they entertained other ideas and activities but did 
not really go along with them” (Chair, Medco, first episode 2013). Information flow is 
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clearly seen from the above as predominantly from the investor director, who is proposing 
the merger to the entrepreneurial manager. 
During the second encapsulated sensemaking episode at Medco, again sensefreezing 
is observed through one subgroup, the investor directors, refusing to discuss business 
building as they need to exit their investment as viewed by one of the investor directors: 
“All had reached their maximum investment levels, which meant we needed to stop 
growing the business” (Inv Dir, Medco, second episode 2013). There is an 
acknowledgement at this stage that power game initiatives could have been employed 
by the investor directors, but they decide not to rock the boat, as a destabilised board 
and company would not be healthy during the sale of the company. This view is echoed 
by one of the investor directors themselves: “Because it’s quite hard to say everybody is 
made redundant, even though we could enforce that” (Inv Dir, Medco, second episode 
2013). Interpretive tasks are still ongoing but with little intent of following through or 
action: “We sort of went through the motions of trying to make things better by assessing 
certain items of value” (CEO, Medco, second episode 2013). Any substantive decisions 
are delayed to frustrate any actions as stated by the CEO: “I was saying: Let’s make X 
and Y redundant and one of the investors said: Just wait” (CEO, Medco, second episode 
2013). 
Across all encapsulated sensemaking episodes, within the phase of sensefreezing, I 
observe the same pattern as illustrated in Figure 4.1 as follows:  
Board dynamics 
In the sensefreezing phase, I observe the use of power by actors with the greatest 
economic currency, namely the investor directors’ subgroup. These actors have greater 
voting power as a proxy for the investor, and can use this either as a threat or by tabling 
a resolution for a board vote. The investor directors (the stronger subgroup economically) 
are observed as the only users of power game initiatives. 
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Information flow  
Information flow is predominantly from the investor director group towards the 
entrepreneurial managers, as more information is added to the narrative purportedly from 
the investor via the investor directors as a proxy for the investors. The exception being 
where the investor directors hear the pleas of the entrepreneurial managers to not rock 
the boat but effectively have no interest in implementing the strategy of the 
entrepreneurial managers. 
Language and interpretive tasks  
The interpretive tasks among subgroups falls away towards little or no meaningful 
interaction, and this is replaced with the search for meaning from within the individual 
subgroups. Therefore, shared action abates and intragroup interaction 
increases/dominates.  Bracketing occurs in isolation within each of the subgroups rather 
than between the groups. This is a way of condensing down larger fluxes of information 
into smaller more digestible portions, or “carving out of the undifferentiated flux of raw 
experience...so that they can become the common currency for communicational 
exchanges” (Chia, 2000 517; Weick et al., 2005). In this context, the assessment of 
valued items is different within each subgroup. The investor directors are looking at 
varying agendas of change and condensing down to preferred options while the 
entrepreneurial managers are refining their thoughts on whether it may be possible to 
resist such change; for example, in the case of Drugtech, the entrepreneurial managers 
value the extension of further drug development to obtain more data (the original plan), 
whereas the investor directors value using the data currently available to sell the 
company (a change to the original plan). The economically powerful seek to dominate 
the interpretation of the sensemaking trigger and drive the agenda for the corrective 
actions needed in response. This comes to a head in senseforcing, discussed next. 
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4.5.3 Senseforcing 
Senseforcing is seen to follow sensefreezing in all encapsulated sensemaking episodes. 
I define senseforcing as: Sensegiving efforts involving the use of pressure to influence 
the sensemaking of others. Whereas sensebreaking revolves around the destruction and 
breaking down of meaning by debate between subgroups, and sensefreezing prevents 
sensemaking through paralysis, senseforcing involves the use of pressure to influence 
the sensemaking of others by a dictatorial (and not through debate) edict. I demonstrate 
this pressure in the following narrative extracts.  
In the second sensemaking episode at Drugtech; one subgroup, the entrepreneurial 
managers, struggle to take a position when the investor directors make out that they were 
representing directly the views of the investors, as suggested by the independent non-
executive director: “There was also an increasing belief that he and the other director 
were speaking directly on behalf of the investor” (NED, Drugtech, second episode 2009). 
This forcing of sense is backed up with the use of power, the investor directors using 
their proxy power but extending it to directly representing the views of the investor: “The 
investor directors used the fact that they have been appointed by the investor in a way I 
think to propagate their views” (Chair, Drugtech, second episode 2010). This results in 
the information flow totally moving from the investor directors to the entrepreneurial 
managers.  Any attempt to debate the position taken by the investor directors is 
quenched, with an entrenched position taken by the investor directors: “One director in 
particular was very difficult to persuade after he had taken a point of view and refused to 
debate any other point” (NED, Drugtech, second episode 2009). Such actions move very 
swiftly to one of the investor directors attempting to rule the board meetings, with no 
actions being agreed other than those proposed and imposed by the investor directors. 
The Chair begins to question his role: “What is the point of being Chair if one of the non-
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executive directors increasingly tried to take over the meeting?” (Chair, Drugtech, second 
episode 2010).  
Senseforcing is also observed after sensefreezing during the second sensemaking 
episode at Pharmadev. Consistent with other encapsulated sensemaking episodes, the 
senseforcing comes from the subgroup with the stronger economic power, namely, the 
investor directors: “They {the investor directors} forced an agenda on the rest of us” 
(CSO, Pharmadev, second episode 2012). Power at this stage is displayed as an 
absolute imposition of specific actions by the investor directors. The CSO expresses this 
situation as follows: “So, it was a kind of bullet to the head, almost a gun to the head” 
(CSO, Pharmadev, second episode 2012). Any interpretive tasks between subgroups 
are becoming more difficult to execute, as it becomes evident that the agenda is totally 
one-sided as described by the CSO: “The founder scientist sort of distanced himself from 
it all” (CSO, Pharmadev, second episode 2012). Board director communication is 
fragmented between the entrepreneurial managers and the members who have been 
parachuted in by the investors. The CSO observes such a division as follows: “Older and 
newer members of the management team refused to debate” (CSO, Pharmadev, second 
episode 2012). 
In the first episode at Medco, one of the investor directors aggressively achieves his aim 
by forcing his agenda to stop the drug development: “He was very forceful and eloquent 
and he won the day” (Inv Dir, Medco, first episode 2013). The investor directors use their 
influence with the underlying investors to take over the agenda, as viewed by the CEO: 
“A particular stakeholder group started to forge its own agenda and the fact that they 
were backed by the investors gave this agenda premier position” (CEO, Medco, first 
episode 2013). In the second sensemaking episode at Medco, the investor directors 
supporting the funds with the largest voting power convince the rest of the investor 
directors that an exit is needed as quickly as possible: “Once the largest two investors 
107 
 
decided they wanted to exit, they convinced the other investors” (CEO, Medco, second 
episode 2013). The investor directors then use their collective economic power to engage 
the sales process in an attempt to realise their shareholdings: “They forced their position 
on the entrepreneurial managers” (CEO, Medco, second episode 2013). This action 
leads to a loss of appetite to work through issues as viewed by the COO: “Nobody else 
on the board seemed interested, so lots of abandonment” (COO, Medco, second episode 
2013).  
In summary, senseforcing often closely follows sensefreezing, and occurs within weeks 
(refer to Table 4.3). Once the opposing subgroup’s (the entrepreneurial managers who 
are economically less powerful) interpretation of the sensemaking trigger has lost 
plausibility and credibility with the other subgroup, there is a void that senseforcing 
attempts to fill. 
Board dynamics  
Powerful actors, who can pursue their goals without the consent of other venture 
shareholders are more likely to impose their sense on less powerful subgroups. Actions 
are mandated but not agreed: “Relations were quite fractious and tasks were imposed” 
(COO, Medco, second episode 2013). 
Information flow  
Rather these powerful actors attempting to force their own sense (i.e. their account of the 
sensemaking trigger and its implications) on others, once sensebreaking and 
sensefreezing have failed to achieve their aim, the information flow is totally one way 
from the investor directors to the entrepreneurial managers to force/impose sense. 
Language and interpretive tasks  
The language is dictatorial from the investor directors to the entrepreneurial managers, 
using their power as proxy to the investor. There is no shared action or interpretive tasks 
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between groups as the group with the greater economic capital seeks to exert influence 
by forcing their position on the group with weaker economic capital.  
4.5.4 Sensehiding  
This component has been defined as: “Promoting a specific kind of thinking and action 
or manipulation in terms of hiding particular ideas” (Vaara & Monin, 2010 6). I observe 
examples of sensehiding in the form of meetings of subgroups of actors (the 
entrepreneurial managers and investor directors) being held, not in the boardroom, but 
covertly in a different location. This covert activity, if discovered, creates mistrust and 
further encapsulation, as well as making it potentially very difficult to reverse the mistrust 
from this point onwards. 
 In the second episode at Drugtech, the subgroups of entrepreneurial managers and 
investor directors stop using the board meetings to debate any issues of strategic 
importance and effectively meet separately outside of the board meeting: “Conversation 
really ceased unless it was within the investor director group or the managers” (Chair, 
Drugtech, second episode 2009). This has the effect of keeping any meaningful 
information flow between the two subgroups. 
In the second sensemaking episode at Pharmadev, there appears to be a total 
breakdown of order and no semblance of sensible board activity: “There was connivance 
in abundance behind the scenes” (CSO, Pharmadev, second episode 2012). There is 
dictatorial management with little or no scope for consensual decision-making or the 
ability to negotiate positions. Tasks become random and consistently subject to change: 
“Many tasks were abandoned” (CSO, Pharmadev, second episode 2012). There are no 
shared actions or interpretive tasks. 
In the first sensemaking episode at Medco, information is withheld from the 
entrepreneurial managers and activity moves away from the boardroom: “Information 
was hidden from other directors” (CEO, Medco, first episode 2013). Shareholders 
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communicate directly with representative directors. All such dialogue is between the 
investor directors and the investors, as in this case the investor directors represent all 
external shareholders (all shareholders other than the entrepreneurial managers). This 
is often the case in venture capital backed entrepreneurial ventures where a lead 
investor, through the appointment of their investor directors will represent other external  
shareholders and provide critical company information, e.g. management accounts and 
company updates: “Shareholders who were not represented on the board were unduly 
influenced” (Inv Dir, Medco, first episode 2013); and “hidden conversations were held 
outside of the board room” (CEO, Medco, first episode 2013); which leads to a loss of 
trust and the suspension of all interpretive tasks. 
During the second sensemaking episode at Medco, these patterns are repeated. The 
severe lack of trust leads to the board becoming so ineffectual that it needs to be 
disbanded: “Do we need to appoint fresh directors?” (Inv Dir, Medco, Second episode 
2013). The use of power is manipulative and involves coercion as observed by the COO: 
“Certain shareholders were being influenced in a hidden way” (COO, Medco, second 
episode 2013). All tasks and actions are paralysed, with the continual input of external 
bodies as observed by the investor directors: “Two outside bodies attempting to impose 
ideas on a non-consensual board” (Inv Dir, Medco, second episode 2013). 
In summary, during encapsulated sensemaking episodes, if sensebreaking, 
sensefreezing or senseforcing are ineffective in producing a narrative that is accepted 
(whilst others are rejected), sensehiding may be employed. Sensehiding refers to the 
process of consciously avoiding certain discourses while managing change (Mahapatra 
& Pattnaik, 2013). In the context of the entrepreneurial ventures I studied, sensehiding 
manifests itself in predestined actions of orchestrating meetings among subgroups of 
actors outside of the boardroom to formulate plans and agendas to meet the purpose of 
that subgroup. Although I present senseforcing and sensehiding as discrete phases in 
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that order which is predominantly shown in the data; there is the potential for sensehiding 
and senseforcing to ebb and flow between the two phases in the pursuit of the more 
powerful subgroup’s agenda, as I indicate below. 
Board dynamics  
In this phase, decisions are averted from ever being tabled at a board meeting through 
not allowing the underlying information to be brought out into the open from meetings 
away from the company boardroom. 
Information flow  
The agenda is firmly in the hands of the actors with the greatest economic power, with 
little or no input into the debate by the less powerful actors, and any information flow is 
intra-subgroup and not between subgroups. 
Language and interpretive tasks  
There is no shared action or interpretive tasks between groups, as the group with the 
greater economic power (the investor directors) seeks to exert influence by hiding their 
position from the group with the weaker economic capital (the entrepreneurial managers), 
by not declaring their views until a later board meeting, and then senseforcing again. All 
interpretive tasks are now dependant on whether there is any trust remaining. If the two 
subgroups are so untrusting of each other, then it will be unlikely that a balanced and 
efficient board will function again with the current board members.  
4.5.5 Encapsulated sensemaking in general 
Information flow, board dynamics and interpretive tasks all interact. If information flow is 
not mutual, this affects the interpretation and the shared meaning to emerge, affecting 
the proceedings of the board meeting. Mistrust between the subgroups grows as the 
phases of sensebreaking, sensefreezing, senseforcing and sensehiding progress. Once 
sensehiding is reached, there may be a move back to senseforcing and these phases 
interplay in an attempt of the more powerful investor directors reinforcing their position. 
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I now turn from the phases of encapsulated sensemaking to those observed in open 
sensemaking. 
4.6 Open sensemaking 
In analysing episodes involving both encapsulated and open sensemaking, I observe 
different phases that make up each process. In coding the open sensemaking episodes 
(the first episode at Drugtech, the first episode at Pharmadev and the first few weeks of 
the first episode of Medco before the process moves into encapsulated sensemaking) it 
becomes evident that few of the activities viewed in the encapsulated sensemaking 
episodes are present. Instead, other activities are evident during open sensemaking. It 
is evident from the empirical data that there is less need for sensegiving initiatives in 
open sensemaking, predominantly because there is little need to attempt to influence 
when the board becomes unanimous in its understanding of the problems and solution 
of the episode. In these episodes, I observe other phases (accommodating, 
comprehending, positioning and accepting) which are illustrated in Figure 4.2 below: 
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Figure 4.2: A process model of open sensemaking in entrepreneurial ventures 
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These phases are common across the open sensemaking cases as noted in Table 4.8 
below, which lead to new company objectives and goals, resulting in a refreshed strategic 
direction. I explore these phases below. 
  
 Drugtech Pharmadev Medco 
 Episode 1 Episode 1 Episode 1 (in part) 
Accommodating Board 1 Boards 1 & 2 Board 1 
Comprehending Boards 1 & 2 Board 3 Board 1 
Positioning Board 2 Board 4 N/A 
Accepting Board 2 Board >5 N/A 
 
Table 4.8: Timing of open sensemaking phases 
 
Note: The board of Medco moved from open sensemaking to encapsulated sensemaking 
after the comprehending phase of open sensemaking. The term “Board” is short for board 
meeting 
I present illustrative quotations from the open sensemaking phases as Tables 4.9 - 4.11 
below, followed by a discussion of each of the open sensemaking phases: 
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Dimension Illustrative Quotations 
Accommodating 
“This turned out to be a road block rather than just a car crash in the road. So he 
{the CEO} dealt with the investor” NED 
    
Board dynamics “Conversations were pleasant, friendly, spontaneous and wide ranging” CSO 
    
Information flow 
“I learnt in a prior appointment as a venture capitalist to keep the investors well 
informed” CEO 
    
Language and 
interpretive tasks 
“All options were open to the company” CSO 
Comprehending 
“Before we went to the board with the recommendation we already had a pretty good 
idea that it would make a lot of sense to develop the drug alternatively through an 
antimicrobial route” CSO 
    
Board dynamics “The board appeared to act in unison” CSO 
    
Information flow “The meeting ended in a constructive manner” CEO 
    
Language and 
interpretive tasks 
“They reanalysed and reanalysed and kept coming to the same conclusion” CEO 
Positioning “I don’t think there was hostility from investor directors at all” CSO 
    
Board dynamics “The board was held in a constructive manner” CEO 
    
Information flow “The board was held with constructive debate” NED  
    
Language and 
interpretive tasks 
“One of the toxicologists stated why don’t we consider switching the programme to 
a topical application” CSO 
Accepting 
“We should re-focus our work on the drug as an antimicrobial used topically and all 
agreed” NED 
    
Board dynamics 
“The board was held in good spirits and with continual mutual respect and free 
exchange of ideas” Chair 
    
Information flow 
“And I think the idea of switching to a topical was almost born in the meeting room 
and the conversation” CEO 
    
Language and 
interpretive tasks 
“The relationship remained effectively unchanged with swift consensus and no 
apportioned blame” NED 
 
Table 4.9: Illustrative evidence-Drugtech first sensemaking episode 
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Dimension Illustrative Quotations 
Accommodating 
"Everybody regarded the company at that time as a disaster waiting to happen due 
to lack of strategy and direction" Ex Chair 
    
Board dynamics "There was lots of support from current investors" Ex Chair 
    
Information flow 
"He (the investor) agreed with the CSO who was very frank about the existing team"  
Inv Dir 
    
Language and 
interpretive tasks 
"I could not believe that the business was in position it was" Ex Chair 
Comprehending "This is a business that is about to go broke" Ex Chair 
    
Board dynamics "The Chair's transition out of the company was not difficult or contentious" COO 
    
Information flow 
"It wasn't accepted technology and it wasn't accepted science, so it was a struggle" 
CSO 
    
Language and 
interpretive tasks 
"The new Chair worked with the scientists" CEO 
Positioning 
"We knew how much we would spend to get to point A.  We knew by this month we 
would achieved that particular goal" CSO 
    
Board dynamics "I worked with the scientists, not against them" Ex Chair 
    
Information flow "Everybody needed to agree on a new Chair, and openly debated the subject" CEO 
    
Language and 
interpretive tasks 
"No viable business plan which must be addressed within days to build 
infrastructure" Ex Chair 
Accepting 
"We suddenly became a team with an agreed new set of goals and direction, with 
the shareholders, the executives, and to add to that the people working in the 
company, the scientists" CSO 
    
Board dynamics "None of the staff now worked against each other" Ex Chair 
    
Information flow 
"The scientific staff in the company always felt the deadlines were too tight.  The 
nice thing was he consulted them rather than imposing deadlines and they reacted 
very well to that" CSO 
    
Language and 
interpretive tasks 
"The transition of the company was not contentious" Ex Chair 
 
      Table 4.10:  Illustrative evidence-Pharmadev first sensemaking episode 
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Dimension Illustrative Quotations 
Accommodating 
“It became apparent to all that there was an increasing adverse variance of actual 
sales to budget” CEO 
    
Board dynamics “I observed good balance of the board” Chair 
    
Information flow “There was frank discussion across the whole board” CSO 
    
Language and 
interpretive tasks 
“The Chair observed a well functional board with shared responsibilities and actions 
across the whole board” Chair 
Comprehending “All directors agreed that the problem was lack of growth” CEO 
    
Board dynamics “Bringing the CEO in had a positive effect around the board table” Chair 
    
Information flow 
“The business got off to a great start with a very strong academic influence and free 
exchange of information” CEO 
 
          Table 4.11: Illustrative evidence-Medco first sensemaking episode 
4.6.1   Accommodating  
I first examine how the triggers of open sensemaking, noted in Table 3.2, lead to the first 
stage of the open sensemaking process, that of accommodating. This phase involves 
reaching a consensus about “what the problem is”, and it may also involve the changing 
of understanding through interaction among all actors and director subgroups in an 
inviting and inclusive environment. 
The start of the open sensemaking process is the sensemaking trigger, which could be 
the company missing revenue targets (Medco), missing breakeven points (Pharmadev) 
or even receiving an unexpected scientific result (Drugtech). Like the triggers that lead 
to encapsulated sensemaking, all the triggers to the open sensemaking process are 
serious enough to potentially cause significant harm to the company if left unaddressed.  
Accommodating involves unfettered and free debate between subgroups to understand 
the nature of the challenge and scope of the problem. Although the trigger causes 
concern and surprise, this does not lead to a combative environment, unlike 
sensebreaking which is combative. At Medco, although the episode starts with open 
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sensemaking, as evidenced through free and frank exchanges to define the problem, 
these exchanges started to resemble those seen in encapsulated sensemaking when a 
single problem could not be defined. This led to an attempt to produce a solution to solve 
several different problems all at once, which became problematic for the board. 
The sensemaking triggers are all unexpected and not desired: “There was denial and 
unbelief when the company missed its key revenue target” (COO, Medco, first episode 
2013). This produces an initial reluctance to believe these triggers but this disbelief 
interferes with the immediate need to accept the problem and address it as expressed 
by the ex-Chair of Pharmadev: “The business found itself in an unbelievable position” 
(Ex Chair, Pharmadev, first episode 2012). In the case of Drugtech, this involved a 
reanalysis of the scientific results followed by a meeting with the supplier of those results, 
who is an outsourced provider: 
After further deliberation and still in a spirit of unbelief, it was decided a 
team should visit the outsourced provider to assess whether the results 
could be wrong or if not, what would be the optimal way forward (CSO, 
Drugtech, first episode 2009). 
Overall there is free and frank conversation both intra and inter-subgroups of directors, 
and the problem is ultimately agreed by all without any alternate options, enabling a co-
ordinated base line for the next stages of the process as exemplified by the investor 
director at Pharmadev: “He (the investor) agreed with the CEO concerning the past 
mismanagement of the company” (Inv Dir, Pharmadev, first episode 2013). This is a key 
part of this process as it is essential to reach a consensual definition of the problem, 
whilst maintaining the trust and respect required in maintaining open sensemaking. 
Board dynamics  
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The boards are conducted in a pleasant and friendly manner, with regard and respect for 
the views of other directors as exemplified by the Chair of Medco: “I observed   
appropriate and focussed behaviour within the board” (Chair, Medco, first episode 2013). 
Information flow 
To move towards solution creating, it would appear essential to avoid the risk of flipping 
to encapsulated sensemaking by keeping communication channels open with the timely 
passage of information as expressed by the CEO of Drugtech: “I kept the investor 
directors and investors well informed at every stage in the process” (CEO, Drugtech, first 
episode 2009).  
Language and interpretive tasks 
Accommodating, as described above, is seen in both open and encapsulated 
sensemaking and the starting point of accommodating is a need to accommodate 
multiple views to diagnose the problem. These initial interpretive tasks may take a few 
days to work through, however, in all three cases, such tasks take no longer than one 
week and end quicker than the initial interpretive tasks within the process of encapsulated 
sensemaking. The first stage of encapsulated sensemaking (sensebreaking) also 
commences with the same activity as observed in accommodating, the accommodation 
of multiple views to diagnose a problem. As soon as trust is lost and the presentation of 
material from one subgroup cannot be reconciled to the view of the world by another 
subgroup, then accommodating moves to sensebreaking, in an attempt to create a void 
of meaning, through no longer considering sense other from their own subgroup.  
4.6.2  Comprehending  
Once the problem is agreed, the next stage is seeking an understanding of the 
component parts of the solution: “It took me about ten minutes to understand the 
numbers” (Ex-Chair, Pharmadev, first episode 2012). Even though this challenge seems 
severe with potentially terminal consequences, the entire board works together to figure 
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out a route map to turn the business around: “We all worked well together to work it out” 
(CSO, Pharmadev, first episode 2012). This process of figuring out involves all directors 
and allows for uninhibited input of ideas and suggestions to formulate the new strategic 
plan, regardless of the Chair retiring: “The Chair at this time was seeking to retire and he 
was helped” (CSO, Pharmadev, first episode 2012). This comprehending phase results 
in a new plan with commercial goals agreeable to the scientists also: “The new Chair 
imposed commercial deadlines for the first time” (CEO, Pharmadev, first episode 2012). 
In the case of Drugtech, accommodating leads to the realisation that there was a potential 
solution, namely transferring to a topical drug development programme, but it needs 
analysing to assess its feasibility: 
The CEO took some soundings from key stakeholders (including the 
investors) before we presented the board paper suggesting a change of plan 
(CSO, Drugtech, first episode 2009). 
Comprehending involves seeking an answer to the question: What are the component 
parts of the solution and are they feasible? 
Everybody agreed that the products were not penetrating the market 
sufficiently, and therein lies the solution – the question is can growth be 
pursued? (CEO, Medco, first episode 2013). 
Board dynamics 
The board of directors are individually and collectively helpful in assessing whether the 
component parts of the solution are feasible through helpful exchanges of information: 
“The investment directors must have been quite helpful” (CSO, Drugtech, first episode 
2009).  
Information flow 
In the comprehending phase, there is continuation of free and frank exchange of helpful 
views and ideas as: “The key personnel of the outsourced company and the company 
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management and consultants agreed” (CEO, Drugtech, first episode 2009). Exchange of 
information takes place between subgroups and involves all members of the board.  
Language and interpretive tasks 
The directors who are aware of a potential route to a solution are engaged in the 
interpretive task of bracketing. Bracketing the problem as uncontrollable in the scientific 
sense (the outcome could not be predicted) opens the possibility of solutions further 
down the process; as the diagnosis of the problem has been agreed and prognosis can 
begin. This may result in the conclusion that the solution lies in changing course: “The 
continuation of the programme was just too risky for a small company to consider” (CEO, 
Drugtech, first episode 2009).  Bracketing assists in further understanding the problem 
and setting up potential solutions and, in doing so, sets the scene for continuing to the 
next stages of the process, which is the prognosis, commencing with the positioning 
phase, described in the next section. Understanding the component parts of any putative 
solution (i.e. comprehending) is an essential phase prior to refining these views towards 
consensual decisions. 
4.6.3  Positioning  
The positioning phase involves debate in working towards a consensual solution and 
board resolution. Once the potential solutions are defined and understood, the next stage 
commences with the process of positioning debate and argument to work towards a 
consensual solution. In the case of Drugtech, the question becomes: The toxicology tests 
were valid, and although unpredictable, can the drug candidate still be developed into a 
medicine, or if not, should the drug development cease? The evidence suggests moving 
towards transferring to the topical programme. In Pharmadev, the whole board agrees 
that the board members and the scientists are aligned: “It was convincing because there 
were numbers to back up the science now” (CSO, Pharmadev, first episode 2012). 
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The interaction between all directors and outside parties, where useful, produces a wide 
spectrum of sources to search for a solution. This may result in more than one option, for 
example in the case of Drugtech, the options are to find an alternate drug development 
administration to develop the drug candidate as a medicine or to discontinue drug 
development entirely and close the company: 
A discussion was held around the new topical market size and competitor 
landscape, new costings, contingencies and challenges (CEO, Drugtech, 
first episode 2009). 
In the case of Medco, this would mean moving to a new strategy and plan with immediate 
effect. In the case of Pharmadev, this involves changing the Chair of the board, however, 
as is often the case, this is not combative: “The subcommittee of investors agreed that 
good men with personal gravitas were hard to come by” (CEO, Pharmadev, first episode 
2012). 
Board dynamics 
At this stage, the board of directors show mutual respect to each other in acknowledging 
their various positions, which is necessary for a fair assessment of which option would 
provide the optimal solution: “The Chair {new} worked with the scientists collaboratively” 
(Ex-Chair, Pharmadev, first episode 2012). This is the same board dynamic as prior 
phases. 
Information flow 
Information flow is freely exchanged between subgroups with ideas and value being 
added by all actors; the same information flow is observed as in previous phases. 
Language and interpretive tasks 
In their search for the optimal solution, the entrepreneurial managers typically engage in 
the interpretive task of labelling involving “stabilising the streaming of experience” (Weick 
et al., 2005 411) by socially constructing identity labels (Corley & Gioia, 2004). Labelling 
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involves expressing possible solutions and what they achieve, for example, the 
abandonment of a systemic development in favour of the development of a topical 
administration. Labelling is an effective way of communicating to others (the rest of the 
board and investors), making it clear why some new opportunities are being pursued and 
others abandoned.  This phase often involves forming the new mission statement and 
re-orienting the company’s goals and these tasks are clearly observed in the case of 
Drugtech. 
4.6.4  Accepting  
The final component of the open sensemaking process involves accepting the execution 
of an outcome through the reconciling of data, suggesting and discarding of data to arrive 
at the production of a sole narrative of the episode: “We should abandon the use of the 
compound as a systemic drug” (NED, Drugtech, first episode 2009), which was 
universally agreed around the board table. 
In the case of Pharmadev, the company transitions from a company that is going bust to 
a company with a viable and sustainable business model and there is agreement in the 
formation of a new strategy: “The transition of the company had to be engineered” (Ex-
Chair, Pharmadev, first episode 2012). As seen throughout the open sensemaking 
process, everybody works together and not against each other. 
Board dynamics  
The production of a sole narrative explaining why the sensemaking trigger happened and 
a route to re-aligned objectives and goals enables the board to consider a consensual 
decision which is not difficult to adopt, as they are acting in unison: “Everybody wanted 
to get a result” (Ex-Chair, Pharmadev, first episode 2012). 
Information flow 
All board actors at this stage appreciate the collective nature of gleaning sense from all 
actors around the board table, and they share information freely. 
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Language and interpretive tasks 
At the end of the accepting phase, there is little by way of interpretive tasks other than 
praiseworthy attribution: “Everybody worked well together” (CSO, Pharmadev, first 
episode 2012), which allows for an efficient board process when the next strategic 
decision is required. This is even the case in often contentious situations, such as during 
change: “The transition of the company was not difficult” (CSO, Pharmadev, first episode 
2012). The use of open sensemaking may increase the likelihood of subsequent open 
sensemaking and helps build trust. 
4.6.5 Open sensemaking in general 
As stated in encapsulated sensemaking; information flow, board dynamics and 
interpretive tasks all interact. But unlike in encapsulated sensemaking; during open 
sensemaking, information flow is mutual which allows for a collective sharing of 
interpretive tasks with all directors freely and frankly expressing their points of view. I 
define these new components in the Glossary as evidenced from the above empirical 
data, as follows: 
Accommodating phase 
Unfettered debate between subgroups to understand the challenge and scope of the 
problem. 
Comprehending phase 
Seeking an understanding of the component parts of the solution. 
Positioning phase 
Debate in working towards a consensual solution and board resolution. 
Accepting phase 
Agreement on the execution of an outcome through suggesting, discarding and 
reconciling information. 
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4.7  Discussion 
I commenced this Chapter with a critique to the way sensemaking has been treated in 
the literature, and focused on the critiques that my findings seek to address; the need for 
greater clarity around the sensemaking process, context, language and behaviour, power 
and politics and the retrospective versus prospective nature of sensemaking. The first 
issue I consider is the need for greater clarity around the sensemaking process and in 
doing so, I elaborate the phases of encapsulated and open sensemaking.  
In all encapsulated sensemaking episodes, I observe the presence of multiple 
interpretations of the trigger accompanied by sensegiving initiatives that progress the 
company towards failure. Due to the multiple accounts, individual board members could 
not find communal plausible solutions from a collective understanding of past events. I 
suggest that for collective sensemaking to occur, board members need to be able to 
reconcile information before agreeing a plausible solution. My analysis of the 
encapsulated sensemaking process suggests that to create order, economically powerful 
actors employ various sensegiving strategies to align the board members, rather than 
pursuing a more consensual approach. Specifically, due to differing interpretations of the 
sensemaking trigger, investor directors with stronger economic capital attempt to give 
sense to other board members with weaker economic capital who are reluctant to accept 
the proffered option as plausible. I argue however that the use of economic capital and 
power dynamics may be antagonistic to consensual decision-making within the 
sensemaking process, further considered and discussed in Chapter 6. I identify two 
sensegiving components that are overlooked in the literature, sensefreezing and 
senseforcing, as defined in Chapter 1. Sensebreaking, sensefreezing, senseforcing and 
sensehiding are all important sensegiving initiatives and are prospective (sensebreaking 
and sensehiding have already been identified as prospective by Gioia & Chittipeddi 
(1991)), challenging the retrospective view of sensemaking as suggested by Weick 
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(1995). These initiatives appear to cumulatively inhibit positive sensemaking and hence 
the restoration of order, which I identify as senseblocking (refer to the Glossary). Among 
these initiatives, sensehiding may contribute to failure as trust among the board directors 
is damaged, and may be beyond repair. Sensebreaking occurs whilst there is still frank 
and open debate across the board table, albeit disagreement and posturing for position. 
As soon as sensebreaking moves to sensefreezing, there is a disengagement of 
conversation, a breakdown in the free passage of information from entrepreneurial 
managers (with weaker economic capital) to investor directors (with stronger economic 
capital) and vice versa, and a lack of shared interpretation and resultant agreed action. 
This lack of agreed action progresses to a forced interaction where the investor directors 
dictate to the entrepreneurial managers and diminish the input of the entrepreneurial 
managers, to such an extent that the entrepreneurial managers withdraw entirely from 
the debate. In the senseforcing and sensehiding phases, all shared actions once again 
abate and the subgroups look for meaning from within their subgroup and from outside 
parties (e.g. the investors and advisors). I examine in Chapter 5 the sources of 
encapsulation by considering the individuals that make up each subgroup and consider 
decision-making in Chapter 6 as an outcome from the types of sensemaking examined 
here, encapsulated and open sensemaking. The four phases of open sensemaking 
(accommodating, comprehending, positioning and accepting) all involve the passing of 
sense from all actors, irrespective of whether they belong to investor directors’ or 
entrepreneurial managers’ subgroups.  This fully inclusive dialogue leads to swifter 
consensual decision-making (further considered in Chapter 6), with board directors that 
have been given the opportunity to express their views openly and freely. The board 
environment encourages the interchange of free and frank ideas. There is no or little 
need for compiling competitive argument because narratives are built in a consensual 
and social manner.  There is little requirement for power initiatives to be employed as 
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actors reach their required acceptable narrative of the episode, with options for solutions, 
without the need to attempt to influence. Outside parties are only used to complement or 
verify the narrative, rather than to oppose or deny it. Sensemaking is swift (taking months, 
not years) with no blame tactics or a lengthy search for plausible options to close the gulf. 
It is possible that through this entire open sensemaking process, the social need to make 
sense commences immediately and depending on the deemed severity and urgency, 
sensemaking can close the gulf in the agreement and delivery of new goals. In open 
sensemaking, the more traditional characteristics of social sensemaking as proffered by 
Weick (1995) hold. In my study, consensual decision-making is the outcome of open 
sensemaking and is a swifter process than outcomes of encapsulated sensemaking. 
When encapsulation occurs, the time of decision-making or indecision is extended often 
from months to years. This may be due to the social aspects becoming anti-social through 
subgroups only gleaning sense from their own subgroups and blocking sense extended 
by other subgroups and extra time is also needed to process newly introduced often 
conflicting data. These aspects are further considered in Chapter 6.  
I specifically take certain challenges from Sandberg & Tsoukas (2015) in which I believe 
I have met the challenge. I have already considered the process itself and now consider 
the issues of context, language and behaviour, power and politics and finally 
retrospective versus prospective sensemaking. Thus, in this Chapter, I respond to 
Sandberg & Tsoukas’s critique of the sensemaking literature for overlooking the process 
of sensemaking. By elaborating the various phases of encapsulated and open 
sensemaking, I am therefore able to contribute to the sensemaking literature (See 
Chapter 7). 
Context 
I state in the theoretical background to this Chapter that Sandberg & Tsoukas suggest 
that very few studies have empirically investigated how the influence of broader 
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institutional contexts (historical, cultural, epistemic, industrial etc.) is crucial for 
sensemaking efforts. I provide further empirical data to support the contextual nature of 
sensemaking. I highlight the effect subgroups have on entrepreneurial ventures (the 
investor directors and entrepreneurial managers) with varying degrees of power (further 
examined in Chapter 6).  In all encapsulated sensemaking episodes within this study, I 
observe powerful actors (the investor directors) initiating power game initiatives in the 
form of sensegiving initiatives to force their agenda. It may alter this board dynamic if the 
investors did not appoint investor directors and allowed the entrepreneurial managers, 
whom they have invested in to direct the board or alternatively employ a Chair who could 
mediate and either direct the board away from encapsulated sensemaking to open 
sensemaking, or endeavour to maintain an open sensemaking environment. I consider 
this scenario of Chair mediation of the board in Chapter 6. 
Language and behaviour 
I state in the theoretical background to this Chapter that language and behaviour through 
interpretive tasks are important for gaining a holistic and coherent interpretation of the 
observed sensemaking episode. During encapsulated sensemaking, language 
progresses from persuasive language during sensebreaking to provocative and 
dictatorial language during sensefreezing and senseforcing; and eventually debate and 
arguments are not heard between subgroups during sensehiding. In contrast, the 
language during open sensemaking is pleasant, polite, respectful and inquisitive in nature 
throughout all the phases. Behaviour through interpretive tasks in encapsulated 
sensemaking is initially between subgroups at the sensebreaking phase, moving to intra- 
subgroup at the sensefreezing phase, followed by a paralysis of the interpretation of 
tasks at the senseforcing phase as entrepreneurial managers view the tasks as purely 
imposed with no allowance for their interpretation. Finally, there is the task of attempting 
to build trust during encapsulated sensemaking episodes which fails in all cases in this 
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study, leading to a breakdown in board relations through the irreparable mistrust 
generated between the subgroups, commencing at the sensefreezing phase and leading 
into the later phases of senseforcing and sensehiding. In contrast, the interpretive tasks 
during open sensemaking involve subgroups gleaning sense from all directors, leading 
to a praiseworthy or blameless re-orientation of company goals as the outcome of the 
sensemaking episode. 
Power and politics 
I state in the theoretical background to this Chapter that Drori & Ellis (2011) depicted how 
conflict and power relations are ubiquitous to sensemaking and note that “multiple uses 
of sensegiving may well serve the interests of a management that pursues an inertia 
strategic path bolstered by internal hegemony and interests, even at the expense of 
better business practices and strategies”(15). From this study during encapsulated 
sensemaking episodes, inertia is observed as bolstered by internal hegemony and in the 
interests of one subgroup, the investor directors, who inadvertently use sensegiving 
initiatives in this manner. However, the entrepreneurial managers are not swayed as they 
have effectively had their voices silenced, and so inertia replaces any momentum around 
the board table to attain a consensual strategic decision. As power games, through 
sensegiving initiatives, are so prevalent in encapsulated sensemaking, I revisit this 
relationship in Chapter 6 to further understand the use of power in encapsulated 
sensemaking. In contrast, power game initiatives are rarely observed during open 
sensemaking episodes as there is no requirement to influence as individual subgroups 
freely interact with each other. The board moves forward to consensual decisions with 
an acceptance of ideas and positions to form the new set of direction and goals, which 
the board of the company is able to adopt as the new strategic plan. 
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Retrospective versus prospective sensemaking  
Increasing sensegiving initiatives by strong powerful subgroups of actors are proactive 
steps and hence prospective in nature. I believe that I have identified further prospective 
steps in adding the two new phases to encapsulated sensemaking, namely 
sensefreezing and senseforcing. Whereas sensemaking appears to be retrospective in 
its nature during open sensemaking, this does not hold during the episodes of 
encapsulated sensemaking. Further work is required in this area and I consider this in 
Chapter 7. 
4.8 Conclusion 
As well as the specific challenges above, Sandberg & Tsoukas (2015) state also the four 
general areas in their critique of sensemaking that require addressing which are as 
follows: Firstly, “there requires further work on process as the notion remains relatively 
vague”(20); secondly, “the concept of sense is insufficiently developed”(20); thirdly, 
“sensemaking overlooks the larger context in which it takes place”(20) and finally, 
“sensemaking reduces reality to subjective understanding”(20). I have considered new 
components for both encapsulated and open sensemaking and, in doing so, have added 
to the sensemaking literature, and removed some of the vagueness and further 
developed the concept of sense leading to positive and negative outcomes. I have sought 
to obtain some clarification of the process with an acknowledgement that there is much 
work still to be done in this area. I have outlined as much around the disruption of sense 
as around obtaining sense and have indicated that most sensegiving initiatives within 
encapsulated sensemaking lead to disruption, paralysis or obstruction to decision-
making. In contrast, I have shown that no or limited sensegiving is used in open 
sensemaking and there is more likelihood of consensual decision-making as a result. 
These findings are in the context of entrepreneurial ventures, where investor directors 
have joined the company board at the request of the investor, and such context leads to 
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episodes of encapsulated, as well as open sensemaking. I believe that the critique of 
sensemaking, reducing reality to subjectivity, is an intrinsic part of sensemaking as it 
stems from actors who are all taking subjective views of their world, and aligns with 
sensemaking being more about plausibility than accuracy.  
I have considered the relationship of power and sensegiving initiatives and believe such 
knowledge is useful to practitioners, considered further in Chapter 6. Although this 
research has sought to unpack the process of sensemaking, sensemaking is context 
specific, hence the generalization of findings cannot be extended to other contexts. I 
consider further limitations and further work in Chapter 7. 
The Weickian view (1993) of sensemaking involves the restoration of order from chaotic 
situations, however this view cannot be universally applied to all sensemaking processes. 
The Weickian view, as is evident from the evidence presented here, aligns with open 
sensemaking processes within the context of entrepreneurial ventures restoring goal 
congruence from equivocal positions. The restoration of order is observed in the cases 
where open sensemaking was observed, consistent with the definition of sensemaking:  
A process prompted by violated expectations, that involves attending to 
bracketing cues in the environment creating intersubjective meaning 
through cycles of interpretation and action and thereby enacting a more 
ordered environment from which further cues can be drawn. (Maitlis & 
Christianson 2014 11).  
I suggest that this definition is more applicable where open sensemaking is employed, 
as opposed to encapsulated sensemaking, as borne out by my data and analysis. I 
observe very different sensemaking phases in encapsulated sensemaking in the context 
of entrepreneurial ventures, which eventually lead to terminal decline. The distinction 
between encapsulated and open sensemaking is important as understanding the phases 
of these differing types of sensemaking lead to new process models. As stated in the 
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Introduction, this is of interest not only in advancing scholarly knowledge, but also with 
the aim of discovering a more effective board process leading to more efficient decision-
making processes.  
 
 
  
131 
 
CHAPTER 5: SENSEMAKING AND FAULTLINES IN ENTREPRENEURIAL 
VENTURES 
 
5.1     Introduction   
In this Chapter, I seek to develop a deeper understanding of the nature of faultlines (in 
terms of activation and strength) in entrepreneurial venture boards and the relationship 
between these faultlines and sensemaking.  
I consider numerous definitions of sensemaking in the introduction to this thesis and have 
settled on the following definition as the most appropriate for this study: “A process 
prompted by violated expectations, that involves attending to bracketing cues in the 
environment, creating intersubjective meaning through cycles of interpretation and action 
and thereby enacting a more ordered environment from which further cues can be drawn” 
(Maitlis & Christianson, 2014 11). Actors in entrepreneurial ventures need to deal with 
uncertainty as part of the decision-making process in response to adverse deviations 
from the business plan and, once a decision is made, the cycle of sensemaking may 
continue if ambiguity remains: “Sensemaking both precedes decision-making and follows 
it, providing the clear questions and clear answers that feed decision-making” (Weick, 
1993 636). Decision-making and the speed of decision-making are particularly important 
in dynamic, rapidly changing environments (Forbes, 2005). If there is a lack of or 
protracted decision-making, leading to lengthy periods before a decision is made, the 
venture is more likely to exhaust its limited resources, often in the form of its investment, 
and effectively fail. Decision-making is considered in depth in Chapter 6, but it is 
introduced in this Chapter, as both sensemaking and faultlines are important to 
understand further as precursors to decision-making. In the previous Chapter, I explored 
different types of sensemaking (encapsulated and open) by entrepreneurial venture 
boards and in this Chapter, I seek to understand the relationship between sensemaking 
and faultline activation and strength. Since whether sensemaking is open or 
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encapsulated can influence venture outcomes (positively and negatively retrospectively), 
and hence it is important to understand the antecedents. One antecedent that inductively 
emerged from my empirical analysis was faultlines. Faultlines are hypothetical dividing 
lines that split a group into two or more subgroups based on one or more individual 
attributes (Lau & Murnighan, 1998; Bezrukova et al., 2009). Lim, Busenitz & 
Chidambaram (2013) consider entrepreneurial ventures within the context of faultline 
discussion and propose that new venture teams often comprise idea-conceiving founders 
and equity-based investors, and that such subgroups represent a faultline. These 
subgroups are often represented at board level with investor directors representing the 
investors and entrepreneurial managers representing the management of the company.   
The presence of faultlines can arguably increase the likelihood of encapsulation because 
encapsulation involves engaging with those in one’s own subgroup at the expense of 
those outside of the subgroup. Indeed Thatcher & Patel (2012) suggest: 
One aspect of the original faultline conception that has largely been 
absent from the literature on faultlines is the idea of sensemaking. It is 
unclear how the sensemaking process is developed, reinforced or 
weakened through subgroup and group-level routines and exchanges 
(993).  
Interestingly in my research, I found that despite the presence of latent faultlines, some 
boards engage in open rather than encapsulated sensemaking. However, I found that 
the sensemaking occurring in a venture board influenced the nature of the faultlines 
themselves. Intrigued by this relationship, in this Chapter I explore this relationship 
between sensemaking and faultlines. I am interested in the research questions: What is 
the nature of faultlines in entrepreneurial venture boards? And how do faultlines promote 
encapsulated and open sensemaking in entrepreneurial venture boards? The inductive 
analysis of three entrepreneurial ventures suggests that the presence and nature 
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(activation and strength) of faultlines may influence the type of sensemaking engaged by 
entrepreneurial venture boards. In this Chapter, I use the three theories of sensemaking, 
faultlines and Bourdieu’s theory of practice, to explain the relationship between 
sensemaking and faultlines. I review these theories and then follow this with the empirical 
settings and methods, research context and study design, data collection and analysis, 
concluding in a discussion, and a new model describing the link between faultline 
activation and strength and the encapsulated sensemaking process. 
5.2      Sensemaking and faultlines  
Venture capital backed entrepreneurial ventures are governed by boards of directors. As 
stated in Chapter 1, these boards initially include idea-conceiving founders but they may 
later incorporate owner managers (entrepreneurial managers) and representatives of the 
equity-based investors (investor directors). In the context of entrepreneurial ventures, a 
key challenge for a venture capital backed board is to maximise its collective ability to 
produce optimal outcomes (strategic decisions) through an effective board process. This 
collective ability to make effective strategic decisions may be influenced by the diversity 
of the groups within the board.  
Since Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) seminal work, strategic management scholars have 
demonstrated the impact that the upper echelons of a firm (i.e. the top management 
team) can have on strategic decision-making and firm-level outcomes. Knippenberg et 
al. (2011) found that top management teams could have a negative effect on 
organizational outcomes if the members of the top management team did not all share 
the same objectives. In entrepreneurial ventures, strategic management of the business 
is carried out not only by the top management team but also by external board members. 
Some scholars have even referred to the board of directors in entrepreneurial ventures 
as the extended team (Vanaelst et al., 2006; Knockhaert et al., 2013). Alignment of the 
firm’s objectives may be particularly challenging in those settings where investor directors 
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take their instructions from the investors and entrepreneurial managers from the board. 
The investors and investor directors may view the venture as part of a larger portfolio of 
investments and their prime goal is to generate a portfolio return, whereas the 
entrepreneurial managers may want to maximise the return from this individual 
investment and have little or no regard for a broader portfolio.   
Over the past three decades, research on group diversity has focussed on the effects of 
group composition on group-level outcomes (Thatcher & Patel, 2012). An emerging line 
of research in this area, as introduced above, is that of group faultlines, which mainly 
draws on social identity theory. There has been increasing research interest in this 
subgroup formation, (akin to the subgroupings of directors on boards, i.e. investor 
directors and entrepreneurial managers) and the potential this should explain the 
dynamics caused by composition distribution (Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp & Gilson, 2008). 
While entrepreneurial managers and investor directors have received considerable 
research attention separately, only limited research (Lim, Busenitz & Chidambaram, 
2013) has considered them as subgroups comprising the decision-making body of an 
entrepreneurial venture (i.e. the board). As already stated, Lim et al. (2013) consider 
entrepreneurial ventures within the context of faultline discussion and propose that new 
venture teams often comprise idea-conceiving founders and equity-based investors, and 
that such subgroups represent a faultline. These subgroups are often represented at 
board level with investor directors representing the investors and entrepreneurial 
managers representing the management of the company.  Lim et al. (2013 48) suggest 
these two distinct subgroups are created around how the members structure the overall 
venture (structural dimension) and how they view it (cognitive dimension). However, the 
authors do not drill down into the attributes of the individuals that make up the subgroups. 
Previously, the focus of faultline research had been to align demographic attributes (age, 
race, gender, etc.) to the hypothetical dividing lines that split a group (Thatcher & Patel, 
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2012 970). There has also been limited work on non-demographic attributes, which 
include the consideration of attributes such as personality and geographical work 
location. I suggest there is a need to move beyond demographic attributes to further our 
understanding of faultlines; e.g. their personal networks, education, culture, shareholding 
and attributed voting power. I have an interest in understanding such individual attributes 
of the individuals that make up the subgroups and in doing so, seek to add to the faultline 
literature through an assessment of their formation. 
Evidence suggests faultlines affect group processes as well as affective and performance 
outcomes (Lau & Murnighan, 2005; Li & Hambrick, 2005; Barkema & Shvyrkov, 2007; 
Bezrukova et al., 2009; Choi & Sy, 2010). Strong subgroup differences explain why 
faultlines have an influence on group processes and outcomes, however this is not 
deemed to be entirely due to diversity between groups. It is acknowledged that the time 
and energy spent in attempting to bridge the chasm created by a strong faultline means 
less time for and focus on meeting the group’s goals (Li & Hambrick, 2005). Subgroups 
can also become competitive with each other (Brewer, 1996; Halevy, 2008) and 
communication hindrances prevent necessary knowledge exchange (Halevy, 2008). In 
my empirical work, I consider these subgroup attributes, focusing on the social, culture 
and economic capital introduced by each actor. This is explained more fully later in this 
Chapter when considering Bourdieu’s theory of practice.  Faultlines may have negative 
repercussions such as coalition formation and conflict on group outcomes (Chrobot-
Mason et al., 2009; Jehn & Bezrukova, 2010). Yet, there has been some argument for 
the positive effects of faultlines. Bezrukova & Uparna (2009) argue that faultline presence 
may increase creativity, while Gibson & Vermeulen (2003) suggest that moderate 
faultlines may lead to an increase in group learning. The psychological support provided 
by subgroups may have positive benefits to individuals where strong faultlines can 
moderate the relationship between perceived injustice and individual outcomes (Spell et 
136 
 
al., 2011). However, these studies provide little insight into how faultlines emerge in the 
first place, and whether the sensemaking processes unpacked in Chapter 4 relate to 
these faultlines activation and strength.  
A faultline is considered strong (Lau & Murnighan, 1998) if the following three conditions 
are met: Firstly, the subgroups within the group are of similar size; secondly, there is a 
high level of homogeneity across other attributes within each subgroup; and thirdly, there 
is a high level of heterogeneity between subgroups based on attributes; e.g. in one group 
there are females in their sixties and in the other there are males in their thirties. However, 
Thatcher & Patel (2012) suggest that the evidence has failed to consistently produce a 
combination of attributes making up a faultline that has a significant effect on group 
outcomes; a gap which I seek to address in this study. This is not a criticism of the 
attribute studies themselves, but a lack of attention to gaining a deeper understanding of 
the formation of faultlines. I use the above criteria in qualitatively assessing the relative 
strength of faultlines. Since my empirical study suggests that faultlines (including their 
strength) are influenced by individual actors’ dispositions as shaped by their capital 
endowments, it is appropriate to consider Bourdieu’s theory of practice.  
5.3        Using Bourdieu to understand faultlines 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice concerns itself with the interactions between individuals, 
and extends the sense of the term “capital” by employing it in a wider system of 
exchanges, and in doing so moves away from the purely narrow instance of mercantile 
exchange (economic capital) to a wider scope of cultural and social capital (refer to 
Glossary). Bourdieu is not new to the literature on entrepreneurship (e.g. Anderson & 
Miller, 2003; De Clercq & Voronov, 2009; Bhugavalula et al., 2010; Bloom & Smith, 2010), 
however Bourdieu’s theory of practice has not been deployed to explain elements of 
faultline formation. As outlined above, faultlines have been identified in the literature by 
considering demographic characteristics that are merely a proxy for individual cognitions. 
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Bourdieu’s theory of practice may capture individual cognitions more effectively and 
hence offer an alternate way of explaining faultlines by considering the individual group 
members’ disposition, that is shaped by their capital, and which may in turn explain 
faultline formation. 
Bourdieu’s notion of capital and disposition may help explain how people see the world. 
Although Lim et al consider cognition, they do so in the context of how members view the 
overall venture (2013 48) but not through the lenses of individual board members. 
Bourdieu identifies actors as being in unique social positions comprising their economic, 
cultural and social capital, as generated by decades of lived experience (Bourdieu, 1986). 
These combinations shape actors’ dispositions towards the field (Bourdieu, 1988), and it 
is these dispositions that are actors’ enduring schemes of perception (cognition), 
interpretation and action (Bourdieu, 1989) and in this context, exist mainly at the 
unconscious (taken for granted) level (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).  Bourdieu accounts 
for the structure and functioning of the social world by introducing three forms of capital 
(Bourdieu, 1986). The notion of cultural capital initially presented itself to Bourdieu as an 
explanation for the unequal scholastic achievement of children originating from the 
different social classes (Bourdieu, 1986). For Bourdieu, cultural capital encompasses a 
broad array of linguistic competences, manners, preferences and orientations, which 
Bourdieu terms the subtle modalities in the relationship between culture and language 
(Bourdieu, 1977). He views cultural capital as an embodied state that begins in early 
childhood and requires adults to sensitise the child to cultural distinctions. 
Institutionalised forms include educational qualifications and the objectified state, which 
stem from items such as books, paintings, artefacts, etc. Bourdieu views social capital 
as capital generated by networking through social processes, including networks 
between the family and wider society (Bourdieu, 1986), and sees economic capital as 
wealth inherited from interactions between the individual and the economy (Bourdieu, 
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1986). Bourdieu suggests that a form of capital could be converted to another, for 
example economic capital could be converted into cultural capital by buying an 
education. Within the context of entrepreneurial ventures, Bourdieu’s three forms of 
capital can be considered as follows: Firstly, economic capital is expressed as power 
through property rights, often expressed by the degree to which an actor has rights of 
control through equity ownership, or through the representation of an investor. Actors’ 
ownership of other investments also adds to economic capital. Secondly, cultural capital 
is represented as the actor’s area of expertise; actors’ educational background and their 
experience in the position that they have taken in the entrepreneurial venture are of 
relevance. Additional experience that may shape actors’ cultural capital might include the 
extent of their financial expertise, commercial expertise and technological expertise. 
Thirdly, social capital is expressed as the nature of relationships that span the different 
domains of expertise. Within the context of entrepreneurial ventures, the networking of 
the actors is of relevance and will be considered in this study. Whereas Lockett et al. 
(2014) explore the multi-dimensional nature of social positions to examine how 
sensemaking is influenced by actors, I extend this work by using such positions to 
examine faultline formation, which I believe is an important and little researched area that 
is shaped by the extent and type of sensemaking. 
In this Chapter, I empirically examine the sensemaking episodes following six adverse 
deviations from the business plan. I pay attention to the role played by sensemaking in 
shaping the faultlines that follows adverse deviations from the business plan. In so doing, 
I seek to extend the research on faultlines by considering the antecedent building blocks 
that lead to their formation. I aim to explain how different actors make sense of events in 
different ways and how the faultlines are shaped through this sensemaking. I also 
highlight the role and disposition of those people who span group memberships and their 
potential effect on sensemaking. In so doing I advance the work on faultlines, which is 
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largely based on demographic information and drawing on psychological work on 
cognition, to focus on the socio-cognitive issues associated with sensemaking.  
5.4         Data and methods 
5.4.1      Research settings, participants and data collection 
The research setting, research participants and data collection are as per the methods 
section presented in Chapter 3. 
5.4.2       Study design 
The study of processes such as sensemaking involves observing and interpreting 
individuals and groups of homogeneous actors’ accounts (their understanding of an 
unfolding story). This calls for a qualitative method (Isabella, 1990; Gioia & Thomas, 
1996) with the potential to compare situations across similar case studies of comparable 
organisations. The present study meets these criteria where both retrospective and real-
time sensemaking dynamics are followed (Gover & Duxbury, 2012). Semi-structured 
interviews were used in this study to collect and analyse the data. As proffered by Lim et 
al. (2013), the entrepreneurial managers (often the founders) and investor directors 
constitute two subgroups within boards of directors. In the second subgroup, there is 
often a proxy for the funders, in the shape of one or more investor directors that are 
appointed by the investor, to look after the interest of the investor. Although I 
acknowledge the above work of Lim et al., I seek to induce the faultlines and groups from 
the data, as it may be that homogeneous subgroups differ in different cases. For 
example, the Chair could be an appointee under the investment agreement to act on 
behalf of the investor, or he/she could be independent, thus bringing additional skills to 
the company.  
5.5  Data analysis and coding procedure 
The data analysis proceeded through three cycles of inductive and deductive reasoning 
(cf. Hoffman & Ocasio, 2004; Gavetti & Rivkin, 2007). An initial review of the literature on 
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sensemaking led me to expect that rich episodes of sensemaking would follow 
substantial adverse deviations from the business plan in entrepreneurial businesses. My 
analysis of sensemaking during these episodes, however, revealed the presence of 
subgroups in the entrepreneurial ventures I studied, which in turn led me to explore the 
group faultlines literature which I had not reviewed at the start of this research. 
The first round of analysis involved a fine-grained reading of the data, which Strauss & 
Corbin (1990) refer to as microanalysis. Narratives were then created for each of the 
three case studies with emphasis on periods when there was an observed adverse 
deviation from the business plan, as well as the sensemaking processes that followed. 
These narratives comprised a chronological depiction of events based on data derived 
from interviews, archival sources, correspondence and meeting minutes.  
From these narratives, I built an initial list of themes and codes for data analysis. My 
interest was around capital and disposition and whether an episode contained open or 
encapsulated sensemaking. Faultlines were observed from the data and included in 
Table 5.7, where an assessment of their relative strengths could be made.  The data 
were read multiple times to generate any further coding. The views of different 
stakeholders were integrated by using interviews, public documents, emails and other 
sources of relevance. The richness of the data enabled triangulation between these 
various documents to allow for refinement, critique and further interviewing if it became 
evident that further clarification and explanation was needed to piece together the chain 
of events. 
In the second round of analysis, I began to theorise on the written longitudinal narratives. 
I proceeded to code these in an inductive manner, creating a set of largely empirical 
codes categorised as “open coding” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Open coding refers to 
analysis that deals with the labelling and categorising of phenomena as indicated by the 
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data.  Subsequently, data are compared and similar incidents are grouped together under 
the same conceptual label.  
The third round of analysis involved axial coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), which is a 
practice of structuring data into aggregate dimensions (Corley & Gioia, 2004). During this 
stage of analysis, the emphasis tends towards teasing out theoretical interpretations of 
the data contained in the empirical results. Table 5.1 details the data coding and structure 
employed in moving from the first order codes to the aggregate theoretical dimensions.  
The fourth round of analysis involved temporal sequencing. This integrates all the 
previous rounds into a temporal explanation of actors’ capital, dispositions and the 
sensemaking process, and differs from the first round in that the first round merely builds 
the story from individual data sources, and does not link the data into the theory. Although 
there can be many interpretations of events (Van Maanan, 1988), the rounds of analysis 
that were followed helped to avoid fitting the data to illustrate a theory (Wodak, 2004 
200). Further, the approach taken constantly interrogated the three theories (faultlines, 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice and sensemaking) along with the data generated 
throughout the study (Locke, 1996). 
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First-Order Codes 
Theoretical 
Categories 
Aggregate 
Theoretical 
Dimensions  
Degree to which an actor has residual rights of control 
through equity ownership, or through the representation 
of an owner 
Economic 
capital 
Capital 
Actors’ ownership of other investments 
Background / role played by an actor (eg finance, 
scientist, commercial) 
  
Jurisdictional calls on specialists’ knowledge Cultural capital 
Evidence of actors’ prior experience of creating economic 
wealth 
  
Diversity of relationships spanning different stakeholder 
groups 
Social capital 
Awareness and understanding of the interests and 
perspectives of other professional groups Allocentrism / 
egocentrism 
Disposition 
Perception of degree to which they were able to act 
independently of the influence of others 
The degree to which the actor’s focal concern is defined 
by their role in the venture Role 
orientation The extent to which the actor’s orientation is to the 
venture (as opposed to other commitments) 
Statements about how actors worked through equivocal 
issues surrounding the sensemaking episode with other 
members employed in their role   
  
Form of 
sensemaking 
Statements about the influence of those in similar/same 
roles in shaping one’s thinking about the sensemaking 
episode 
Encapsulated 
sensemaking 
Evidence of actors forming subgroups and holding 
discussions behind closed doors 
  
Statements about how they worked through issues 
around uncertainty with a wide range of actors employed 
in different roles Open 
sensemaking 
Statements about the diversity of people, across different 
roles, who shaped their thinking about the venture 
 
 
Table 5.1: Data coding for capital, disposition and sensemaking 
5.6  Findings and analysis 
My analysis of the episodes revealed a distinct set of common attributes for these groups 
of actors. I initially use Bourdieu to consider the capital and disposition of each actor, and 
I then consider whether I can group the actors based on such attributes as the degree of 
homogeneity across the grouping. Finally, I explore why any homogeneous groups based 
on capital as influenced by disposition may affect the faultline activation and strength and 
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the relationship between sensemaking and faultlines. Tables 5.2 - 5.4 detail the capital 
ascribed to each actor for both episodes within each company. Since Lim et al. (2013) 
have already suggested the potential for faultlines between entrepreneurial managers 
and investor directors; I started arranging the data in this manner and in doing so 
discovered homogeneity in some of the subgroups. Using the data from Tables 5.2 - 5.4, 
the following observations can be made in relation to the two homogeneous groups, with 
the Chair in some cases representing a distinct actor from the entrepreneurial managers 
and investor directors. 
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Assessment 
of capital (in 
bold) 
Sensemaking 
Episode 
Economic capital Cultural capital Social capital 
Management Team 
CEO (Ian 
Petersen) 
1 & 2 
No other 
investments 
First appointment in 
SME Biotech as 
CEO  
No network in 
Biotech 
LOW   LOW LOW LOW 
CSO (Jeffrey 
White) 
1 & 2 
<10% 
shares/options and 
no other 
investments  
Academic opinion 
leader with PhD 
working for UK/US 
universities with 
commercial acumen  
Network in 
academic circles  
MEDIUM   LOW HIGH MEDIUM 
Investor Directors 
Investor 
Director 
(Jeremy 
White) 
1 & 2 
>25% voting rights 
plus power to enact 
typical venture 
capital covenants 
Responsible for 
other investments 
From an investment 
and consulting 
background with no 
early stage direct 
business building 
experience 
Possesses a 
strong network 
but not from 
within the industry 
MEDIUM TO 
HIGH 
  HIGH MEDIUM MEDIUM 
Investor 
Director 
(Stephen 
Wright) 
1 & 2 
>25% voting rights 
plus power to enact 
typical venture 
capital covenants 
Responsible for 
other investments 
From an investment 
and consulting 
background with no 
early stage direct 
business building 
experience 
Possesses a 
strong network 
but only within 
venture capital 
circles 
MEDIUM TO 
HIGH 
  HIGH MEDIUM MEDIUM 
Chair 
 (Peter 
Newall) 
1 
Did not possess the 
level of economic 
capital of the 
Investor Directors 
and <1% share 
options, but more 
influence than 
management team 
Retired from a multi-
national, but no 
experience of SMEs 
other than non-
executive 
appointments 
Had substantial 
network but 
outside this 
industrial sector 
LOW TO 
MEDIUM 
  LOW  TO MEDIUM  LOW MEDIUM 
 
Table 5.2: Board capital in Pharmadev 
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Assessment 
of capital (in 
bold) 
Sensemaking 
Episode 
Economic capital Cultural capital Social capital 
Management Team 
CEO (Janet 
Smith) 
1 & 2 <10% shares/options 
Graduate with MBA 
and 1st CEO 
appointment in SME 
branch 
No network in 
Biotech 
LOW   LOW LOW LOW 
CSO (Ian 
Smith) 
1 & 2 
<10% shares/options 
and no other 
investments  
Engineer and 
research degree, 
regulatory and 
compliance 
Network in 
academic circles  
LOW TO 
MEDIUM 
  LOW MEDIUM MEDIUM 
Investor Directors 
Investor 
Director 
(James 
Blunkett) 
1 & 2 
>25% voting rights 
plus power to enact 
typical venture 
capital covenants  
As well being 
financial astute, he 
also possessed 
experience through 
acting as both 
investor as well as 
CEO and CFO 
Substantial 
network – 
commercial and 
investment- 
having being a 
CEO of a quoted 
company with a 
track record in 
successful 
investing 
 HIGH   HIGH HIGH HIGH 
Investor 
Director 
(Peter 
Northwick) 
1 & 2 
>25% voting rights 
plus power to enact 
typical venture 
capital covenants  
Undergraduate 
degree with a MBA, 
stemming from an 
investment 
background with no 
direct business 
building experience 
Possesses a 
strong network but 
only within venture 
capital circles 
MEDIUM TO 
HIGH 
  HIGH MEDIUM MEDIUM 
Chair 
 (Hugh 
Mortimer) 
1 & 2 (part) 
Did not possess the 
level of economic 
capital of the 
Investor Directors 
and <10% share 
options, but more 
influence than 
management team 
Commenced life in 
the public sector, but 
swiftly moved to 
commercial roles and 
management of a 
corporate equity 
portfolio. He had not 
held prior Chair or 
CEO appointments in 
start-up ventures  
Had substantial 
network but only 
within medical 
device circles 
LOW TO 
MEDIUM 
  LOW TO MEDIUM  MEDIUM MEDIUM 
 
Table 5.3: Board capital in Medco 
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Assessment 
of capital (in 
bold) 
Sensemaking 
Episode 
Economic capital Cultural capital Social capital 
Management Team 
CEO 
(Sebastian 
Petersen) 
1 & 2 
<10% shares/options 
No other investments 
Graduate with ACA 
1st CEO appointment 
in SME Biotech 
No network in 
Biotech 
LOW   LOW LOW LOW 
CSO (Gerard 
Britten) 
1 & 2 
<10% shares/options 
No other investments 
PhD - Academic 
opinion leader 
working for UK/US 
universities 
Network in 
academic circles  
 MEDIUM   LOW HIGH MEDIUM 
Investor Directors 
Investor 
Director 
(James 
White) 
1 
>25% voting rights 
plus power to enact 
typical venture 
capital covenants  
Responsible for 
other investments 
Legal background 
with no early stage 
direct business 
building experience 
Already had a 
network but not 
within biotech 
circles 
MEDIUM-
HIGH 
  HIGH MEDIUM MEDIUM 
Investor 
Director (Ben 
Skilman) 
1 
>25% voting rights 
plus power to enact 
typical venture 
capital covenants  
Responsible for 
other investments 
PhD with a banking 
background.  Little 
early stage direct 
business building 
experience 
Possesses a 
strong network but 
only within venture 
capital and 
banking circles 
MEDIUM-
HIGH 
  HIGH MEDIUM MEDIUM 
Chair & Independent Director 
 Peter 
Edmonson & 
Edward Gray 
(Independent 
Director)  
1 & 2 
Do not possess the 
level of economic 
capital of the 
Investor Directors 
and <1% share 
options  No other 
investments 
Have backgrounds in 
science and 
management but not 
in entrepreneurial 
ventures 
Have substantial 
network but only 
within large 
pharmaceutical 
circles 
LOW- 
MEDIUM 
  LOW LOW MEDIUM 
 
                                      Table 5.4: Board capital in Drugtech 
In considering faultline presence and strength, I now consider whether patterns can be 
established across the subgroups. I then summarise these patterns in Table 5.7, where 
I consider the homogeneity and heterogeneity of the subgroups.  
In terms of the entrepreneurial managers, it is evident the data strongly suggests a 
homogeneous subgroup with similar capital. The following is evident from the data: No 
one in this group has substantial economic capital and no one has enough voting power 
to prevent a special resolution being passed, which requires 75% voting rights; the value 
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of the shares they do possess have “hope” value (i.e. only have any significant value if 
future events turn out positively) and are not realisable until a sale; no one in the group 
possessed any investment capital in other unquoted companies when they entered the 
position; all possess high standards of educational attainment and hence high levels of 
cultural capital, and since the CEOs had little by way of an established network in the 
industry, the remaining management plugged this gap by providing access to academic 
and industrial relevant networks. The social capital is deemed homogeneous in that the 
subgroup covers academic and industrial networks and is therefore strong in academic 
and industrial circles, but is weaker in investment and funding circles. 
In terms of the investor directors, the data strongly suggests a homogeneous subgroup 
with similar capital profiles: Everyone in this group has substantial economic capital; 
everyone has sufficient voting power to prevent the passing of a special resolution, which 
requires 75% voting rights; the voting rights of the shares they represent allow for actions 
that could substantially affect the management team, e.g. to enact covenants that may 
lose the management their entire shareholding; all have responsibility for other 
investments; all possess high standards of educational attainment, and hence high levels 
of cultural capital and all have extensive networks, albeit some only in the venture capital 
industry. Hence, they typically have stronger social capital in investment and funding 
circles than in industrial and academic circles. 
The Chair stands out as distinct from these two subgroups. The literature review of the 
Chair is within Chapter 6 where the mediation role of the Chair is discussed further. The 
Chair must take the prime leadership position in attempting to obtain consensus in 
committing the company’s resource to a set course to meet the overall objectives of the 
company. A board can only become effective if organised as a collective decision-making 
body, and the Chair has a pivotal role in achieving this aim. A Chair has no statutory 
position and ranks equally in legal terms with all other directors. The Chair may be 
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brought in by the investors and investor directors or the entrepreneurial managers. The 
Chair cannot be deemed to be part of one of the other subgroups, due to the following: 
One of the Chairs (Medco) was appointed by the investor, one of the Chairs (Pharmadev) 
was appointed by a founder investor, namely the University, and the third Chair 
(Drugtech) was appointed by the company before venture capital had been raised; 
although none had significant holdings in the company that they chaired, the second had 
other holdings and the third had no other investments in unquoted venture capital backed 
companies; and all had differing cultural and social capital. The Chairs act and 
sometimes align with one subgroup or outside all subgroups due, in part, to the 
heterogeneity of their capital relative to the identified subgroups. 
After consideration of the individual actors’ capital, I now explain relationships between 
capital and disposition. The actors are influenced through their social positions, including 
dispositions in the form of egocentric or role-centric behaviour, or behaviour that stems 
from a disposition to think about others and to behave in relation to them, which is defined 
as allocentrism (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Lockett et al., 2014). Allocentrism is the 
movement away from the natural egocentrism of the individual and results in a disposition 
to think about others and to behave in relation to them: 
Allocentrism manifests itself in terms of movement from self-centred to 
decentred states on social, affective, moral, relational and cognitive 
dimensions (Thornberry, 1997). 
Allocentrism may be of significance when considering the varying subgroups of the 
board. If an actor or group of actors observes events through the lenses of others, then 
there may be a greater potential for understanding the viewpoint of others, with a 
subsequent acceptance of a position that the board can adopt. Allocentrism is more 
available to actors who possess more diverse networks and a broader education, simply 
because they are exposed to differing views and a more comprehensive use of language 
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in differing contexts and culture, however this does not necessarily translate into 
allocentrism. Allocentrism can remain latent; this would be the case where an actor 
deems he does not need to act in such a way to achieve a decision that he believes to 
be the correct decision for the company. In contrast, egocentrism derived from Jean 
Piaget’s 1951 theory of cognitive development refers to an inability to differentiate 
between the self and others (Anderman & Anderman, 2009). Table 5.5 following 
summarises the venture pursuit, due to the roles that the subgroups play and whether 
they are investor driven or enterprise driven and the ego/allocentrism of the identified 
subgroups induced from the data. 
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Case 
Sub-  
group 
Role orientation Ego/allocentrism 
  Em 
Sustainable venture 
growth 
Egocentric 
Medco Ids Financial return and exit 
Allocentric (1st 
episode) Egocentric 
(2nd episode) 
  Chair Financial return and exit Egocentric 
 Pharmadev 
Em 
Scientists – sustainable 
venture growth (1st 
episode)  
Allocentric (1st 
episode) Egocentric 
(2nd episode) Financial return (2nd 
episode) 
Ids Financial return and exit 
Allocentric (1st 
episode) Egocentric 
(2nd episode) 
Chair Financial return and exit 
Allocentric (1st 
episode) Egocentric 
(2nd episode) 
 Drugtech 
Em 
Sustainable venture 
growth  
Allocentric CEO (1st 
episode) Egocentric 
(2nd episode) 
Ids  Financial return and exit Egocentric  
Chair Financial return and exit Egocentric 
 
Key:  Em = Entrepreneurial managers, Ids = Investor directors representing investors 
Table 5.5: Dispositions of board subgroups 
 
5.7  Capital and disposition 
As stated in the Introduction to this thesis: “An entrepreneurial venture typically starts 
with a founder or founders who have an idea” (Byers, Dorf & Nelson, 2010). During the 
initial stage of growth, founders may seek finance from their own resource or friends and 
family, and then seek external finance at a later stage in the form of venture capital (Cox, 
Katila & Eisenhardt, 2012). It is during these times of investment that boards appoint 
further directors to represent the interest of the new investors (Bagley & Dauchy, 2008). 
As the board increases after progressive investment rounds, the proportion of outside 
directors also increases (Lerner, 1995). Although it is more usual for an outside investor 
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to appoint an investor director, not all make such appointments (Kaplan & Stromberg, 
2003) and further non-executive directors (of which investor directors are a subgroup) 
may be appointed due to their market, competitor or technical knowledge (Bagley & 
Dauchy, 2008). The investor directors have a primary role of protecting their investment 
and the entrepreneurial managers have a primary role of growing the enterprise value of 
the business guided by board decision-making. These roles in this context means 
sustainable venture growth is pursued by the entrepreneurial managers and financial 
return and exit is pursued by the investor directors. If the entrepreneurial managers are 
not founders, but parachuted into the venture by the investors, they act like investor 
directors.  I bring out this relationship and explore relationships between individual actors’ 
capital and disposition, such as ego/allocentrism. The reason for such an analysis is an 
attempt to understand whether links between certain types of actors’ capital (economic, 
cultural and social) and their disposition affect the formation and strengthening of 
faultlines.  
First sensemaking episode at Medco 
In their drive for an exit, an acquisition target was identified by the company to attempt 
to purchase market ready products, which would accelerate the company’s revenue 
growth and make it look more appealing to potential purchasers and the capital markets. 
This target was found and it subsequently took several months to secure a deal, but the 
company acquired its target. Through the transaction, the company acquired the target’s 
assets, including the rights to commercialise its products and intellectual property 
portfolio. However, the entrepreneurial managers and an investor director believed that 
there was a further acquisition target that was more closely aligned to the core business 
and would be a substantially better fit, which would solve the issue that triggered the 
sensemaking, namely missing a pivotal revenue target. This disagreement only became 
evident when the company missed its revenue target, as before this event, there was no 
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or little need for sensemaking on this issue. The entrepreneurial managers and an 
investor director took an opposing view to the rest of the board: 
We had acquired a company, but nobody else on the board seemed 
interested in doing any further acquisitions other than the management 
and James, {an investor director} and it was a no go (CEO, Medco, first 
episode 2013).  
The investor director, James, who voted to continue with the acquisition strategy, was 
unable to persuade the investor directors because collectively they held stronger 
economic capital and believed that the company needed no further acquisition activity to 
gain the required exit at a specified time point, which indicates that their priority was to 
their portfolio and not to the individual venture. A further acquisition would merely delay 
the timing of an exit and the investor directors believed sufficient organic growth, as 
proffered in the business plan, should attract a satisfactory selling price for the venture. 
Although initially there was informed and open debate on the subject at the board 
meetings, James was unable to persuade his fellow investor directors of the need for 
acquisition to fund the required growth. The investor directors gained enough overall 
board support to pass a resolution in favour of their position (i.e. no further acquisitions). 
This outcome indicates subgroups with stronger economic capital (the investor directors) 
can force decisions on subgroups with weaker economic capital. The investor directors, 
who possessed the voting power of the investor, which was always substantially more 
than the entrepreneurial managers, had a requirement to consider the portfolio return 
before the individual investment return, which often conflicted with the requirement of the 
entrepreneurial managers to maximise the individual investment return. 
Second sensemaking episode at Pharmadev 
In the second sensemaking episode at Pharmadev the investor directors, and part of the 
management team that had been parachuted in by the investor to address a missed 
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revenue target, contributed to the board’s indecision over whether to pursue a sale that 
eventually collapsed, thirty-six months after the commencement of the adverse deviation, 
with no input from the scientists. The CSO noted during the first month of the episode: 
“From a harmonious shareholder base, appeared a King Maker almost out of the blue” 
(CSO, Pharmadev, second episode 2012). This was due to a change in the management 
of a principal venture capitalist investor. This venture house placed a new investor 
director on the board, “the King Maker” who thought he knew best and whose position 
was made clear through a directive issued during his first month in office: “Comply with 
me or you will not receive any further investment” (Inv Dir, Pharmadev, second episode 
2013). During 2007-2008, the financial market became difficult and the financial collapse 
was beginning. The appetite for venture capital funding from financial institutions started 
to become more limited. The CSO expressed the feeling of the entrepreneurial 
managers: “The agenda of the King Maker was to surround the company with his own 
people and what that actually achieved was to destroy the soul of the company which 
had been built up over the preceding years” (CSO, Pharmadev, second episode 2012). 
He undermined the Chair by suggesting that he did not have the scientific background 
necessary to lead the company to success. Regardless of this posturing, the Chair 
wanted to move to a non-executive position for personal reasons and stood aside to 
make way for: “A Chair to have a clear pitch to run at it” (Ex-Chair, Pharmadev, second 
episode 2012). The King Maker also started to dictate to the CSO what sort of science 
he should be doing, which led to a combative environment. The CSO recalled: 
We were riding on the crest of a wave, we had a lead on the opposition, 
our competitors worldwide, and everything was working out the way we 
had said. I did not believe in the sector specialists because their ideas 
were old ideas and we had to maintain ourselves (CSO, Pharmadev, 
second episode 2012). 
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This venture capital funder, through their investor director, pressured the board to accept 
their nominee. The King Maker insisted on the right to appoint directors. The new board 
members who had strong economic capital had been parachuted in by the investors, who 
had a portfolio of investments and hence the new board members and investor directors 
acted together to create a dictatorial environment, which supported the investors’ agenda 
of maximising their portfolio return over the return of individual investments. The strength 
of their economic capital, aligned with their egocentric (and role centric) disposition 
amongst these investor directors formed a strong faultline and ensured that they got their 
position heard and supported by a board that became impotent to do otherwise. We see 
that subgroups with strong economic capital can force decisions on subgroups with 
weaker economic capital.  
Second sensemaking episode at Drugtech 
The second sensemaking episode at Drugtech commenced with a pronouncement by 
investor directors at a board meeting to stop all drug development. The investor directors 
stated that because they represented the investor and his voting and economic rights, 
they could force the decision to stop drug development and to sell the company against 
the desire of other investor groups including, in this case, the Chair. The CEO recalls: 
The use of influence was beginning to be imposed, where individual 
directors expressed opinion from a sense of who they were 
representing, whether the representation was investors or themselves 
(CEO, Drugtech, second episode 2009). 
Within the board, there developed alignments of groups who spoke frequently within 
group and, hence, by each board meeting there were well-rehearsed arguments that 
produced a progressively entrenched position:  
I struggled to find any board consensus other than attempting to keep 
the item on the agenda as no decision other than further review of the 
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issue was plausible to the board (Chair, Drugtech, second episode 
2010). 
This outcome further supports the view that subgroups with stronger economic capital 
can force decisions, in this case the sale of the company, on subgroups with weaker 
economic capital. This subgroup has stronger economic capital and a role orientation as 
investor directors. 
 In all three cases, we observe a common theme expressing a relationship between 
capital and disposition. Subgroups with stronger economic capital and an egocentric 
disposition as investor directors force decisions on the entrepreneurial managers who 
possess less voting rights than the investor directors. The investors all had a portfolio of 
investments that were part of closed-end investment funds and needed to realise their 
investment by a certain time point, which took precedent to maximising the individual 
return of the underlying investments. Hence the entrepreneurial managers often held 
differing exit ambitions to the representatives supporting the investors. The investor 
directors possess the voting power on the entrepreneurial venture board as a proxy for 
the investors themselves, as the investor directors fully represent the investors in this 
regard and these voting rights were always greater than those of the entrepreneurial 
managers. The greater economic power, linked with the egocentric disposition, 
represents a latent faultline which has the potential to activate if, following a sensemaking 
trigger, encapsulated sensemaking is used by the actors in search of meaning. There 
may be circumstances where this relationship is weakened; a relationship was identified 
from the data involving allocentrism, which is discussed in the next section. 
5.8  Allocentrism 
I consider firstly the effect of cultural and social capital on the behaviour of actors and the 
relationship to allocentrism, as I observed from the data that allocentrism weakens 
faultlines and reduces the possibility of actors becoming engaged in encapsulated 
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sensemaking. In all cases, the cultural capital of the entrepreneurial managers, captured 
by their financial expertise, commercial expertise and/or technological expertise, is low-
medium, whereas the cultural capital of the investor directors is medium-high. 
Differences in social capital are also observed from the data as the entrepreneurial 
managers’ network tends to mature within industrial and academic circles: “The 
managers improved their networks as they attended further conferences and commercial 
skills as they did more deals” (CSO, Drugtech, first episode 2009) and the investor 
directors in investment and financial circles: “The more deals the investor directors were 
involved with, they improved their deal structuring skills and syndicating opportunities” 
(CEO, Drugtech, second episode 2009). The two homogeneous subgroups, 
entrepreneurial managers and investor directors share the same dispositions as those 
expressed in Table 5.5, with the exception where the management had been imposed 
on the venture by the investors (Pharmadev, second episode). The way the subgroups 
see the world, including their role in the venture and their ability to take someone else’s 
perspective, is strongly related to an individual’s capital. Allocentrism may disturb the 
above relationship and is more likely to be evident where broader cultural and social 
capital is possessed within a subgroup of actors. This is because networks are likely to 
be broader and more diverse when coupled with a more diverse education and 
background, facilitating the ability to look through the perspective of others.  
There are three observed cases of allocentrism, two cases where actors from one 
subgroup observed through the lens of another subgroup (first sensemaking episode of 
Medco and Drugtech) and one case where the scientists wanted to work in the interest 
of the company, as testified by the CSO (first sensemaking episode of Pharmadev). In 
the latter instance, consultative debate between management and the scientists created 
an environment where observing through each other’ perspectives facilitated better co-
operation. The sensemaking episodes that illustrate allocentrism are as follows: 
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First sensemaking episode at Drugtech 
The first sensemaking episode at Drugtech commenced with an unexpected toxicology 
result suggesting the systemic drug development administration was too risky. The CEO 
could see through the lenses of the investor directors. The CEO appreciated the needs 
of the investors, perhaps because he had been a venture capitalist himself and could put 
himself in the place of the investors.  As expressed by the CSO: 
We were fortunate enough to have the CEO with us on the visit, and 
we’d talked at length about what was going on and what might be 
happening and had a sort of an idea of where to go next (CSO, 
Drugtech, first episode 2009). 
During the second week of the episode, the CEO compiled a board paper with other key 
personnel to table a resolution, detailing the change from systemic to topical 
administration with data that had been compiled from past research and development. 
At the end of the second week, the CEO sent a note to the investor representatives again 
detailing the outcome of the meeting with the scientists and explaining that a board paper 
was being written detailing the proposed changes. He emphasized that he would like to 
take the counsel of the investor directors, and that there was a degree of urgency to 
facilitate such a meeting and urged that such a meeting be set up. Before the next board 
meeting (five weeks from the start of the episode), the CEO met with the investor 
representatives, which assisted the negotiation of the strategic change. The investor 
representatives were sympathetic that the adverse deviation from the business plan was 
an uncontrollable event. The scientific outcome could not have been predicted and was 
a remote possibility that was both an unlikely and unexpected outcome. At this stage, the 
CEO and CSO realised that all parties at that meeting may be aligning in terms of a 
preferred solution. The change of administration for the drug from systemic to topical was 
debated and relief was expressed by the investor directors that at least there was a viable 
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alternative, and that the CEO and management team had pulled out the stops to present 
the case in a timely manner: “He dealt with the investors” (CSO, Drugtech, first episode 
2009). The CEO presented the case via the language and understanding of a venture 
capitalist due to his ability to use the language and culture of an investor (as he was 
trained as a venture capitalist) and negotiated this position with both sides to gain a swift 
resolution. This broader (more diverse) cultural capital places actors in a better position 
to display allocentrism. The second observation of allocentrism is from the scientific 
group of management at Pharmadev.  
First sensemaking episode at Pharmadev 
The first sensemaking episode commenced when there was an announcement at a 
board meeting that the company had not met its breakeven point at an agreed time. The 
sensemaking episode unfolded and a new management team and board were recruited. 
By allowing the scientists (a part of the management team) to become a team with the 
shareholders, they became part of an open sensemaking process, consulting with the 
management:  
Everybody wanted to get a result. We suddenly became a team with the 
shareholders, the executives, and to add to that the people working in 
the company, the scientists. The scientists felt that they were the last to 
know about anything, and the fact that they were on board for every 
decision that was made at this point really made it feel like we were all 
in one board. The scientific staff in the company always felt the 
deadlines were too short or too tight. The nice thing was we consulted 
them rather than imposed deadlines and they reacted very well to that 
(CSO, Pharmadev, first episode 2012). 
In this case, the scientists had demonstrated commercial acumen earlier in the episode 
in particularly the CSO could tell a commercially exciting story: 
159 
 
He (the Chair) was wowed by the presentation (from the CSO) which on 
paper had appeared grim (Ex Chair referring to CSO, Pharmadev, first 
episode 2012). 
The CSO had fulfilled commercial roles in industry, so stood in the shoes of commercially 
minded executives. This broader (more diverse) cultural capital once again places actors 
in a better position to display allocentrism. 
The third observation of allocentrism is between the entrepreneurial managers and one 
of the investor directors at Medco. 
First sensemaking episode at Medco 
In the case of the first sensemaking episode at Medco, the individual actors saw the 
events through different lenses and can be portrayed in the following comparison. The 
first investor director, (an industrialist and now an investor director), sometimes took the 
same view as the CEO, but later in the venture aligned with all the other investor 
directors. However, the CEO was not aware of the other investor directors’ collective 
viewpoint and pursued a business-building vision that was contrary to their desire to go 
all out to attract an exit after the acquisition. The Operations Director represented the 
views of the senior management team and aligned with the CEO, while a second investor 
director was typical of the pool of investor directors. The second investor director 
observed that the board had become polarised between the investor directors, who were 
working in tandem, and the entrepreneurial managers, with the investor directors failing 
to affect changes through a Chair who did not like public confrontation. This resulted in 
the board leaving it too late to change the direction of the company because the investor 
directors as a subgroup did not want to rock the boat, as they did not want adverse 
publicity from this investment to have a detrimental effect on the valuation of the portfolio.  
In this first episode, the first investor director acts in an allocentric manner. As well as his 
current position of investor director, he has acted as CEO of several companies and 
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could hence take either role to meet his needs and belief of events at a certain point in 
time: 
The board consensus, driven by investor directors (other than James 
{the first investor director}, the investor director who had been a 
commercial manager) carried the vote and the acquisition was not 
voted through. It is interesting to observe James had a significant 
commercial track record of start-ups, whereas other investment 
directors had no such demonstrable record and this may have had a 
bearing on this board polarization and outvoting of an alternate 
acquisition (CEO, Medco, first episode 2013). 
Although the board decision ultimately did not present in favour of the first investor 
director, at least the subject was initially discussed at the board in an open dialogue. If 
the investor director had not taken an allocentric view, it is probable the topic would have 
generated less interest at the board and been suppressed at an earlier stage in the 
debate. This would have been problematic as such important strategic initiatives are 
required to be debated and directed by the whole board: “James was also able to reach 
out to commercial networks for advice. James was useful on the board as he contributed 
by reaching out to his commercial networks” (CEO, Medco, first episode 2013). James 
could take a commercial role as he possessed diverse cultural capital (See Table 5.3). 
As well as being financially astute (Chartered Accountant), he also possessed 
commercial awareness and experience through acting as both an investor as well as 
CEO and CFO. This was further enhanced by diverse social capital (network in both 
commercial and investment circles) that enabled him to obtain both commercial advice 
but also meant he could be instrumental in sourcing contracts and acquisitions. 
Observations from the three episodes suggest, for allocentrism to be effective in reducing 
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the effects of economic capital and role orientation on sensemaking, an actor or actors 
need: 
1. To have capacity for allocentrism 
An actor or actors are likely to have capacity for allocentrism if they have more diverse 
cultural and/or social capital as seen in the three episodes above.  
2. To be allowed by other actors on the board to demonstrate their allocentrism 
In the first episode of Pharmadev, it was apparent that the scientists joined in board 
debates. Without such an invitation, they could not have demonstrated to the commercial 
team that they possessed valuable commercial knowledge which assisted in open 
sensemaking, as subgroups were comfortable to extract sense from each group. 
3. To have a need to use allocentrism 
Allocentrism may remain latent if actors do not require arguments to promote their 
positions. The three cases above all indicate that allocentrism is shaped by capital, 
demonstrated by individuals possessing social and/or cultural capital that is more 
diverse, allowing these individuals to see through the lenses of others. Having considered 
relationships between capital and disposition at both the individual actor level and team 
level, I now consider their role in faultline formation. 
5.9  Board faultlines 
5.9.1  Nature of faultlines 
As detailed earlier in this Chapter, a faultline is considered strong if: The subgroups within 
the group are of similar size; there is a high level of homogeneity across other attributes 
within each subgroup; and there is a high level of heterogeneity between subgroups 
based on attributes, e.g. in one group there are females in their sixties and in the other 
there are males in their thirties. In the case of entrepreneurial venture boards, the 
subgroup of investor directors is likely to increase as the rounds of investment increase 
where individual investment houses require individual board representation. The number 
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of entrepreneurial managers is likely to stay relatively constant, hence creating 
subgroups of dissimilar size. The number of directors in each subgroup is based on the 
actual number of directors at the time of each episode as noted in Table 5.6: 
First sensemaking episode 
Medco Pharmadev Drugtech 
Chair (1) Chair (1) Chair (1) 
Investor Directors (2) Investor Directors (2) Investor Directors (2) 
Management (4) Management (2) Management (2) 
    Independent Director (1) 
Second sensemaking episode 
Medco Pharmadev Drugtech 
Chair (1) Chair (1) Chair (1) 
Investor Directors (4) Investor Directors (6) (moving to 4) Investor Directors (2) 
Management (5) (moving to 3) Management (2) Management (2) 
  Observers (2) (moving to 0) Independent Director (1) 
 
       Table 5.6: Board composition during sensemaking episodes 
The homogeneity of the groups is based on the degree to which capital is similar across 
the group and the degree to which disposition is similar across the group; the greater the 
similarity of capital (social, cultural and economic) across the group, the greater the 
homogeneity of the group.  If allocentrism is enacted, then an actor or actors from one 
group can act as if they belong to another group, hence lowering the heterogeneity 
between groups. So interestingly, when high allocentrism prevails, this reduces faultline 
strength counter to most other cases, where allocentrism is absent. In considering the 
relationship between sensemaking and faultline strength, it is important to establish the 
relative strengths of the faultlines across all the episodes. 
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5.9.2 Relative faultline strength 
Earlier in this Chapter, whilst discussing different forms of capital and dispositions, I 
observed within Drugtech, all the subgroups of management are egocentric (except the 
CEO in the first episode) and all the investor directors are egocentric. The social capital 
was homogenous within groups and heterogenous between groups, indicated by the 
observation that similar networks exist within groups. The economic capital was 
homogenous within groups as indicated by >50% ownership rights for the investor 
directors and <20% for the entrepreneurial managers. The cultural capital was also 
homogenous within groups as shown by the investor directors aligning themselves with 
investment and science, whereas the entrepreneurial managers aligned themselves with 
commercial business-building and science. Therefore, I expected the presence of a 
strong faultline in the board. In the second episode at Drugtech, the circumstances are 
the same as the first episode other than there is no observed enactment of allocentrism 
and hence the relative strength of the faultline is increased from strong to very strong.  
Within Pharmadev, the subgroups are not as homogenous as those in Drugtech, with 
more subgroups receiving sense from other subgroups. There is a split in the 
management team between the scientists and the commercial team. The subgroups 
were more heterogenous within groups during the first episode, as all actors were 
relatively new to their roles, so the board in the first episode is associated with a weak 
faultline. It has been suggested above that as funding rounds progress in the evolution 
of an entrepreneurial venture, the actors in the entrepreneurial management subgroup 
and investor director subgroup accumulate greater cultural and social capital. Therefore, 
faultlines may strengthen on both sides of the divide, potentially leading to more 
entrenched positions. This is clearly seen in all the companies and is observed in all 
second sensemaking episodes, where stronger faultlines are observed in comparison to 
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the corresponding first sensemaking episodes. Therefore, I expected a faultline with a 
medium strength, since the teams have worked together longer.  
Medco is very similar to Pharmadev, in terms of faultline strength. Although there is more 
evidence of allocentrism in Pharmadev, there is similar homogeneity between groups 
with differing numbers of directors in the faultline subgroups in both Pharmadev and 
Medco compared to Drugtech, which has the same number of directors in the faultline 
subgroups, strengthening the faultlines within Drugtech. Therefore, I have designated the 
same strength of faultlines at Medco and Pharmadev, initially with Medco moving to 
medium strength of faultline as sensemaking becomes encapsulated. A presentation of 
the faultline constituents is exhibited in Table 5.7: 
 No in 
subgroup 
     
 board 
composition 
Homogeneity within 
the group 
 
 Episode 
Heterogeneity 
between groups 
 
        Episode 
    Faultline strength 
 
       
     Episode       
 (from Table 
5.6) 
      Episode 
  1               2 
 1                2       1                2    1              2 
MEDCO     Medium   Medium 
Weak    Medium 
Medium        
Management 4               5 - 3  Low-medium    Medium     
Investor Directors 2                   4   High               High     
Chair 1                   1   N/A                 N/A     
PHARMADEV     Low          Medium 
Weak       
Medium 
Management 2                   2  Low-medium    Medium     
Investor Directors 2               6 - 4 Medium           Medium     
Chair 1                   1   N/A                  N/A     
DRUGTECH     Medium        High 
Strong      Very 
               Strong 
Management 2                    2   High               High                     
Investor Directors 2                    2   High               High     
Chair/Independents 2                    2   High               High     
 
         Table 5.7: Assessment of relative faultline strength 
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The faultline strengths (right hand column) are allocated according to their relative 
strengths using the assessments in the first three columns as the basis for such a 
ranking. 
5.9.3        Faultline strength and sensemaking 
I now analyse the data with a view of understanding the relationship between faultline 
strength and sensemaking. An explanation of encapsulated and open sensemaking is 
presented in Chapter 4, where I elaborate encapsulated and open sensemaking. To 
consider the relationship between faultline strength and sensemaking, I need to first 
understand the relationship between faultline formation, faultline activation and the 
interpretation of the sensemaking trigger, which results in either a unitary or multiple 
accounts of the narrative (Maitlis, 2005). 
5.9.4      Faultlines and the production of accounts 
I reread my narratives to look for similarities, and in all cases, I fit the narratives into either 
a unitary account or multiple accounts as defined in the Glossary. I now consider whether 
there is an observed relationship between faultline formation and activation and 
sensemaking, resulting in unitary or enduring multiple accounts of the narrative (Maitlis, 
2005). I group unitary accounts and then multiple accounts of the narrative for each 
sensemaking episode, I commence with the unitary accounts with a view to identifying 
precursors of faultline formation and activation to the unitary account formation. Both 
unitary accounts are the first sensemaking episode at Drugtech and the first 
sensemaking episode at Pharmadev. 
5.9.5      Unitary accounts 
The first episode at Drugtech presents with a unitary account where there was no 
requirement for the actors to present multiple accounts, since all actors accepted the 
account of the CEO as plausible. Maitlis (2005) in her definition allows for numerous 
views of the interpretation of the sensemaking trigger in a unitary account, and a unitary 
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account results if the numerous views can be integrated into a single account (refer to 
definition in the Glossary).  The alternative involving terminating the business was neither 
necessary nor desirable. Although the board subgroups of Drugtech exhibit the strongest 
faultlines in comparison with the other cases, their faultlines were not activated because 
alternate accounts of the episode were proffered to restore order:  
We needed some clear idea of what the next steps were. And I think the 
idea of switching to a topical drug was almost born in the meeting room 
and the conversation. And I think it bore fruit within days and weeks 
rather than months. It was a very, very quick decision. The board was 
held in good spirits, with constructive debate, and with continual mutual 
respect, which was critical in assisting the company move to its next 
stage of development. The management were clear of the significance 
of this decision (NED, Drugtech, first episode 2009). 
The independent non-executive director recalled a swift re-orientation of the company: 
“Certainly there wasn’t any sense of crisis at the time” (Inv Dir, Drugtech, first episode 
2009). This was echoed by the CSO, indicating that there was no hint of disagreement 
or resistance from the investor directors: 
The flow of action was certainly very intelligible, intelligent as well (CSO, 
Drugtech, first episode 2009).  
The relationship remained effectively unchanged with a swift consensus and no 
apportioned blame. A non-executive director affirmed the swift re-orientation of the 
company: 
The CEO and CSO proposed quite quickly that we should re-focus our work 
on its use as an antimicrobial used topically (NED, Drugtech, first episode 
2009). 
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During the fifth week of the episode, planning commenced to suspend systemic drug 
development, which was to be replaced with a topical programme. A further hurdle was 
the passage of the amendment through the UK regulatory agency, the MHRA (Medicine 
and Health Regulatory Authority), which was to take three months from this point. 
However, a phone call to the regulatory body confirmed that it was likely it would be 
passed (although the MHRA was unable to confirm unreservedly until it had fulfilled its 
review obligations): 
By week eight, the board members were unanimously realigned, along 
with re-motivated staff, with a continual hope for the future of both the 
company and their personal careers (NED, Drugtech, first episode 
2009). 
In this episode, we observe open sensemaking throughout with the ultimate presentation 
of a unitary account. This is the case, even though there is a putative strong faultline, as 
it was not activated. Subgroups of actors will continue to receive sense from each other’ 
subgroups if their position is not under attack. In this episode, there was no need to gain 
a dominant position, because as was reported by Maitlis, “multiple stakeholders gave 
and guided numerous and varied views of multiple stakeholders into a new single 
collective account” (Maitlis 2005 36). Initially there were numerous views of the next steps 
mentioned in the above narrative. The scientists came up with a putative suggestion that 
the CEO guided the rest of the board into a new single account – that being the switch 
from systemic drug development to topical development is beneficial and as such, a 
strategic change should be agreed to move to topical development of the drug candidate.  
As well as the first episode at Drugtech, the first episode at Pharmadev presents with a 
unitary account, but the precursor to the account is the formation of a weak active 
faultline, compared to a strong latent faultline as observed in the case of Drugtech above. 
The CSO of Pharmadev recalled the events: 
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And that was a completely different way to running an academic lab – 
and in fact the scientific staff who came from an academic background, 
many of them reacted very well to that discipline to achieve landmarks, 
milestones, call them what you will (CSO, Pharmadev, first episode 
2012). 
Open sensemaking weakened the faultline even though historically in this case, the 
scientists (entrepreneurial managers) had failed to trust the investor directors. The new 
team, including new investor directors, believed that they could achieve better 
commercial endpoints with the co-operation of and using a collaborative approach with 
the scientists. Their economic capital was less than investor directors in the sense that 
they were new to non-executive board appointments and less experienced compared to 
more seasoned investor directors, hence we observe only weak divergent role orientation 
between the investor directors and the entrepreneurial managers. This assists in 
promoting closer working relationship between the two subgroups on the board. 
The above two episodes (the first sensemaking episode of Drugtech and the first 
sensemaking episode of Pharmadev) were also the shortest sensemaking episodes (two 
months and nine months respectively) with open sensemaking keeping faultlines latent 
or weak, presenting in unitary accounts. In contrast, in all encapsulated sensemaking 
episodes, activated faultlines were observed I now consider the episodes, presenting in 
multiple accounts, with a view to identifying relationships that are precursors to the 
account formation.  
5.9.6  Multiple accounts 
The second sensemaking episode of Drugtech commenced when the board was divided 
on whether to proceed with further drug development. The sensemaking trigger was an 
unexpected board meeting pronouncement by investor directors to stop all drug 
development.  
169 
 
Before the presentation of multiple accounts, subgroups aligned swiftly against each 
other and by the second board meeting (eight weeks later) there were well-rehearsed 
arguments that produced progressively more entrenched positions. The Chair struggled 
to find any board consensus other than attempting to keep the item on the agenda as no 
decision other than further review of the issue was plausible to the board. 
A clear link is evident in this case between their economic capital and their disposition 
(egocentric and role orientated) and a strengthening faultline. Encapsulated 
sensemaking led to the formation of this strong faultline. The directors were unable to 
reach consensus due to the desire of the entrepreneurial managers, as one subgroup, 
to continue drug development, and the investor directors wanting to secure an exit. Within 
six months from the episode start, there were multiple accounts of the episode. It is 
interesting to note that as Maitlis suggests, these numerous opposing views are narrow 
in that they are not developed by seeking the views of opposing subgroups and as each 
subgroup is relatively homogeneous in capital and disposition, this does not allow for 
wide and comprehensive debate. The Chair became somewhat impotent in controlling 
the board. The board meetings became progressively disordered until eventually board 
meetings were held away from the board table: “I observed a board that really did not 
hang together and more conversations were held away from the boardroom” (Chair, 
Drugtech, second episode 2009).  
In the first sensemaking episode at Medco, open and free debate quickly moved to 
disjointed and confused debate: 
I think it was difficult at times. My non-executive on the board (I was the 
Chair at this point) struggled to get a co-ordinated response. I think that 
he was quite sensible with his approach, but had a problem with some 
of the other [directors], and I guess that was due to conflicted interests. 
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It was complicated by the fact that it had so many shareholder 
representatives on the board (Inv Dir, Medco, first episode 2013). 
This imbalance between investor directors, representing the investors and the 
entrepreneurial managers, affected the board debate regarding the consideration of fund 
performance ahead of company success, leading to conversations outside of the board. 
The investors all viewed the performance of their investment portfolios over the individual 
company success, which may have meant allowing the company to trade for longer with 
dilutive investment rounds to the current investors, something that they could not tolerate. 
The faultline was weakened because one of the investor directors, James, took the view 
of the entrepreneurial managers. However, the investor directors, as a group, held 
enough economic capital to oppose the view of the entrepreneurial managers leading to 
encapsulated sensemaking which swiftly strengthened the faultline from weak to medium 
strength, with the presentation of multiple accounts. 
The second sensemaking episode at Pharmadev commenced with a missed revenue 
target, and the scientists were excluded from strategic board decisions. This led to a 
dysfunctional board. The new Chair held the view that the boards should not last longer 
than about an hour. To the CSO, an hour a month to bring a management team together 
was not at all effective, and it felt like they were going through a rubber-stamping 
exercise. Prior to the company’s restructuring, the scientists had been brought back into 
the fold and care had been taken to listen to their advice, but again this was reversed 
and the entire section relating to the science was cut from the board paper. Also, the new 
CEO stopped any information passage from the company to the University, in case any 
trade secrets were leaked. The scientists were being asked to do experiments that they 
had already performed, that would merely give the same scientific results already 
recorded. This caused frustration with the scientist group, who constituted the 
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entrepreneurial manager group as other commercial managers had been parachuted in 
by the investor and hence aligned with the investor director subgroup:  
At this stage, the board meetings became shorter and less structured 
with nothing really getting decided (CSO, Pharmadev, second episode 
2012). 
At the end of this process, the company did not achieve a sale, not helped by a 
dysfunctional board, and was put into administration. 
The second sensemaking episode at Medco was triggered by a missed revenue target. 
This sales decline continued for forty-eight months, until the company eventually went 
into administration.  The CEO observed that there was little by way of creativity, 
innovation or fresh ideas due to the investor directors believing their own story that the 
company had done enough to gain an attractive exit:  
I think being independent or not is very important to how the directors 
saw the business. I do not think the business was their main priority. 
Some of the investor directors just sat there not paying lots of attention. 
They were just bums on seats (CEO, Medco, second episode 2013).  
Encapsulated sensemaking (with the presentation of multiple accounts) ultimately led to 
the failure of the company. The accounts observed were narrow and shallow as the 
investor directors displayed an apathetic attitude and did not want to discuss anything 
that would suggest the company needed to change strategy. 
I now present a summary of the patterns in Table 5.8 below: 
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Company Episode Sensemaking Faultlines Narrative 
Medco 1 
Open / 
encapsulated 
Weak / medium Multiple 
Medco 2 Encapsulated Medium Multiple 
Pharmadev 1 Open Weak  Unitary 
Pharmadev 2 Encapsulated Medium Multiple 
Drugtech 1 Open Strong* Unitary 
Drugtech 2 Encapsulated Very Strong Multiple 
 
                Table 5.8: Sensemaking, faultlines & narrative accounts 
 
*The faultline in this case remained latent, whereas in all other cases, it became active. 
Note: Even though the first episode at Medco commenced using open sensemaking, this 
turned into encapsulated sensemaking as the episode progressed 
5.10  Discussion  
In this Chapter, the relationship between type of sensemaking, faultline formation and 
the presentation of unitary or multiple accounts is considered. Venture capital backed 
boards are often faced with the necessity to make strategic decisions in the face of 
equivocality, representing an interesting research site in which to study the effect of 
sensemaking on faultlines. My research has sought to gain a deeper understanding of 
sensemaking in entrepreneurial venture boards and the potential impact of faultlines on 
sensemaking and the subsequent production of either unitary or multiple accounts.  
In all the cases I studied, the investors and their representatives, the investor directors, 
were tasked with obtaining a portfolio return, and they all operate closed-end funds that 
require realisation of their underlying investments within a set time, hence the investor 
directors take a portfolio view of the investment. Such closed-end funds are 
commonplace in the venture capital industry. By contrast, the entrepreneurial managers 
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have an interest in my case studies only in the company that employs them. They take 
the view that they need to maximise the enterprise value of the company, irrespective of 
the timelines to exit imposed by the investors and investor directors. The Chair may align 
with either of the subgroups, dependant on whether they were appointed by investors, 
entrepreneurial managers or be independent.  These homogeneous role orientations 
within the subgroup, and the heterogeneous role orientations between the subgroups, 
lead to the formation of faultlines.  
As stated earlier in the Chapter, Bourdieu (1986, 1990) is not new to literature on   
entrepreneurship, but his theory of practice has not been extended to an understanding 
of faultline composition. I use Bourdieu’s work to extend the faultline literature by 
considering Bourdieu’s concepts of economic, cultural and social capital as well as to 
form a link to dispositions (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) to explain certain antecedents to 
faultline formation.  
I initially consider the effect of economic capital on the behaviour of actors. My data 
suggest that subgroups with stronger economic capital (the investor directors) can force 
decisions on subgroups with weaker economic capital (entrepreneurial managers), but 
this is also due to their portfolio orientation, which enables them to use the power 
stemming from their economic capital. In all cases, actors with a portfolio orientated role 
seek a timed financial return and exit due to the closed-end nature of such funds, and 
possess stronger economic capital compared to their entrepreneurial manager 
counterparts. The investor directors possess stronger economic capital and hence they 
assume the control of the investors with the resultant voting power and shareholding. In 
three episodes, I clearly observe how subgroups possessing stronger economic capital 
are more likely to force decisions on subgroups possessing weaker economic capital, 
due to their position as investor directors.  
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The way individuals within subgroups see the world, including their role in the venture 
and their ability to take someone else’s perspective, is strongly related to an individual’s 
capital. Allocentrism has been shown to disturb the above relationship and is more likely 
to be evident where broader cultural and social capital is possessed by an individual 
within a subgroup of actors. This is because networks are likely to be broader and more 
diverse when coupled with a more diverse education and background, facilitating the 
ability to look through the perspective of others.  
Increasing role orientation is likely to strengthen faultlines, whereas increasing 
allocentrism is likely to weaken faultlines. These dispositions are shaped by the capital 
endowments of the individuals in the subgroups. If the faultline is strong, once activated 
by the sensemaking trigger, then this is likely to result in numerous views of the 
sensemaking trigger event and increases the chances of encapsulation; further 
strengthening the faultline. These relationships can be tempered when there are group 
members who are allocentric, and who use this allocentrism to temper their role 
orientation, and try to understand and write the multiple accounts towards a unitary 
account. Open sensemaking is more likely when faultlines are weak or not activated. 
Earlier in the Chapter, I note that in their review of the extant literature on faultlines, 
Thatcher & Patel suggest that the idea of sensemaking is largely absent from the faultline 
literature (Thatcher & Patel, 2012 993). I seek to address this gap. As sensemaking is 
contextual, and I have only considered two types of sensemaking, encapsulated and 
open, this is a limited study, nevertheless a contribution to the faultline and sensemaking 
literature. 
There is a relationship in all cases between the type of sensemaking and relative faultline 
strength (refer to Table 5.11). When open sensemaking moves to more encapsulated 
sensemaking, faultlines strengthen with a greater potential for the presentation of multiple 
accounts. As Maitlis states: “The new accounts generated through these processes 
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tended to be cumulative and dense as leaders built upon, rather than tore down the 
accounts” (2005 36). The observations from this study support this proposition.  
As shown in this study, a relationship exists between the activation and strength of 
faultlines and sensemaking. A new model is proposed (Figure 5.1) to link faultline 
formation and activation to encapsulated sensemaking with resultant multiple accounts. 
In this model, the economic, social and cultural capital of an individual within a subgroup 
(shaping the dispositions of role orientation and allocentrism) contribute to the faultline 
strength. The faultline is latent until activated by a sensemaking trigger. If numerous 
views of the interpretation of the sensemaking trigger cannot be resolved into a unitary 
account, this promotes encapsulated sensemaking which results in enduring multiple 
accounts, which in themselves strengthen faultlines. 
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Figure 5.1: The relationship between faultlines and encapsulated sensemaking in 
entrepreneurial ventures 
 
Note: All italic text contributes to faultline strength and unitary and multiple accounts were 
dealt with when considering sensemaking in Chapter 4 
5.11  Conclusion 
Lim et al. (2013), suggests that a faultline perspective offers an important alternative to 
the principal-agent perspective to understand new venture team dynamics. I add to this 
literature by providing insight into why these faultlines may emerge and with what 
consequences through a detailed study of the boards of venture capital backed 
entrepreneurial ventures. For new ventures, Lim et al. (2013) suggest “the presence of 
weak faultlines that demarcate subgroups of founders and investors are likely to enhance 
the discovery of new opportunities” (62). They propose that some factors strengthen 
faultlines; such as greater perceived imbalance of ownership equity between subgroups, 
the addition or replacement of new venture team members by investors without the 
involvement of founders, the existence of strong pre-existing ties between founders and 
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investors and factors relating to relationship conflict. Existing research indicates that 
there tends to be faultlines that run through new ventures, and that the membership of a 
group may significantly shape actors’ sensemaking. I contribute to this with factors such 
as capital and disposition. I have suggested from this research that both capital, in the 
form of economic, cultural and social capital, and disposition (shaped by capital) are 
constituents of faultlines and hence should be evaluated when considering the overall 
board composition and individual board appointments. 
Faultline strength has been historically viewed as strong if: The subgroups within the 
group are of a similar size; there is a high level of homogeneity across other attributes 
within each subgroup and thirdly there is a high level of heterogeneity between 
subgroups based on attributes (Lau & Murnighan, 1998). In assessing the homogeneity 
within each subgroup and heterogeneity between subgroups, capital and disposition 
have been considered as an alternate way of establishing the strength of faultlines, and 
contribute to the entrepreneurship literature on faultline formation by showing that the 
formation of faultlines is influenced by the individual capital and dispositions of the actors. 
This understanding of individual actors’ capital and disposition may help future 
researchers provide better predictions of where active faultlines are likely to develop, and 
practitioners may predict board compositions that avoid the probability of strong faultlines 
and encapsulated sensemaking. 
I extend the literature (particularly Chrobot-Mason et al., 2009; and Jehn & Bezrukova, 
2010) in demonstrating further negative repercussions of strong faultline formation, in the 
context of entrepreneurial ventures. The relationship suggested by this study between 
encapsulated sensemaking, promoted by strengthening faultlines leading to the 
presentation of multiple accounts, which then further contributes to the strength of the 
faultline, adds to such negative repercussions. Any positive effects, such as creativity 
and learning, from the strengthening of faultlines in entrepreneurial ventures, suggested 
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by the literature, may be diluted by the above negative effects. If a board struggles to 
make timely decisions or is unable to make decisions, no matter how creative or open to 
learning it becomes, the board will become ineffectual and impotent in its purpose. 
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CHAPTER 6:  BOARD OUTCOMES FROM SENSEMAKING WITHIN 
ENTREPRENEURIAL VENTURES 
 
“How did you go bankrupt?” Bill asked. 
“Two ways,” Mike said “Gradually and then suddenly.” 
Ernest Hemingway. The Sun Also Rises, 1926 
6.1  Introduction 
In this Chapter, I seek to gain a deeper understanding of decision-making in 
entrepreneurial venture boards. I consider the board processes of sensemaking within 
entrepreneurial ventures in Chapter 4, link these processes to faultlines in Chapter 5 and 
now follow through to decision-making outcomes. In this Chapter, I consider how 
encapsulated and open sensemaking processes influence boards, in reaching or failing 
to reach decisions, which may benefit practitioners in more efficient and effective 
decision-making. I also explore whether mediation by the Chair can be impactful in 
orchestrating sensemaking processes as well as the impact powerful actors can have on 
the process of sensemaking, leading to decision-making. 
Encapsulated sensemaking, if left unchecked, is likely to end in venture failure. This is 
because progression through the constituent phases of encapsulated sensemaking 
potentially leading to sensehiding generates such mistrust that it may be difficult to return 
to open sensemaking. Indeed, there was no indication in my empirical data of such a 
return. This may be due to a lack of knowledge and education about the issues 
surrounding the two types of sensemaking, or a lack of leadership from the Chair in 
preventing encapsulated sensemaking. I suggest in Chapter 4 that encapsulated 
sensemaking leads to the introduction of often contradictory sensegiving material, which 
extends the time required to reach a board decision, or prohibits the reaching of a board 
decision. Can encapsulated sensemaking become open sensemaking or can 
encapsulated sensemaking be averted at all? If the Chair can prohibit the negative 
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progression from sensebreaking to sensefreezing, senseforcing and sensehiding, this 
intervention may decrease the probability of failure. In considering the role of the Chair 
in mediating the relationship between sensemaking and decision-making, I acknowledge 
that the concept of mediated sensemaking is not new. Strike & Rerup (2016) define 
mediated sensemaking as: “The social position, orientation, and actions used by 
mediators to facilitate adaptive sensemaking that unfolds when someone begins to doubt 
the sense already made” (880). The data from their study captures the mediation process 
through which “most trusted advisors” help family business entrepreneurs interrupt the 
momentum in sensemaking, by slowing down action and facilitating doubt. In this 
Chapter, the Chair may be viewed as a most trusted advisor by at least some of the board 
members, and indeed trust is an important element, that if lost may prohibit swift 
consensual decision-making. 
One of the outcomes of entrepreneurial activity, which takes place under conditions of 
uncertainty, is that of failure (Ucbasaran et al., 2013). The terminal failure of a venture 
does not happen out of the blue, rather the build-up to the failure is commonly 
characterized by a series of more minor failures, such as adverse deviations from the 
venture’s warranted business plan. Decision-making and the speed of decision-making 
are particularly important in dynamic, rapidly changing businesses, such as 
entrepreneurial environments (Forbes, 2005). If there is lack of or protracted decision-
making leading to lengthy periods before a decision is made, the venture is more likely 
to exhaust its limited resources, especially its investment, and effectively fail. In Chapter 
4, I saw patterns that suggested power game initiatives can be evident in encapsulated 
sensemaking and the mediation skills of the Chair to balance the debate between more 
powerful actors (the investor directors) and less powerful actors (the entrepreneurial 
managers) was also evident. In this Chapter, I dig deeper into these themes and explicitly 
code for mediation and power. In doing so, I supplement the relevant quotations from 
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Chapter 4 with further quotations around the mediation skills of the Chair and power. The 
research questions I seek to answer in this Chapter are: How does sensemaking affect 
decision-making and how does the Chair influence this relationship through mediation? 
And is there a relationship between the use of power and sensemaking that affects 
decision-making? A good environment to research such questions is the board meetings 
of entrepreneurial ventures, where decision-making is often seen following unexpected 
declines in business performance, which may be deemed an adverse event of sufficient 
severity to be of major concern to the investor. I initially consider the influence of 
sensemaking on decision-making within entrepreneurial venture boards, aiming to close 
this gap in the literature.  
The Belgian Corporate Governance code guidance on board decision-making states: 
No individual or group of directors should dominate the board’s decision-
making. No individual should have unfettered powers of decision-making; 
and good governance should provide a mechanism to ensure leadership, 
integrity and transparency to the decision-making process. 
(Source: www.corporate governance committee.be) 
I showed in Chapter 4 that during open sensemaking, the directors were prepared to 
listen and consider the views of all other directors, irrespective of whether they belonged 
to an opposing subgroup; in contrast to encapsulated sensemaking where it is more likely 
a subgroup of directors will attempt to dominate the board meeting. Simon (1983) proffers 
that real life is not about making optimal decisions with perfect information, and using 
fully rational thinking, but about making sufficiently acceptable decisions, using subjective 
judgements given the constrained resource available to individuals as well as 
organisations. The challenge is to reach this position, i.e. “sufficiently acceptable 
decisions” even when subgroups constitute strong faultlines as suggested in Chapter 5, 
following an adverse deviation from plan, where a strategic board decision needs to be 
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made to realign goals and take a different path. Within the context of entrepreneurial 
ventures, action should stem from the decision to reinstate the interruption leading to the 
new objectives as suggested by Sandberg & Tsoukas: “The specific sense generated is 
seen as a springboard for the actions actors take to reinstate an interrupted activity” 
(Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015 S15). The sense, in my case, following an adverse deviation 
from the business plan, does not need to be truthful or accurate but rather a plausible 
account that assists in the creation and adoption of a narrative that helps to restore order 
to an interrupted activity (Weick, 1995 55). However, it must be noted that some 
sensemaking scholars suggest accuracy should not be totally abandoned as “some 
representations can be more helpful than others” (Winch & Maytorena, 2009). There is 
an acknowledgement that such decisions from the sensemaking process may not result 
in restored activity, or can even lead to a catastrophic conclusion, as in the case of the 
Mann Gulch disaster, where many lives were lost in fire-fighting a natural disaster (Weick, 
1993). The literature, however, has focussed on many more cases where order has been 
restored and only a few scholars have considered the outcomes of “nonsense” (the 
absence of agreed sense) with an absence of restored action. In my empirical study, 
there is a mixture of decision outcomes including failure of the venture, nonsense with 
no restored action, and sense with restored action. Such decision outcomes are not 
atypical in entrepreneurial ventures and hence make the empirical setting attractive and 
purposeful. 
6.2  The role of the Chair on the board 
Board level work requires that directors are engaged in sensemaking or direction setting, 
on behalf of the organisation as well as the multiplicity of stakeholders (Pratt, 1998, 
2000). Through his/her leadership role, the Chair can make a significant contribution to 
board decision-making by knitting together information relating to acquisitions, 
sensemaking, sensebreaking, sensegiving and long term strategic decisions (Fleishman 
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et al., 1991). I consider the role of the Chair; firstly, in managing the decision-making 
process within boards in general, then secondly, I consider the role of the Chair 
specifically in entrepreneurial ventures through the mediation of board debate and in 
managing board contributions from powerful actors. 
Board dynamics, constituting board composition and the interactions between board 
members, including the role of the Chair, have been a recent area of research activity 
(Nadler, Behan & Nadler 2006; Ehikioya, 2009;) with a strong emphasis on the positive 
and negative impact of the role of the Chair and CEO. In Europe, there is an acceptance 
that the role of the Chair and CEO should be split, which may control agency issues 
(Coombes & Wong, 2004). As my study uses a European research setting, all the boards 
I observe have both a Chair and CEO, and there is growing acknowledgement that this 
split role strengthens the monitoring, scrutiny and decision-making capacity of boards 
(Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2008); in contrast to the dual role which may limit decision 
discretion (Ugeux, 2004). 
In examining the role of the Chair, I consider the concept of board alignment (i.e. ensuring 
the directors work in the interest of the organisation and its shareholders), which involves 
both agency theory and stewardship theory (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). Agency 
theory favours control through externally-dominated boards relying on independence and 
drawing on various disciplines to achieve the correct balance of the board and the 
incentivisation of executives, whilst searching for a solution to reduce conflicts of interest 
among board directors (Jenson & Murphy, 1990).  Stewardship theory favours 
collaboration between directors to gain consensual decision-making through goal 
alignment, which relies on the cohesiveness of the board (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 
2003). From the stewardship or agency perspective, the role of the Chair in nurturing a 
cohesive and balanced board becomes pivotal (Lorsch & Zelleke, 2005). Therefore, I 
observed the actions and language of the Chair when leading the board through 
184 
 
sensemaking processes, focusing on whether a cohesive and balanced board is 
achieved and what the consequences are to the decision-making outcomes.  
Roberts et al. (2005) suggest that board effectiveness depends on the behavioural 
dynamics between the executive and non-executive directors, and the quality of those 
interactions depends on the mediation skills of the Chair (Roberts & Stiles, 1999). As 
already stated, I hope to add to this literature by further considering the mediation skills 
of the Chair in this study, as I saw the importance of such skills as a pattern in Chapter 
4, and the need for mediation skills to balance the view of more powerful actors (the 
investor directors) with the less powerful actors (the entrepreneurial managers). This 
aligns with an emphasis in the extant literature on the Chair to include soft measures 
(culture, board composition etc.) as well as hard measures (finance, legal etc.) (Roe, 
2003). Hollanders (2004) conducted a study in twelve European countries that identified 
that circa two-thirds of the expected skills of a Chair are on the soft side with leading and 
motivational skills at the top of the list.  Several studies have been carried out confirming 
the influence of the Chair in shaping the board and aligning board interests (Pettigrew & 
McNulty, 1995; Levrau & van den Berghe, 2007). This includes the receipt of relevant 
material to board members and reducing the non-executive director’s reliance on the 
executives to be informed. Kakabadse & Kakabadse (2008) conducted a study that 
reveals that good Chairs could nurture a better understanding of board dynamics by 
continual assessment of the board through monitoring and stewarding.  
The role of the Chair includes collating information, facilitating information flow and 
developing an environment of free, frank and open debate. Board effectiveness has been 
shown to be positively related to interpersonal relationships between board members, 
where trust and openness are pivotal and the engendering of such an environment is 
somewhat dependant on the leadership skills of the Chair (Roberts & Stiles, 1999). There 
are several studies that embrace the idea that the Chair shapes the dynamics of the 
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board (Levrau & van den Berghe, 2007; Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2008). Some studies 
have focused on information flow and the Chair’s ability to ensure all relevant information 
is made available for timely decision-making (Hackman & Wageman, 2005), whilst others 
have concentrated on acting as a counter-weight between the various board members 
(Alexander et al., 1993).  
Gabrielsson et al. (2002) proffer that the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur/owner-
manager of the portfolio firm may have diverging expectations to board roles. In this 
setting, the board becomes an interesting meeting place for studying the dynamics 
between external and internal stakeholders and the role of the Chair. Hence my research 
setting of the boards of entrepreneurial ventures is an appropriate setting to consider the 
role of the Chair. Also, the boards of venture capital backed entrepreneurial ventures 
normally consist of entrepreneurial managers as executive directors and investor 
directors as non-executive directors, as they frequently sit on numerous boards within 
the investment portfolio. Although this is common practice in Europe; in the US, boards 
tend to include a small number or even just one executive director. Hence, the research 
setting of using European biotechnology entrepreneurial venture boards is more 
appropriate in observing subgroups of executive and non-executive directors. The UK 
self-regulating combined code of Corporate Governance supports the principle which 
suggests the Chair should facilitate the effective contribution of non-executive directors 
and ensure constructive relations between executives and non-executive directors. 
In summary, the Chair must take the prime leadership position in attempting to obtain 
consensus in committing the company’s resource to a set course to meet their overall 
objectives. Therefore, a board can only become effective if it is organised as a collective 
decision-making body, and the Chair has a pivotal role in achieving this aim. I now 
consider this vital relationship between the role of the Chair in board decision-making. 
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6.2.1 The role of the Chair in board decision-making 
The principal work of the board revolves around complex decision-making (Leblanc, 
2009). Useem & Neng (2009) define decision-making as: “A fundamental board duty as 
those moments when governing boards face a discrete and realistic opportunity to 
commit company resources to one course or another. Decisions in the case of a board 
are made by a group of peers acting as a college”. 
In his review of Corporate Governance in UK banks and other financial industry ethics, 
Walker (2009) states: “The Chair should facilitate, encourage and expect the informed 
and critical contribution of the directors, in particular in discussion and decision-making 
on matters of risk and strategy” (Recommendation 9). Capable Chairs lead by example, 
empowering and involving direction in decision-making (Bloch, 2005).  
Surowiecki (2004) takes the position that to be able to act, decision-making is needed 
and that there is potentially a problem with decision-making in small groups where there 
is no method of aggregating the members’ opinions: “Under the right circumstances, 
groups are remarkably intelligent and often smarter than the smartest people in them” 
(2004: xiii).  A stronger Chair may be able to achieve such aggregation of opinions if 
there is awareness of the need to conduct board meetings to achieve this aim and to 
mediate board debate and decision-making. The Belgian Corporate Governance Code 
highlights the role of the Chair of listed companies as follows:  
The Chair should take the necessary measures to develop a climate of 
trust within the board, contributing to open discussion, constructive 
dissent and support for the board’s decisions (Belgium Corporate 
Governance Code, 2009). 
An area where recent research has been focussed on is gender diversity, and such 
diversity on boards may also impact both the process and quality of decision-making 
(Hoogendoom et al., 2013); and may cause conflict as a consensus may be more difficult 
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to achieve (Terjesen et al., 2009). The Chair has a duty to ensure the composition of the 
board is appropriate for purpose, as noted earlier, and an important area this impacts is 
gender diversity and decision-making. Gender diversity on boards guards against 
groupthink (Robinson & Dechant, 1997; Daily et al., 2003). This research found that when 
a board does not include gender diversity, the directors are likely to be similar, coming 
from similar backgrounds, with a similar education and having similar networks. 
Maznewski (1994) has found that such homogeneity among directors is more likely to 
lead to groupthink; whereas Zelechowski & Bilimonia (2004) takes an opposite view, 
citing women ask more questions and decisions are less likely to be made without a 
discussion, hence reducing groupthink. No empirical studies have considered 
sensemaking, decision-making and the role of the Chair, and I seek to address this gap 
in the literature. 
6.2.2        The role of the Chair in managing powerful actors 
McNulty et al. (2011) argue that the Chair can tap into four sources of power when 
fulfilling their leadership role: 
1. Structural power is the power inherent in the formal organisational structure and 
hierarchy 
2. Ownership power is the power deriving from either owning a significant 
shareholding in the firm, or power gained from forging long-term relationships with 
significant owners or founders 
3. Expert power is the power that emanates from demonstrating an ability to handle 
the firm’s key tasks and contribute to organisational performance 
4. Prestige power is the power related to personal prestige or status.  
These forms of power are influenced by the capital and disposition of individual directors 
(seen in Chapter 5). Structural power can be used where the Chair may speak to the 
leadership team of an organisation, all of whom may not be on the board, to glean 
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information and understanding prior to board debate. Expert power can be accessed by 
the Chair if an expert opinion is required either to affirm a board decision or to contribute 
to the board debate, prior to decision-making. Prestige power can be used by the Chair 
if say he/she is an industrial expert, with an influential industrial network to establish 
contact with potential customers. Ownership power (in terms of my study, economic 
power) is particularly observed during phases of encapsulated sensemaking as 
discussed in Chapter 4, which the Chair may influence through mediation and 
demonstrates the link between the role of the Chair and power. Kakabadse & Kakabadse 
(2008) suggests that one of the Chair’s attributes needed for effective performance is an 
understanding of sensemaking, and as I show a relationship between power and 
encapsulated sensemaking in this Chapter, the consideration of power is relevant to 
understanding sensemaking. I now review the relevant literature between sensemaking 
and power.  
6.3     Sensemaking and the influence of power 
Having examined the various components of sensemaking in Chapter 4, I now consider 
the influence of power on these sensemaking components in the context of the boards 
of entrepreneurial ventures. This is in response to the identification of new phases of 
encapsulated sensemaking that were seen in Chapter 4. In this Chapter, I further 
investigate power to understand the contribution made by powerful actors within the 
sensemaking process and in turn the influence on decision-making. The issue of power 
and politics remains largely detached from our understanding of sensemaking. This 
detached relationship is considered by Maitlis & Sonenshein (2010), who state that 
Weick’s (1995) updated work on sensemaking suggests that there is a key role for power 
and politics in sensemaking, where Weick recognizes the structural constraints on action 
and cognition (Magala, 1997). Despite Weick repeating his call for increased attention to 
be given to power and politics in his updated theory of sensemaking, his hopes are still 
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largely unfulfilled; a gap I seek to address. This call for further research in this area was 
echoed by Drori & Ellis (2011), when they considered power game initiatives and 
sensegiving initiatives through an in-depth case study. They state (15): “The 
generalization of sensegiving through power games for the purpose of avoiding change 
warrants further studies. A key issue for future research would be to look at other contexts 
and conditions, such as organisations in different industries and in different stages of 
their life cycles”. They also call for further research that may look at power game 
initiatives as informal mechanisms used to erode structures of control by bypassing or 
ignoring managerial decisions or curtailing and neutralizing managerial action. Further 
research may take the task of studying how sensegiving through power game initiatives 
eventually contributes to ambiguity in situations of change. This is of relevance to my 
study where I look at sensegiving through power game initiatives in entrepreneurial 
venture boards where a change of direction is required. 
There are several ways of conceptualising power. Parsons (1957, 1963a, 1963b, 1967) 
seeks to treat power as: “A specific mechanism operating to bring about changes in the 
action of other units, individual or collective, in the process of social interaction” (Parsons, 
1967 299). Parson’s conceptualisation of power links to consensus and the pursuit of 
collective goals. A second definition is given by Adrendt (1970 44) and relates to the 
human ability not just to act alone but in concert, whilst the power play occurs. A third 
conceptualisation is the three-dimensional view of power presented by Lukes (1974), and 
one which I adopt. Although this now seems dated, having been written some forty years 
ago; his 1986 book which outlines his conceptualisation has been cited 11,700 times as 
noted by Google Scholar as of February 26th, 2017, and is still considered relevant, and 
a second edition of Lukes’ book was published in 2005. This new edition includes a 
critique of the three dimensions of power, concluding that although there is due criticism 
against all three dimensions, they are still relevant (Lukes, 2005 58 & 59). I have 
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considered all the conceptualisations outlined above, and conclude that Lukes 
conceptualisation most closely aligns with my empirical observations in Chapter 4; and I 
describe this alignment as I progress through a description of Lukes’ conceptualisation 
of power below. Therefore, I use the literature which subscribes to Lukes’ 
conceptualisation of power as core along with the arguments presented therein and 
consider the various views of the expressed three dimensional views of power. Lukes 
presents a conceptual analysis that considers what he terms the first, second and third 
dimensional views of power. 
The first dimensional view is that typified by Dahl and his fellow pluralists (Dahl 1957; 
1958; 1961); the first where groups of individuals try to maximise their interests, with 
moving lines of conflict. Dahl’s definition of power is: “A successful attempt by A to get B 
to do something he would not otherwise do” (Roderick et al., 1969 82). This definition 
assumes power cannot be taken for granted and should be observed empirically.  Polsby 
(1963 121) notes that the researcher “should study actual behaviour, either at first hand 
or reconstructing behaviour from documents, informants, newspapers and other 
appropriate sources”. This focus on observable behaviour involves studying decision-
making that results in a decision, often after observing conflicting interests. This one-
dimensional view may fit well with early sensegiving initiatives within encapsulated 
sensemaking episodes, where the attempts are openly discussed around the board table, 
with an initial intent to try and reach a consensual decision, moving to sense gleaned 
only from the subgroup offering their version of the problem and solution. 
The second dimensional view put forward by Bachrach & Baratz (1970) embraces 
coercion, influence, authority and force. This is important in the context of entrepreneurial 
ventures as I observe all four of these elements in the empirical data. These elements 
are defined as follows: “Coercion exists where A secures B’s compliance by the threat of 
deprivation where there is a conflict over values or course of action between A and B” 
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(Bachrach & Baratz, 1970 24). In the context of entrepreneurial ventures, coercion, 
through the threat of deprivation, may be the threat of withholding consent required by 
an investor director (to protect the investor’s interests), to allow the entrepreneurial 
managers to execute a course of action. However, such consent is needed for the 
entrepreneurial managers to progress the business: “Influence exists where A, without 
resorting to either a tacit or an overt threat of severe deprivation, causes B to change his 
action” (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970 30). In the context of entrepreneurial ventures, 
influence may occur from the mere knowledge that the investor directors possess greater 
economic power (as discussed in Chapters 4 & 5): “In a situation involving authority, B 
complies because he recognises that A’s command is reasonable in terms of his own 
values, either because its content is legitimate and reasonable procedure” (Bachrach & 
Baratz, 1970 34, 37). In the context of entrepreneurial ventures, authority may exist as 
the entrepreneurial managers recognise that the investor directors possess more 
professional knowledge, say in relation to deal structuring, so they will accept authority 
around this subject as it aligns with their acceptance of the superior knowledge of investor 
directors; or conversely the investor directors recognise that the entrepreneurial 
managers may have superior knowledge of the business, so they concede authority to 
the entrepreneurial managers in this area.  In the case of force: “A achieves his objectives 
in the face of B’s non-compliance by stripping him of the choice between compliance and 
non-compliance” (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970 28). In the context of entrepreneurial 
ventures, choice is removed through senseforcing, a concept introduced in Chapter 4, 
where the investors typically force/impose a decision on the management. Hence two-
dimensional power involves both decision-making and the absence of decision-making: 
“A decision is a choice among alternate modes of action” (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970 39); 
a non-decision is “a decision that results in suppression or thwarting of a latent or 
manifest challenge to the values or interest of the decision maker” (Bachrach & Baratz, 
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1970 44); such a thwarting may be seen during sensefreezing, where an idea stemming 
from the entrepreneurial manager subgroup is disregarded by the investor director 
subgroup on the basis that the investors would never agree to the idea. This two-
dimensional view of power may fit very well with the empirical data, which considers 
sensemaking processes leading to both decision-making and the absence of decision-
making, which I observe in my data. In Chapter 4, the phases of encapsulated 
sensemaking can lead to the absence of decision-making as they progress beyond 
sensebreaking. An understanding of any link to the views on power may help to further 
understand the reason power has such an impact on encapsulated sensemaking.  
The third dimensional view broadens out to allow for potential issues that can be kept out 
of decision-making, such as decisions never reaching a decision-making stage because 
they are averted or because potential conflict has never been actualised. Schwartz 
(2005) further considers this third dimension of power and includes several types of 
“power over people”, including both positive and negative influences (1010), as well as 
issues that can be neglected in decision-making because they tend to be associated with 
situations that never reach a point of decision-making or are never fully acknowledged. 
This would be the case in latent conflict, which consists of a contradiction between the 
interests of those exercising power and the real interest of those they exclude, such as 
the case where there are latent faultlines as evidenced in Chapter 5. A broad definition 
of power should include all three views and allow for the broadest interpretation of data 
to minimize the risk of missing pertinent observations and issues. Therefore, the 
definition of power used in the current study can be summarised as follows:  
Power is one individual or group getting another individual or group to 
do something that he or they would not otherwise do (Dahl 1957   203). 
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This definition is inclusive of both decision-making and the absence of decision-making 
processes and may involve the aversion of potential conflict which aligns with the 
observations seen within the phases of encapsulated sensemaking in Chapter 4. 
Although there is research on power game initiatives and sensegiving by managers 
(Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007), which acknowledges that persuasion and meaning creation 
are key parts of strategic management, little research has been carried out to consider 
confrontational sensegiving (Drori & Ellis, 2011), and no attempt has been made to link 
the dimensions of power to sensegiving initiatives in confrontational situations. In 
presenting the following Table 6.1, I suggest a relationship between power and the 
encapsulated sensemaking constituents (from Chapter 4) and decision-making; and 
suggest the order of employing power game initiatives is likely to follow the first, second 
and third dimension of power as conceptualised by Lukes, aligning with the temporality 
of sensemaking components. I do this because from Lukes’ description of his 
conceptualisation, these seem to align, as described above, to the phases of 
encapsulated sensemaking as observed in Chapter 4.  I then code against these (refer 
to section 6.4.3) to establish whether the empirical data supports the theoretical 
construct. 
Sensemaking components 
Dimension of 
power 
Decision-making potential 
Sensebreaking 1 Decision-making 
Senseforcing and 
sensefreezing 
1 & 2 
Decision-making and no 
decision making, including 
coercion, influence, authority 
and force 
Sensehiding 1, 2 & 3 
The dimension that can avert 
potential decisions reaching 
the decision-making stage 
 
      Table 6.1: Encapsulated sensemaking, power and decision-making 
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I have introduced above the possibility that sensemaking could influence decision-
making and that the mediation skills of the Chair, including the control of power game 
initiatives by the Chair, may impact decision-making through influencing the 
sensemaking process. I now seek to examine these relationships through analysing 
empirical data from my study. 
6.4 Data and methods 
6.4.1  Research setting 
Board decisions are critical to the success and failure of a company. To understand the 
decision-making processes of entrepreneurial venture boards, I set out to understand the 
relationship between the board’s sensemaking processes and the resultant outcomes by 
way of decision or indecision: 
There are many situations requiring individuals to engage in 
sensemaking, and we suggest that none is more important than when 
an entrepreneur experiences business failure (Ucbasaran et al. 2013   
196). 
Whereas the above refers to sensemaking after the failure event, here I consider 
sensemaking before the final failure occurs and after adverse deviations from the 
business plan, attempting to throw light on whether such negative outcomes can be 
avoided. Any influences on the outcome of the process that lower the chance of failure, 
including mediation of contested debate and the control of power game initiatives 
amongst board directors by the Chair, may usefully inform the sensemaking literature, 
and may assist the practitioner in understanding board dynamics. In this Chapter, I seek 
to explore how it is that in some ventures the more minor failures are addressed, whereas 
in others the minor failures accumulate into the terminal failure of the business. I do this 
by presenting my empirical evidence about all six episodes, then I analyse them via 
synthesis. How actors sensemake about minor failures and then make decisions is 
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clearly an important component of this story which I consider from the empirical data, but 
inductive observations from the data show that the Chair may have a significant role in 
directing the board towards decision-making by being influential on the sensemaking 
process. 
6.4.2        Sensemaking episodes and case backgrounds 
In total, six episodes were selected where these three companies substantially (as 
recognised by a majority percentage of the board members) adversely deviated from the 
warranted business plan.  
As already stated in Chapter 3, the decisions that followed each sensemaking episode 
were varied; two episodes were followed by consensual board decisions (i.e. all board 
members agreed), two episodes were followed by forced board decisions whereby some 
board members disagreed or agreed reluctantly to support the board decision, and two 
were preceded by protracted indecision, resulting in board paralysis and eventual 
company failure. A summary of each sensemaking episode, its trigger, its length and the 
final board decision is presented, along with case study narratives are presented in Table 
3.2 and Chapter 3 under Methods. I observed power game initiatives in encapsulated 
sensemaking in Chapter 4 (as represented in Table 6.2 below) and will now consider 
power as an influence over this sensemaking process in more detail. I use the data in 
this section to consider whether there is a theme between the dimensions of power, the 
types of sensemaking, and the outcomes in the form of decisions or indecision.  
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 Drugtech Pharmadev Medco Medco 
 Episode 2 Episode 2 Episode 1 Episode 2 
Sensebreaking Boards 1 & 2 Boards 1 & 2 Boards 1 & 2 Boards 1 & 2 
Sensefreezing Boards 3 & 4 Board 3 Boards 3 & 4 Boards 3 & 4 
Senseforcing Boards 5 & 6 Board 4 Board 5 Board 5 
Sensehiding Boards >6 Board 5 Board 6 Board 6 
 
                       (Taken from Chapter 4, Table 4.3) 
                   Note: Boards relate to board meetings 
                Table 6.2: The timing of components of encapsulated sensemaking 
I use my empirical data to illustrate the relationship between the three dimensions of 
power as assembled in Lukes (1974) and components of the sensemaking process, not 
all defined in the extant literature (refer to definitions in Chapter 1 and Glossary).  
6.4.3      Data coding 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 display the data coding and structure used in analysing the data for 
this Chapter. The coding for encapsulated and open sensemaking and information flow 
linked to power game initiatives is displayed in Chapters 4 and 5. I do not repeat the 
sensemaking coding, however I do enhance and refine the coding of power, using both 
quotations from Chapter 4 and quotations not used in Chapter 4. The data is 
subsequently used in this Chapter to consider relationships between sensemaking and 
decision-making, the influence of the Chair as both a mediator within the sensemaking 
process of the board debate and control of power game initiatives. Table 6.3 involves the 
coding for the decision-making outcome and the mediation skills of the Chair.  Table 6.4 
shows the data coding to move from power quotations to various phases of sensemaking 
and the link of these to the power literature as described above. I then use this data to 
illustrate an important link between decision-making, the mediation skills of the Chair, the 
type of sensemaking and the use of power games. 
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First Order Data Second Order Data 
Aggregate 
Theoretical 
Dimensions 
Evidence of protracted discussion in the board room 
Indecision / no decision 
Decision-
making 
outcomes 
Avoidance of discussion in and outside the board 
room 
Statements from various actors that they felt coerced 
into a particular decision 
Forced decision-making Evidence that investors invoked their ownership rights 
as a means of pursuing a course of action that was 
not unanimously agreed 
Evidence of open discussion taking place in the board 
room soon after the adverse deviation 
Consensual decision-
making 
Statements from actors that they wanted to work 
together to resolve the issue 
Statements from actors that they felt the decision-
making process was fair open and contributed to by 
all that wished to contribute 
 Statements about the way the Chair is perceived 
Observations of the 
Chair on the direction of 
the board 
Effect of 
mediation 
strength of 
the Chair 
   Statements about the direction of the company as 
observed by others  
Statements relating to observations by the Chair that 
impacts on the company         
Statements about the way the Chair acts Chair activity that 
affects the direction of 
the board 
Statements about the direction of the company due to 
the action of the Chair 
 
 
Table 6.3: Data coding for decision-making outcomes and mediation     
strength of the Chair 
 
 
First order data Second order data 
Aggregate theoretical 
dimensions 
Use of power by both subgroups to discredit 
alternate positions 
Lukes first dimension 
of power 
Power 
Use of power predominantly by the more 
powerful investor director group to paralyse 
Lukes first and second 
dimensions of power 
Use of power solely by the more powerful 
investor directors to force their agenda and 
point of view 
Lukes first and second 
dimensions of power 
Hiding of facts or pertinent data knowingly 
and with an intent to manipulate 
Lukes first, second 
and third dimensions 
of power 
 
Table 6.4: Data coding for power linking to Lukes’ conceptualisation  
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6.4.4        Research participants 
The study uses the same research participants for all the empirical work, so the narrative 
on research participants in this section is repeated in all the relevant empirical Chapters 
for clarification. 
The views and experiences of the board members of these three companies were 
recorded over thirteen years. There were several stakeholder groups: Entrepreneurial 
managers, investor directors, investors and Chairs that made the environment suitable 
for sensemaking behaviour, especially given that the subgroups could attempt to gain 
influence in numbers (Allmendinger & Hackman, 1996). The board members represented 
several stakeholders, providing the environment to observe the responses of and 
interactions among individual board members and director groups when presented with 
adverse deviations from warranted business plans. The board members were observed 
throughout the lives of the companies and were interviewed during periods of adverse 
deviations from a business plan that had been agreed by at least one subgroup. They 
were also interviewed subsequently, either when regrouping to enable a board decision 
to be made as a unified course of action or when failing to make a board decision, often 
ending in terminal failure. 
6.4.5       Study design 
The study of processes such as sensemaking involves observing and interpreting 
individuals’ and groups of homogeneous actors’ accounts (their understanding of an 
unfolding story). As is consistent with the rest of this empirical study, this work calls for a 
qualitative method (Isabella, 1990; Gioia & Thomas, 1996) with the potential to compare 
situations across similar case studies of comparable organisations. The present study 
meets these criteria where both retrospective and real-time sensemaking dynamics are 
followed (Gover & Duxbury, 2012). Semi-structured interviews were used in this study to 
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collect and analyse the data. The methodology is the same as that used in Chapters 4 
and 5 (sections 4.3 & 5.4). 
6.5        Findings and analysis 
6.5.1  Decision-making outcomes 
As I am interested in decision-making in this Chapter, I consider the sensemaking 
episodes and start with the decision-making outcome; then explain what happens in each 
case drawing out mediation displayed by the Chair and power game initiatives and the 
connection between the use of power and the role of the Chair, and connect this to the 
type of sensemaking observed during such episodes, as described in Chapter 4. Table 
3.2 sets out the episodes and details the strategic board decisions; two decisions were-
consensual, two forced and two were periods of indecision. I consider these decisions in 
that order and then compare them. 
As this Chapter concentrates on the Chair as a mediator in reaching a decision and as a 
putative controller of power game initiatives, I set out their background, how they were 
appointed and their prior experience, which all may have a bearing on their subsequent 
behaviour and ability. 
Drugtech 
The Chair was appointed by the entrepreneurial managers and remained in post 
throughout the life of the company. He did not possess the level of economic capital of 
the investor directors and less than 1% share options. He held no other investments. His 
background was in both clinical science and management, but not in entrepreneurial 
ventures. He possessed a substantial network, but only within large pharmaceutical 
circles (refer to Table 5.4). 
Pharmadev 
Pharmadev appointed three Chairs during the life of the company. The first Chair was 
removed during the first sensemaking episode (along with the CEO), which was a 
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consensual and an uncontested decision by the shareholders and replaced by the 
second Chair, whom was the interviewee. The second Chair, appointed by the University 
who held a significant shareholding at the time, was replaced prior to the second 
sensemaking episode, as the investors called for relevant industrial experience and the 
second Chair was from the telecommunications industry and not the life science industry. 
At the time of the interviews, this Chair was no longer in place, hence defined as the ex-
Chair, as a third Chair had replaced him who led the board during the second 
sensemaking episode and to the company termination. The second Chair (my 
interviewee) did not possess the level of economic capital of the investor directors and 
less than 1% share options, but he had more influence than the entrepreneurial 
managers. He had retired from a multi-national corporation, but had no experience of the 
entrepreneurial ventures other than other non-executive director appointments (refer to 
Table 5.2) 
Medco  
Medco appointed two Chairs throughout the life of the company. The first Chair was 
appointed by the investor and in place throughout the first sensemaking episode. He 
departed at the end of the second sensemaking episode, been replaced by a Chair that 
took the company to receivership. He did not possess the level of economic capital of the 
investor directors and held less than 10% share options, but significantly more influence 
than the entrepreneurial managers. He commenced life in the public sector, and swiftly 
moved to commercial roles in the private sector and management of a corporate equity 
portfolio. He had not held prior Chair appointments in entrepreneurial ventures. He 
possessed a substantial network but only within medical device circles (refer to Table 
5.3).  
6.5.2  Consensual decisions 
Drugtech (first episode) 
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The first sensemaking episode resulted in a consensual swift decision, with the investor 
directors accepting an alternate strategy put forward by the entrepreneurial managers 
and probably wanting ammunition to argue with their boss, the investor, who was both 
an individual private business angel and the sole investor. They were surprised at a 
toxicological result, from the drug development process, which meant the systemic drug 
development had to be curtailed, and pleased that the executives had taken the initiative 
to find a suitable alternative plan, which led to consensus, and maintaining respect: “He 
{the CEO} spoke directly with the investors” (CSO, Drugtech, first episode 2009). 
The investor directors received the sense as they engaged and accepted the alternate 
option as a viable alternate strategy. The swiftness and consensual nature of the decision 
led from early sensegiving by the CEO to sensereceiving by the rest of the board and the 
acceptance of the alternate option as a plausible new strategic direction: 
The CEO and CSO suggested that the abandonment of the drug as a 
systemic and moved to a topical (CSO, Drugtech, first episode 2009). 
This led to the re-orientation of the company, with the adoption of a fresh vision, a new 
mission, new goals and objectives: “I think {the adverse deviation as a trigger} came out 
of left field and the company did re-orientate itself in a quite dramatic way” (NED, 
Drugtech, first episode 2009). 
A swift consensual decision resulted from open sensemaking. I now consider the role of 
the Chair on this process. In the first episode of Drugtech, the functionality of the board 
did rest on the mediation skills of the Chair keeping an environment open and where all 
views from all directors are brought in to the open for fair and balanced consideration, 
and in doing so, assisted the information flow to move freely between all directors. I have 
hence defined the mediation strength of the Chair as strong, due to his ability to keep the 
sensemaking open. I observed a functional board where sense was being drawn from 
any actor that was willing and able to contribute to the debate: 
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The Chair oversaw a functional board with good interaction between the 
directors that were healthy, constructive or value added (CEO, Drugtech, 
first episode 2009). 
The Chair’s main challenge was to encourage the right balance of advice and opinion 
from each director, but he certainly was acting in a ‘no blame’ environment: 
Such a board environment led to a harmonious board with no fear of 
expressing opinions or of adding to a debate in a constructive manner 
(CEO, Drugtech, first episode 2009). 
This led to a board that functioned appropriately in its decision-making capacity: 
The Board appeared to act in unison with no blame or little contention 
observed (CEO, Drugtech, first episode 2009). 
The mediation skills were strong in this episode, where the Chair ensured the board 
meetings involved free and frank debate. The Chair’s role was facilitating information flow 
in an open, high trust environment:  
Board conversations were regular, open and often spontaneous, 
allowing for creative and innovative problem-solving (Chair, Drugtech, 
first episode 2009). 
It may not be trivial for the Chair to maintain an open sensemaking process, but with less 
evidence of power game initiatives, it is likely that the Chair will be orchestrating an open 
and uncontested debate. There is some suggestion of power game initiatives where the 
entrepreneurial managers demonstrated to the investor directors their knowledge of the 
business and networks that assisted in defining the new strategy and change of direction: 
I do not think there was anything in this instance where anybody needed to 
use power dynamics (BD director, Drugtech, first episode 2009). 
As this solution was immediately accepted by the investor directors, they had no need to 
use power to force their agenda as it was the same as the entrepreneurial managers: 
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The whole energy of the board was turned on the problem. There was none 
of the attitude of who can I hit to avoid being hit myself (NED, Drugtech, first 
episode 2009). 
It can be argued that sensemaking was swift (two months, refer to Table 3.2), minimal 
sensegiving was aimed at the actors with the strongest economical capital first and 
sensebreaking activities were either suppressed, so accommodating (observed at the 
start of sensebreaking) or not evoked, with no blame tactics and an ongoing lengthy 
search for plausible options to close the gulf. It is possible that through this change 
management process, the social need to make sense commences immediately and 
depending on the deemed severity and urgency, sensegiving by one set of actors can 
close the gulf in the delivery of new goals and setting of new objectives. 
Pharmadev (first episode) 
The first Pharmadev sensemaking episode was triggered by the company not meeting 
its breakeven point at an agreed time-point in the business plan. The trading position 
further declined and the company ran out of cash reserves and was forced, after a period 
of nine months, to return to shareholders with a request to recapitalise the company. This 
request was granted by the board (with total agreement) but not without removing the 
Chair and the CEO, prior to this request. The first sensemaking episode was discussed 
openly at board meetings and the decision led to immediate action. It was obvious to all 
the board directors that a new management team, a new business model and the 
engagement of the scientists were all required. This was also obvious to all the major 
shareholders at the time, and such a crisis led to an open sensemaking environment with 
one resultant unitary account, leading to a consensual decision: 
The University had one of its most promising ideas on the risk of early 
failure.  Everyone concerned pulled together to find a solution (Ex Chair, 
Pharmadev, first episode 2012). 
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At the time of interview, the ex-Chair interviewed was the new Chair, replacing the Chair 
mentioned below. Over the life of this company, three Chairs existed, the first was 
dismissed during this first sensemaking episode, and the second (the Ex-Chair 
interviewed) was dismissed during the second sensemaking episode when a new Chair 
was forced onto the board by the investors. 
As well as a consensual decision, i.e. to recapitalize and replace the CEO/Chair which 
was uncontroversial, the decision was taken swiftly when all the facts were presented to 
the board, with little requirement for debate around the subject or the need to suggest 
alternate options. The support and observation around the impactfulness and strength of 
leadership by this new Chair was affirmed by the CSO as illustrated by the quotation 
below: 
This is the event really, unless something happened, this company would 
be out of business with the current team within the next two or three months, 
it was as short as that. There was no cash so the money would have run out 
so that’s catastrophic failure (CSO, Pharmadev, first episode 2012). 
There was no evidence of power game initiatives, but mutual respect to try and help: 
“The CSO is one of the University’s leading professors who needed support” (Ex-Chair, 
Pharmadev, first episode, 2012). Everybody was engaged in their pursuit of the same 
goal: “Everybody wanted to get a result” (CSO, Pharmadev, first episode 2012); with a 
communal approach to problem solving: “We {the board} consulted the scientists rather 
than imposing deadlines and they reacted very well to that” (CSO, Pharmadev, first 
episode 2012). 
Like the first open sensemaking episode of Drugtech, in this environment of open 
sensemaking a relatively swift (less than twelve months) consensual decision also is the 
result. All other decisions (if indeed decisions were made) took greater than twelve 
months with encapsulated sensemaking, discussed later.  
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Unlike the case of the first sensemaking episode of Drugtech, where the Chair was 
assisted in keeping the sensemaking open, in this episode the Chair took a more 
proactive and visionary role, with an emphasis on instilling confidence in the subgroups: 
There was a rapid turnaround from a poor situation to a company that 
was sound with a strong Chair that directed the board (CSO, 
Pharmadev, first episode 2012). 
In fulfilling this role, he created an environment, so the entrepreneurial managers and 
investor directors felt that they were duly represented in any decision-making: 
The partial failure was reversed by a new Chair taking a differing view, 
which was positive to the outcome and working with the scientists and 
not against them, but imposing commercial deadlines (Inv Dir, 
Pharmadev, first episode 2013). 
This resulted in efficient and effective board dynamics that gave solid, yet inclusive, 
direction from all directors on the board: 
The new Chair announced during his first board meeting that he believed 
in the science and that he should be given three months to get the 
company into an investible state, which he did (CSO, Pharmadev, first 
episode 2012). 
In summary, the Chair in open sensemaking episodes creates and maintains an open 
and fully inclusive environment where all directors are unfettered to contribute to the 
sensemaking episode, and all directors give and receive sense at will. I now turn to the 
episodes which resulted in forced decisions. 
6.5.3    Forced decisions 
Medco (first episode)  
The first Medco sensemaking episode was triggered by the company missing a revenue 
target at an appointed time-point, which was a critical milestone for the investors. Some 
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actors believed that the business should be built through sensible acquisitions that would 
enhance the revenue and potentially make up the deficit, whilst others wanted to forge 
an exit, without acquisitions. So, there were potentially several options. Although this first 
sensemaking episode was protracted (taking twenty-one months), it eventually ended 
with the forced decision by the investor directors (Table 3.2) that no further acquisitions 
were necessary, since growth should be attainable from the existing operational base. 
The CEO here states that the Chair held this belief, and that it was in common with the 
investor directors. In this case, although there was observed allocentrism in that one of 
the investor directors had been an industrial CEO and had sympathy with the view of the 
CEO and her team, he was unable to sway the investor directors as a class (as observed 
from Chapter 5). Therefore, further acquisitions, although considered at subsequent 
boards, never formed a dominant frame in the sensemaking process: 
It felt like a nonsense; it felt like there was a lot of back patting going on 
from the {previous} acquisition but the investor directors were continuing 
to think about their own positions with their investment funds and not the 
success of the company. I think being independent or not {none where} 
is very important to how the directors saw the business. I do not think 
the business was their main priority (CEO, Medco, first episode 2013). 
The episode commenced with open sensemaking (sense been drawn from both 
subgroups and the Chair) and all directors took part in the board debate with the belief 
that the strategy was delivering results for the company, tracking its plan: “Hugh observed 
a functioning board at this time” (CEO, Medco, first episode 2013). As soon as the 
revenue target was missed, a debate commenced to consider whether alternate 
strategies were needed to replace the adopted strategy. Although numerous alternate 
strategies were considered to increase growth (acquisitions, new products or new 
markets), the board was unable to reach a decision and the attention turned to the 
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effectiveness of the Chair as a mediator. There was consensus from both subgroups and 
from the Chair himself that he was not sufficiently strong to mediate between the 
subgroups: “I needed to get a bit more of a grip” (Chair, Medco, first episode 2013). He 
also was allocating his Chair’s time between two companies, which were competitors in 
certain aspects and as such was conflicted: 
This was an uncomfortable time as the Chair also spread his time across 
both companies and he was conflicted and things started to go very 
wrong (CEO, Medco, first episode 2013). 
During a period of open sensemaking and the earlier stages of encapsulated 
sensemaking (sensebreaking), the Chair was visible in creating and keeping an 
environment where he actively encouraged trust between all directors.  
The Chair both during the board meetings and outside of the board 
meetings, spent time encouraging relationships of trust and openness 
which paid dividends (CEO, Medco, first episode 2013). 
His weakness in assisting the board to reach consensual decisions became evident 
during encapsulated sensemaking (from the sensefreezing phase), when subgroups 
started to look to their own subgroups for sense, and preferring the way the world is 
viewed by their own subgroup compared to the other subgroup. Also during the period of 
open sensemaking, there was little evidence of power game initiatives which is one 
defining feature of open sensemaking, which remarkedly changed as faultlines 
strengthened and encapsulated sensemaking emerged. As sensefreezing occurred, the 
board dynamics changed: “The board meetings became ceremonial in nature and 
ritualistic in process” (CEO, Medco, first episode 2013). The more powerful subgroup 
(the investor directors) started to confer and gather sense outside of the board meetings: 
“Numerous telephone conversations were held outside of the board around potential 
weaknesses in the management team” (Inv Dir, Medco, first episode 2013). This resulted 
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in further conversations between the investor directors outside of the board where they 
may have targeted other shareholders to attain either voting power to effectively control 
the company: “Outside of the board meetings, there were discussions which could have 
been more helpful. They were maybe influencing shareholders in what could be seen in 
an underhand way” (Inv Dir, Medco, first episode 2013). The Chair failed to prohibit the 
strengthening of faultlines promoting encapsulated sensemaking and the more powerful 
investor directors (even though the less powerful entrepreneurial managers disagreed 
with the decision) forced a board decision not to progress with any further acquisitions. 
The Chair failed in ensuring free information flow and creating an environment of trust, 
partly due to his own lack of credibility. It is the lack of trust that in fact stemmed the flow 
of information from one subgroup (the entrepreneurial managers) to the other subgroup 
(the investor directors). 
Drugtech (second episode) 
The second sensemaking episode commenced several years after the first episode 
which I discussed above under consensual decisions, when the board was divided on 
whether to proceed with further drug development. The sensemaking trigger was an 
unexpected board meeting pronouncement by investor directors to stop all drug 
development. This decision eventually led, after thirty-six months, to the suspension of 
operations and the company being put up for sale.  In the second sensemaking episode, 
individual board members could neither control the board debate nor find communal 
plausible solutions from an understanding of the past events. The investor directors, to 
give sense, broke the sense as the entrepreneurial managers failed to accept the 
proffered option as plausible, as they had already obtained contrasting information 
directly from the investors relating to cessation of the clinical trial:  
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This decision was not expected. It caused anger among the non-
executives and executive directors, frustration and discord on the board 
during that day (CEO, Drugtech, second episode 2009). 
The Chair was clearly challenged as the expression of ideas and potential solutions were 
aggressively put forward by the investor directors with a refusal to listen to the views of 
the entrepreneurial managers:  
The board became a less happy place. I think people were more 
guarded about what they said and what they thought (NED, Drugtech, 
second episode 2009). 
Later, in this second sensemaking episode, the board became virtually paralysed, which 
was challenging to the Chair. The Chair failed to strongly mediate as evidenced by an 
inability to affect the sensemaking process:  
One of the non-execs succeeded in taking over the meeting (NED, 
Drugtech, second episode 2009). 
The lack of mediation skills became more pronounced as the episode progressed 
through a temporal sequence of events as elaborated in Chapter 4. As the board became 
less functional: “I think the board was not very functional” (CSO, Drugtech, second 
episode 2009). The Chair’s position of mediation became paramount and if he either fails 
or was unable to act, then decision-making suffers: “The Chair was helpless to do little 
about balancing the board” (CEO, Drugtech, second episode 2009). This observation 
accords with the position taken by Surowiecki (2004) noted in the literature review, who 
suggests that there may be a problem with decision-making in small groups like 
entrepreneurial venture boards as aggregation of director opinion becomes difficult or 
impossible. In this encapsulated sensemaking episode, decision-making is paralysed, 
resulting in a forced decision led by the investor directors with the majority voting power 
to sell the company, over the less powerful entrepreneurial managers, who wanted to 
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continue to build the business. The Chair was unable to mediate as one of the investor 
directors increasingly dominated the board debate and the use of power became more 
evident, through the attempt to force the agenda by suggesting the investor had spoken 
to him prior to the meeting: 
Mr A {an investor director} was very forceful and had considerable dialectical 
skills that could hold the floor at some length (NED, Drugtech, second 
episode 2009). 
During the sensefreezing stage, powerful actors started to take entrenched positions:  
One investor director {Mr A} had very strong opinions and was very difficult 
to dissuade once he had taken a point of view (CSO, Drugtech, second 
episode 2009). 
During the senseforcing stage, the investor directors forced their position by taking the 
full voting rights of the investor through the suggestion that they stood in the shoes 
directly of the investor: 
He (the investor director) represented the impression that it was the view of 
the investor and not his own personal view (to terminate the clinical trial) 
(CEO, Drugtech, second episode 2009). 
This led to sensehiding, with the investor directors increasingly behaving as they were 
running the company by making decisions outside of the board meetings and sometimes 
then having made their decision outside of the board, they forced these decisions on the 
entrepreneurial managers during the board meetings: 
The two investor directors met frequently to formulate plans to impose on 
the rest of the directors (Chair, Drugtech, second episode 2010). 
Although the entrepreneurial managers did not make decisions outside of the meeting, 
they did review their legal position, which suggests their uneasiness over the situation: 
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The extent of power play (by the investor directors) made the 
entrepreneurial managers review the legals as they became nervous (CEO, 
Drugtech, second episode 2009). 
So, ultimately the level of mistrust could not be repaired and the board became impotent. 
Decisions were merely imposed by the more powerful subgroup, leading to the 
production of a sale memorandum and ultimately a transaction to sell the company. The 
result of this transaction was the entrepreneurial managers bought back the assets (a 
management buy-out), as no trade purchaser was found and the management buy-out 
became a commercial possibility, in that the assets were sold at a heavy discount to book 
value.  
So in summary, In these cases where forced decisions were observed, the Chair failed 
to prohibit encapsulated sensemaking. Maybe a change in board appointment or an early 
conversation between the Chair and the investor could assist in maintaining open 
sensemaking. I now turn to those episodes where no decision was made or there was a 
period of protracted indecision, resulting in terminal failure. 
6.5.4  No decision or indecision leading to failure 
Medco (second episode) 
The second sensemaking episode was triggered by a further missed revenue target (the 
first sensemaking episode also started with a missed revenue target). This sales decline 
continued for forty-eight months, until the company eventually went into administration.  
Numerous differing views were proffered to explain deviation in sales, resulting in a 
protracted period of indecision. In the cases like this, where numerous differing views 
were expressed, resulting in the availability of numerous explanations and deviations, 
the importance of the Chair increases. The lack of organic growth or any further 
acquisitions led to insufficient growth to meet the business plan. The business 
underperformance then led to the CEO’s attempt to manage the shareholder base: 
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There was a huge amount of shareholder and management discussion 
and relationships were quite fractious at points with certain investors 
(Chair, Medco, second episode 2013).  
Although there was debate about the underperformance, this was discussed outside of 
boards by the investor directors, who had made a communal decision that they did not 
want to bring this to the board. They were all supporting closed-end funds and hence 
their portfolio track record took precedence for them compared to individual company 
performances. They preferred to believe that a transaction would generate the necessary 
return. Finally, this lack of agreement and the inability of the board to make a consensual 
decision led to the failure of the company: 
It became more apparent as the time passed that the board became 
dysfunctional, something the Chair could have controlled better (CEO, 
Medco, second episode 2013). 
Even the Chair retrospectively agreed he had lost the leadership role in the board: “I 
found that it was really difficult to keep control” (Chair, Medco, second episode 2013). 
This was also observed by one of the investor directors who even initiated a call to 
remove the Chair. “The investor directors asked: Do we need to alter the board 
composition and especially the Chair?” (Inv Dir, Medco, second episode 2013). The 
same investor director made his views clear on the Chair: “When you are in trouble, you 
need a little bit of dynamism and he did not hit that dynamic” (Inv Dir referring to the 
Chair, Medco, second episode 2013). The Chair in this episode not only lost control of 
the confidence of the investor directors, even though he was recruited by the investor 
and de facto the investors, but also the entrepreneurial managers, and he himself 
acknowledged that he had lost the respect of the board. This lack of orchestration and 
no counteraction towards strengthening faultlines resulted in the promotion of 
encapsulated sensemaking by subgroups of board members. 
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There were numerous power play initiatives as strengthening faultlines promoted 
encapsulated sensemaking. Their power plays added to the sensefreezing phase: “Some 
investor directors did not deal with the underperformance in a transparent manner – 
hence paralysing board discussions” (CEO, Medco, second episode 2013). The board 
became impotent: “They {the board members} did not add anything positive to the 
company” (CEO, Medco, second episode 2013). The investor directors used power 
during the senseforcing phase: “The investor directors forced an external body onto the 
company to oversee the sales process” (CEO, Medco, second episode 2013). Although 
power game initiatives were used outside of the board meeting during the sensehiding 
phase: “It all became a little bit suspicious outside of the boardroom, which got worse 
over time” (Chair, Medco, second episode 2013). These once hidden conversations were 
then played out in the board room reinforcing the interplay (both ways) between 
senseforcing and sensehiding: “Some of the hidden discussions behind closed doors 
were then expressed at board meetings – the investor directors wanted an exit and 
became unmovable in their opinion” (Chair, Medco, second episode 2013). In this case, 
what had been discussed in secrecy of initially the most powerful subgroup, the investor 
directors, became an unmovable position at subsequent boards: “The largest two 
investors wanted to exit, they became entrenched in that position and would try and bring 
other investors around” (COO, Medco, second episode 2013). This position led to an 
impotent board being unable to reach a decision, before it was too late and the 
administrators were called in to eventually wind up the company. Whereas in the previous 
episode, the board reached a forced decision; in this instance, the indecision to sell the 
company meant that when it was eventually put up for sale, it was too late to find a 
suitable partner. So even though a decision was made to sell the company, the period of 
indecision was so protracted to make the final decision to sell somewhat meaningless, 
as it was inevitable the company was heading into receivership.  
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Pharmadev (second episode) 
The trigger for sensemaking in this episode was the point at which the company missed 
a revenue target at an agreed time, and consideration of what options were available 
were debated by the board. The second sensemaking episode lasted thirty-six months 
and during that time the board became more dysfunctional, with no agreement whether 
it should be sold or grown. These non-decisions were driven by the disengagement of 
the board members and a change in strategic direction which lost credibility with the lead 
scientific team: 
The change in direction was indeed driven by the VC funder (CSO, 
Pharmadev, second episode 2012). 
It was clear to the existing board members that the forum for open debate was closed, 
and a more dictatorial regime had commenced: “You will do it my way” (Inv Dir, 
Pharmadev, second episode 2013). This led to the imposing of new board members, 
effectively resulting in a board that was split between the old guard and new guard. The 
new guard were a set of directors (the investor directors) who represented the investors 
and wanted to sell the company; the old guard were the entrepreneurial managers who 
wanted to grow the company and raise another round of funding. A significant driver of 
the actions of the investor directors was the portfolio view of the investor which they 
represented, who required an exit: 
The seed capital was injected in small amounts against milestones and 
by the time we came to attempt to sell the company, all the funds were 
maxed out, and that was another reason an exit was the only available 
option (Inv Dir, Pharmadev, second episode 2013). 
This need to exit became paramount and drove the sensehiding, destroying virtually any 
sensereceiving between the investor directors and the CSO. The Chair had been 
appointed by the venture capitalists, but the venture capitalists had appeared to have lost 
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confidence in the Chair as they continued to use their powers to appoint further investor 
directors, and the Chair held no respect from the entrepreneurial managers as he had no 
scientific knowledge. The commercial management team members had also been 
catapulted in by the venture capitalists, which further isolated the scientific members, and 
hence caused a totally dysfunctional board and all strategic decisions were taken outside 
of the tabled board meetings. This was observed by both the CSO and an investor 
director: 
He {an entrepreneurial manager} undermined the Chair in respect of not 
having the scientific background in this field that was necessary to lead 
the company to success and left the Chair somewhat impotent (CSO, 
Pharmadev, second episode 2012). 
On further parachuting of investor appointed investor directors, key members of the 
board already had opinions on the motives of the new investor director and did not view 
him as an independent director that sought to look for solutions that were in the best 
interest of all shareholders:  
The Chair and CSO observed this event with some suspicion and 
hostility (referring to the addition of a new investor director) and they 
could do little to manage this new director (CSO, Pharmadev, second 
episode 2012). 
This lack of respect for the Chair led to a breakdown of relations between the Chair and 
the new investor director, which meant there was no attempt to integrate the views of the 
new investor directors into board debate. This alienation of the new investor director led 
to an inefficient and ineffective board decision-making process with potentially further 
sensemaking to understand the board complexities as well as underlying issues: 
There was a more complex situation than before producing weak board 
dynamics (Inv Dir, Pharmadev, second episode 2013). 
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There was a great deal of power play observed in this episode, as demonstrated by the 
degree of senseforcing: “So it was kind of a bullet to the head, a gun to the head, in terms 
of accepting one of the nominees {to become another investor director}” (CSO, 
Pharmadev, second episode 2012). This was superseded by a significant amount of 
sensehiding: “There was connivance in abundance behind the scenes” (CSO, 
Pharmadev, second episode 2012). These power game initiatives became known to the 
entrepreneurial managers which only led to deepen the mistrust: “As the ex-Chair has 
already said, Mr X {an investor director} used to play games really using the investor’s 
viewpoint, and he was quite devious really which did not always help” (CEO, Pharmadev, 
second episode 2012). As seen in the second episode of Medco, the second episode of 
Pharmadev also ended in terminal failure with the board impotent to reach a decision. 
The indecision was preceded by a forced decision in a previous episode, which led to 
mistrust, which only helped to fuel the lack of sensereceiving between the entrepreneurial 
managers and investor directors. 
In summary, there is strong evidence that if the Chair allows encapsulated sensemaking 
to persist, the likelihood of consensual and swift decisions abate to the extent that the 
board may become impotent and the company is at risk of terminal failure.  
Table 6.5 below summarises the above cases and indicates the patterns between 
decision-making, the role of the Chair in mediation and controlling power play and the 
link to sensemaking.  
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Episode 
(Sensemaking 
type) 
Decision 
Mediation strength of the 
Chair 
Evidence of 
power games 
Drugtech (1) 
(Open 
sensemaking) 
Consensual Strong Not observed 
Pharmadev (1)  
Consensual Strong 
  
(Open 
sensemaking) 
Not observed 
Medco (1) (Open 
sensemaking/ 
Encapsulated 
sensemaking) 
Forced 
Strong to weak (moving from 
open to encapsulated 
sensemaking) 
None to 
multiple (>5) 
Drugtech (2) 
(Encapsulated 
sensemaking) 
Forced Weak Multiple (>5) 
Medco (2) 
(Encapsulated 
sensemaking) 
No decision Weak Multiple (>5) 
Pharmadev (2) 
(Encapsulated 
sensemaking) 
No decision Weak Multiple (>5) 
 
Table 6.5:    Decision-making and the role of the Chair in mediation and power 
 
6.6  Discussion 
6.6.1  Decision-making 
The coding and analysis indicates that that there are differing decision-making outcomes 
from the observed sensemaking processes. The first type of outcome is in the form of a 
decision made by the board of the company, whether a consensual or forced decision. 
This outcome is seen in the cases of the first and second episodes of Drugtech, the first 
episode of Medco and the first episode of Pharmadev. The second type of outcome is 
the form of indecision whether that is due to the paralysis of the board through 
discrediting alternate solutions or no plausible solution being tabled for the board to duly 
consider. This second outcome can also include no decisions being made due to sense 
being hidden from at least one subgroup of the board, so there is no collective board 
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sensemaking on the topic as one subgroup is unaware of the issues. This outcome is 
seen in the second episodes of Medco and Pharmadev. 
The sensemaking episodes from the first episode of Pharmadev and the first episode of 
Drugtech end in swifter consensual strategic decisions, with the episodes lasting no more 
than nine months, leading to a changed course of action and giving the companies fresh 
objectives. The sensemaking episodes from the other four episodes lead to enduring 
multiple accounts of events (covered in Chapter 5) with resultant forced decision, 
indecision or no decision. The production and working through of multiple accounts 
becomes even more time-consuming when the varying components of the encapsulated 
sensemaking process are engaged. In all cases where multiple accounts develop and 
alternate versions of the narrative become competitive, encapsulated sensemaking is 
evident. The components of encapsulated sensemaking were elaborated in Chapter 4, 
suggesting that the components are not generally positive towards achieving goal 
congruence in entrepreneurial ventures. The data analysis in this Chapter demonstrates 
that in all cases of encapsulated sensemaking, the outcome was that of a forced decision, 
indecision or no decision. This is in stark contrast to episodes of open sensemaking that 
led to swift consensual decision-making, in which the components are generally positive 
in entrepreneurial ventures towards achieving goal congruence.  
If the Chair has taken a position to side with the investor directors or indeed the 
entrepreneurial managers, he has a challenge to maintain sufficient credibility with both 
sides, especially if two strong faultlines have been activated, to turn around a board. This 
results in a dysfunctional, ineffective and non-directional board with a denial to consider 
issues derailing the process of open sensemaking, in that chaos is ignored instead of 
triggering the search for sense and the actors look to their subgroup for sense in 
deepening encapsulated sensemaking. Ironically, the Chair could see the problem but at 
the time felt impotent to act. In both the cases of Medco and Pharmadev, where the 
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boards became more dysfunctional and after sensehiding initiatives had been employed, 
there was a decline, ultimately into failure. It is evident from this study that the Chair must 
create the right environment to keep sensemaking open, otherwise it may be very difficult 
to reverse encapsulated sensemaking to open sensemaking, as there is little evidence 
of this occurring once encapsulated sensemaking passes beyond the sensebreaking 
phase, as this is the phase where mistrust commences in the encapsulated process. 
6.6.2  Comparison of Chair leadership positions 
For Drugtech (first episode), Pharmadev (first episode) and the early part of Medco (first 
episode); all open sensemaking episodes, the board was considered functional and 
director interaction was considered healthy, constructive and value adding with resultant 
positive effects on the company’s performance. This was not a passive occurence as the 
Chair in several cases helped to create the right environment.  In all other encapsulated 
episodes, the Chair became more visible, but ineffective, and is engaged in competitive 
conversations where actors are attempting to gain a dominant position. The performance 
of the Chair appears to be regularly questioned and the Chair is more likely to have to 
deal with a dysfunctional board. It appears that in these contested episodes, the Chair is 
truly tested and may make the difference between leading the board to a consensual 
decision or a route to failure. However my study demonstrates that in all contested 
episodes, no consensual decision was reached. So, if possible, the Chair needed to do 
more to maintain an open sensemaking environment, which I now cover, whilst 
considering the Chair as a mediator.  
6.6.3 The Chair as a mediator 
There is a notable difference between chairing in open sensemaking episodes opposed 
to chairing in encapsulated sensemaking episodes. There is a requirement for the Chair 
to mediate in encapsulated sensemaking episodes, as swifter decision-making is 
observed during open sensemaking episodes and indecision or lack of decision is 
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observed during the longer encapsulated sensemaking episodes. It may be that there is 
a period during sensebreaking where the process can be reversed, and certainly it is 
evident from this research that once sensefreezing and senseforcing is reached, it is too 
late as there is no evidence of reversal at this stage back to open sensemaking. Beyond 
sensebreaking, the venture is often left with an ineffectual board that cannot be changed, 
other than restructuring by changing individual board members. There were no observed 
cases where senseforcing and sensefreezing did not progress to sensehiding within 
encapsulated sensemaking episodes (Chapter 4) and hence further empirical work is 
needed to further understand the potential reversibility between encapsulated 
sensemaking to open sensemaking. In Medco, the Chair was initially a non-executive 
director and replaced one of the scientific founders that was initially in that role. He often 
saw the challenges facing the company in a different way to the other parties and 
sometimes aligned himself to one actor or groups of actors but not consistently 
throughout. Open sensemaking was observed with one of the investment directors taking 
a sympathetic view of the position of the entrepreneurial managers. Nevertheless, the 
other investor directors were not convinced as a group by the argument and were 
egocentric, so their view prevailed, and led to encapsulation. If the Chair had been a 
stronger mediator, there may have been a better chance of a fuller board debate leading 
to a more consensual decision and some alleviating of the feeling that the entrepreneurial 
managers had not had a fair and thorough hearing.  
Similarly, during the second episode at Pharmadev the Chair showed professional 
affiliation to large corporations and this affiliation led to the inability to see through others’ 
lenses. The Chair’s weakness as a mediator led in part to the strengthening of the 
faultline from weak to medium between the first episode and the second episode, when 
the investor directors aligned as an egocentric stereotypical class with no interest of 
business building, but merely entirely focussed towards an exit.  
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However, in contrast to Medco and Pharmadev, the first episode of Drugtech ended in a 
swift consensual decision, which was brought about to some extent by a Chair, whose 
mediation skills appeared to be strong and an allocentric CEO acting in the role of an 
investor director.  
My research has shown that attaining open sensemaking is through a mechanism of 
open debate and all steps should be taken to avoid encapsulated sensemaking or to 
reverse encapsulated sensemaking to open sensemaking, if possible, and as quickly as 
possible. Once encapsulated sensemaking endures for a period, there is more likelihood 
that sensegiving initiatives will be used by powerful actors to gain a dominant frame, and 
progressively sensegiving initiatives that make the Chair’s role in reaching consensual 
decisions harder as sensegiving initiatives move from sensebreaking to sensefreezing 
and senseforcing to sensehiding.  
It is clear from the empirical data from my study that the Chair may have an influence on 
the board dynamics. In considering the Chair, I have concluded s/he may have a pivotal 
role in orchestrating the board towards open sensemaking and diverting harmful 
sensegiving initiatives, which s/he may or may not succeed in, depending on the ability 
to comprehend sensemaking and further to have the ability and power to be able to act 
on comprehension; and in doing so add to this body of literature. My empirical study 
presented in Chapter 4 presents the temporal phases of encapsulated sensemaking 
shown in Figure 6.1. It is the Chair’s ability to guide the board back to open discussion 
(as presented in the section on the boardroom leadership by the Chair) which leads to a 
greater potential for consensual decision-making. In the study by Strike & Rerup (2016), 
they capture how mediators facilitate sensemaking by regulating the pacing and 
temporality of entrepreneurs’ sensemaking. This study confirms that the mediator in the 
form of the Chair can also affect sensemaking pacing as decision-making is swifter in 
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open sensemaking than in encapsulated sensemaking and can be affected by the 
mediation skills of the Chair. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: The relationship between sensemaking, mediation by the Chair and 
decision-making 
 
I make the observation above that as encapsulated sensemaking progresses through the 
discrete phases, power game initiatives are employed; and the Chair is confronted with 
the need to control these games to reach decisions. I now consider the ability of the Chair 
to control these power games. 
6.6.4    The Chair and control of power 
The first dimensional view assumes power cannot be taken for granted and is to be 
observed empirically, which is useful in the context of this research being based on 
empirical studies of entrepreneurial ventures. In this case, the focus of power is 
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determined by whose decision (or which subgroup’s decision) prevails to become the 
outcome through decision or indecision of the sensemaking process. In this pluralist 
approach, “an attempt is made to study specific outcomes to determine who actually 
prevails in community decision-making” (Polsby, 1963 113). The emphasis in this first 
dimensional view is on “concrete observable power” (Lukes, 2005 17). The focus on 
observable behaviour in identifying power involves the pluralists in studying decision-
making, as their central task. For Dahl, power can only be analysed after careful 
examination of a series of concrete decisions (1958 466). Polsby further argues that “who 
prevails in decision-making seems the best way to determine which individuals and 
groups have more power” (1963 4). In this context, “decisions involve direct (actual and 
observable) conflict” (Lukes 2005 18). This first dimension is seen around the board table 
where vigorous and contested debate is more likely during early periods of encapsulated 
sensemaking, where sensebreaking may be used to influence opponents to abandon or 
dilute their position through the breaking down of their sense. Sensebreaking is observed 
to be used during the first few months of encapsulated sensemaking and is an attempt 
around the board table to find a decision through active and open debate. The actors, 
however, look to their own subgroups for sense, as described in Chapter 5, and the power 
of the subgroup relates to the strength of the faultline, which depends on the economic 
capital of the subgroup.  
Two-dimensional power “involves examining both decision-making and the absence of 
decision-making” (Lukes, 2005 22). In the context of the work of Bachrach & Baratz 
(1970) who critique the pluralists’ one dimensional view of power, power is often confined 
to decision-making in overt safe issues (1970 6), and that non-decisions can stem from 
power use that allows for “consideration of the ways in which decisions are prevented 
from being taken on potential issues over which there is an observable conflict of 
interests” (Lukes, 2005 25), as seen in sensefreezing. The typology of power in this 
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second dimension of power embraces coercion, influence, authority, force and 
manipulation (Lukes, 2005 21), which is observed in senseforcing. 
As stated in the introduction to this Chapter, Schwartz (2005) considers the third 
dimension of power. This covers several types of “power over people, including both 
positive and negative influences” (3), which includes issues that can be neglected in 
decision-making, since they tend to be associated with issues that never reach a point of 
decision-making or are never fully acknowledged. This would be the case in latent 
conflict, which consists of a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power 
and the real interest of those they exclude. Such manipulation and exclusion mean that 
decisions are in fact not brought to the board because they are hidden from certain 
actors, which equates to sensehiding. The reason decisions are not brought to the board 
is that any debate around the problem is not tolerated by at least one subgroup of 
directors. In the case of this empirical data, the hiding is performed by the actors with the 
greater economic power, namely the investor directors and the management parachuted 
into ventures by investors to enact the investors’ agenda, and is hidden from the 
entrepreneurial managers on the board, so to appear that there is no decision to be 
made. The data expressed in Table 6.8 shows the temporality of sensemaking 
components during encapsulated sensemaking episodes, which are consistent 
throughout all encapsulated sensemaking episodes. I express this relationship below 
schematically in Figure 6.2: 
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Figure 6.2: The relationship between sensemaking, power and decision-making 
 
Power game initiatives have been clearly shown to influence the process when 
sensemaking moves towards stronger encapsulation, as shown in Figure 6.2. 
Considering the empirical work and observations from Chapters 4 & 5, actors use their 
economic capital as currency to employ power initiatives and obtain their ability to enter 
the power game through such economic capital. I observed power game initiatives being 
used predominantly by investor directors and management who had been parachuted 
into a company by the investors to effect change and implement the agenda of the 
investor. This is the case in all observed encapsulated sensemaking episodes, and it is 
the actors with stronger economic capital (the investor directors) who use power play 
initiatives to gain dominant framing, and actors with stronger economic capital have the 
currency to employ power games in that they can influence by increased voting power 
either as a threat or by tabling a resolution for a board vote. Actors who possess strong 
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economic capital are more likely to employ power game initiatives opposed to actors with 
weaker capital during encapsulated sensemaking. 
6.7  Conclusion  
In this Chapter, I have considered how the directors of the boards of entrepreneurial 
ventures share or withdraw their actions and language to position their viewpoints prior 
to decision-making. There are two distinct processes that stem from whether sense is 
gleaned openly or whether subgroups of directors look to their own subgroup, as that 
subgroup views the world in an aligned manner, to sensereceive from and senseblock 
opposing subgroups on the board (refer to Glossary for definitions). Consensual 
decision-making becomes more remote the further through the encapsulated 
sensemaking process the sensegiving initiatives progress. A reason for this remoteness 
is the influence of power and the building of mistrust, already considered.  
It is more likely sense is created and received in open sensemaking episodes, while all 
contested episodes in encapsulated sensemaking episodes exhibit sensegiving 
initiatives that destroy sense and inhibit sensereceiving, which I define as senseblocking 
defined from the empirical data as: “The use of collective sensegiving initiatives that are 
observed in encapsulated sensemaking inhibiting the restoration of order”. 
A way of destroying sense is through powerful actors (those that possess strong 
economic capital) ignoring the sense of others around the board if they have taken a 
position, whether that position has been verbally expressed or not. They are also the 
main actors who lead on sensehiding initiatives. Open sensemaking is more likely to 
result in progressive sensereceiving with consensual decision-making as an outcome, 
whereas encapsulated sensemaking is more likely to result in progressive senseblocking, 
with forced or no decision-making as an outcome. There is the potential for the Chair to 
mediate in the hope of promoting open sensemaking or encouraging directors to refrain 
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from sensegiving initiatives observed during encapsulated sensemaking in this study, 
which may be the difference between success and failure. I further consider how the 
Chair may achieve this aim during my discussion on the contributions to practice in 
Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 7:   CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE AND PRACTICE 
7.1  Introduction 
In this thesis, I have examined the socio-cognitive processes of sensemaking in 
entrepreneurial ventures. In doing so, I have presented new processes with discrete 
phases for both encapsulated and open sensemaking. I have explained the nature of the  
relationships between actors’ social positions and their sensemaking in entrepreneurial 
ventures through faultline activation and strengthening. I further considered the 
relationship between the role of the Chair in decision-making during sensemaking 
episodes; especially considering the mediation skills of the Chair and the Chair’s ability 
to control powerful actors, to ensure a balanced debate. 
As stated in the Introduction, I set out to address gaps in the literature as follows: Firstly, 
the literature on sensemaking and entrepreneurship (as with the literature on 
sensemaking per se) fails to deal with the issue of context in terms of how it shapes 
stakeholders’ cognitions. Drawing on the work of field theory, and particularly the work of 
Bourdieu, I have addressed this gap by exploring how the content of stakeholders’ 
cognitions is shaped by their social position in a field (Chapter 5). Secondly, the literature 
on sensemaking does not address the issue of power in an explicit sense. In this study, 
I have linked power to sensegiving components and explained how it shapes and is 
shaped by these social processes (Chapter 4). Thirdly, the literature on sensemaking 
and entrepreneurial ventures has tended to focus on entrepreneurs’ sensemaking about 
terminal failure. In doing so, the focus has been on sensemaking after the terminal failure. 
In contrast by examining sensemaking during and following adverse deviations from the 
business plans (i.e. partial failure), I am able to explain the circumstances that facilitate 
and prevent partial failures from turning into terminal failure. Fourthly, the existing 
literature has only recently considered the sensemaking of a broader range of 
stakeholders (Maitlis, 2005), with the need to consider differing contexts. To further 
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address this gap, I have examined sensemaking from the perspective of different 
stakeholders in entrepreneurial ventures; the entrepreneurial managers (representing 
the company and its staff) and the investor directors (representing the venture 
capitalists). Finally, the literature on sensemaking and entrepreneurship needs to further 
consider the socially negotiated processes of sensemaking, and how they may shape 
the unfolding of an event. By drawing on the work of Maitlis (2005) and others around the 
social processes of sensemaking, I have explored these social dynamics and how they 
unfold in practice. 
The following research questions were considered. How does sensemaking unfold in 
entrepreneurial ventures and how do encapsulated and open sensemaking processes 
differ? (Chapter 4). What is the nature of faultlines in entrepreneurial venture boards and 
how do faultlines promote encapsulated and open sensemaking in entrepreneurial 
venture boards? (Chapter 5). Does sensemaking affect decision-making, how does the 
Chair influence this relationship through mediation and is there a relationship between 
the use of power and sensemaking that affects decision-making? (Chapter 6). 
In addressing these questions, I summarise the contributions of this thesis in this 
Chapter. I initially detail the patterns across the sensemaking episodes with the purpose 
of pulling the themes together to consider the contribution to the literature, and then 
explain how my findings generate practical insights that can inform practitioners. 
7.2    Patterns across the sensemaking episodes 
I consider below the patterns observed across the six sensemaking episodes. 
In two cases, I observed a harmonious and agreeable social process, leading to a swift 
unitary outcome of a consensual strategic decision. In four cases, I observed a highly 
contested social process, leading to multiple potential outcomes of indecision or no 
decision. In contrasting these patterns, I present two processes outlined below. 
Encapsulated sensemaking is typified by the phases of sensebreaking, sensefreezing, 
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senseforcing and sensehiding and is likely to endure longer than open sensemaking 
episodes resulting in a forced decision, indecision or no decision. In contrast, open 
sensemaking is typified by the phases of accommodating, comprehending, positioning 
and accepting and is likely to result in swifter consensual decision-making compared to 
periods of encapsulated sensemaking. 
Within all cases, I observe the actors around the board table during sensemaking 
episodes. Actors’ sensemaking is shaped by their social positions and disposition leading 
to different accounts that promote either encapsulated or open sensemaking. Differences 
in sensemaking accounts can endure, leading to paralysis and in some cases 
dysfunctional activity and conflict where directors block sense from board members of 
opposing subgroups representing strong faultlines (i.e. encapsulated sensemaking). 
Collective sensemaking is facilitated by directors’ ability to better understand the different 
realms of science, commerce and finance, and to accept the receiving of sense from all 
board members (i.e. open sensemaking). 
7.3   Contribution to the literature 
There are a number of findings from this thesis, which are worthy of comment. 
Firstly, sensemaking is a social process, which requires an understanding of the 
underlying social processes in play. Actors’ capital and dispositions shape their 
sensemaking, in both encapsulated and open sensemaking forms. Bourdieu (1986, 
1990) is not new to literature on entrepreneurship, but his theory of practice has not been 
extended to an understanding of faultline composition. I use Bourdieu’s work to extend 
the faultline literature by considering Bourdieu’s concepts of economic, cultural and social 
capital as well as to form a link to dispositions (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) to explain 
certain antecedents to faultline formation. Lim et al. (2013), suggests that a faultline 
perspective offers an important alternative to the principal-agent perspective to 
understand new venture team dynamics. I add to this literature by providing insight into 
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why these faultlines may emerge in shaping the sensemaking process. I extend the 
literature (particularly Chrobot-Mason et al., 2009; and Jehn & Bezrukova, 2010) in 
demonstrating further negative repercussions of strong faultline formation, in the context 
of entrepreneurial ventures. 
Secondly, failure is more likely to occur when sensemaking is encapsulated and less 
likely when it is open. The identification of new phases within encapsulated and open 
sensemaking which exhibit the same temporal relationship in all observed cases should 
assist in both understanding progressive failure but lead to the potential to avert terminal 
failure. As stated in Chapter 4, Sandberg & Tsoukas (2015  20) state the four general 
areas in their critique of sensemaking that require addressing which are as follows: 
“There requires further work on process as the notion remains relatively vague, the 
concept of sense is insufficiently developed, sensemaking overlooks the larger context 
in which it takes place” and “sensemaking reduces reality to subjective understanding”. I 
have considered new components for both encapsulated and open sensemaking and, in 
doing so, have added to the sensemaking literature, and removed some of the 
vagueness and further developed the concept of sense leading to positive and negative 
outcomes. I have outlined as much around the disruption of sense as around obtaining 
sense and have indicated that most sensegiving initiatives within encapsulated 
sensemaking lead to disruption, paralysis or obstruction to decision-making. In contrast, 
I have shown that no or limited sensegiving is used in open sensemaking and there is 
more likelihood of consensual decision-making as a result. The Weickian view (1993) of 
sensemaking involves the restoration of order from chaotic situations, however this view 
cannot be universally applied to all sensemaking processes. The Weickian view, as is 
evident from the evidence presented here, aligns with open sensemaking processes 
within the context of entrepreneurial ventures restoring goal congruence from equivocal 
positions.  
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Thirdly, in encapsulated sensemaking, power game initiatives are more likely to derail 
the open sensemaking process leading to failure. Although there is research on power 
game initiatives and sensegiving by managers (Maitlis & Lawrence, 2007), which 
acknowledges that persuasion and meaning creation are key parts of strategic 
management, little research has been carried out to consider confrontational sensegiving 
(Drori & Ellis, 2011), and no attempt has been made to link the dimensions of power to 
sensegiving initiatives in confrontational situations. I suggest a relationship between the 
dimensions of power as characterised by Lukes (1974) and progressive sensegiving 
initiatives employed during encapsulated sensemaking, which adds to the sensemaking 
literature. 
Finally, the Chair may mediate board processes towards open sensemaking suggesting 
a greater potential for board directors to make earlier consensual decisions. This is 
further considered in section 7.4 on practical insights. 
I present two process models, illustrating the discrete phases of both encapsulated and 
open sensemaking. In encapsulated sensemaking episodes, if sensebreaking, 
sensefreezing or senseforcing have been ineffective in producing a dominant frame (i.e. 
a narrative that is accepted whilst others are rejected), sensehiding may be employed. 
Sensehiding refers to the process of consciously avoiding certain discourses while 
managing change (Mahapatra & Pattnaik, 2013). In the context of the entrepreneurial 
ventures I studied, sensehiding manifests itself in predestined actions of orchestrating 
meetings among subgroups of actors outside of the boardroom to formulate plans and 
agendas to meet the purpose of that subgroup. In this phase, decisions are averted from 
ever being tabled at a board meeting through not allowing the underlying information to 
be brought out into the open from meetings away from the company boardroom. The 
agenda is firmly in the hands of the actors with the greatest economic capital, with little 
or no input into the debate by the less powerful actors. There is no shared action between 
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groups, as the group with the greater economic capital seeks to exert influence by hiding 
their position from the group with the weaker economic capital position, by not declaring 
their views until a later board meeting. All interpretive tasks are now dependant on 
whether there is any trust remaining. If the two subgroups are so untrusting of each other 
then it will be unlikely that a balanced and efficient board will function again with the 
current board members, and hence if possible should be avoided. In contrast, the four 
phases of open sensemaking (accommodating, comprehending, positioning and 
accepting) all involve the passing of sense from all actors, irrespective of whether they 
belong to investor directors or entrepreneurial managers.  This fully inclusive dialogue 
leads to swifter consensual decision-making, with board directors that have been given 
the opportunity to express their views openly and freely. The board environment 
encourages the interchange of free and frank ideas. There is no or little need for 
compiling competitive argument because narratives are built in a consensual and social 
manner, using additive data and information introduced by the actors. There is little 
requirement for power game initiatives to be employed as actors reach their required 
acceptable narrative of the episode, with options for solutions, with little need to attempt 
to influence. Tasks are fully inclusive with outside parties only used to complement or 
verify the narrative, rather than to oppose or deny it. Sensemaking is swift (taking months, 
not years) with no blame tactics and an ongoing lengthy search for plausible options to 
close the gulf. It is possible that through this process, the social need to make sense 
commences immediately and depending on the deemed severity and urgency, 
sensemaking can close the gulf in the delivery of new goals. Hence where possible, open 
sensemaking should be promoted and encouraged. These contrasting forms of 
sensemaking present in differing processes with discrete phases in the context of 
entrepreneurial ventures. I present these contrasting processes in Chapter 4, and 
duplicate below, in pulling my conclusions together. 
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interact either 
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with external 
parties 
outside the 
board 
         
Information flow  
Information flow 
among both 
subgroups starts 
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restricted with 
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of selective data 
from the investor 
directors 
 
Information flow 
predominantly 
from the 
investor director 
group to the rest 
of the board 
 
Information 
flow totally 
from the 
investor 
director 
group to the 
managers 
 Information 
flow minimal 
         
Language & 
interpretive tasks 
 Disbelief        
Confusion 
 
Bracketing of 
valued elements 
by subgroups 
 None - tasks 
paralysed  
 
Attempt to 
repair 
mistrust 
 
 
Figure 7.1: A process model of encapsulated sensemaking in entrepreneurial 
ventures 
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Phases of open sensemaking 
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and are not 
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interchange of 
ideas 
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understanding 
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agreed 
narrative 
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Bracketing of 
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Figure 7.2: A process model of open sensemaking in entrepreneurial ventures 
 
 
 
My study has indicated a relationship exists between sensemaking types and faultline 
strength and activation. A new model is proposed (Figure 7.3) to link sensemaking to 
faultline formation with a resultant impact on the presentation of the accounts, whether 
they present in unitary or multiple accounts.  
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Figure 7.3: The relationship between faultlines and encapsulated sensemaking in 
entrepreneurial ventures 
 
Note: All italic text contributes to faultline strength and unitary and multiple accounts were 
dealt with when considering sensemaking in Chapter 4 
 
One strong influence on encapsulated sensemaking, along with the likelihood of faultline 
strengthening is that of the progressive use of sensegiving initiatives by powerful actors. 
In presenting the following Table 7.1, I suggest a relationship between power and the 
encapsulated sensemaking phases (from Chapter 4) and decision-making (from Chapter 
6). Table 7.1 positions the sensemaking phases of encapsulated sensemaking in a 
temporal sequence and the use of these components align with the three dimensions of 
power. The order of employing power play initiatives is likely to follow the first, second 
and third dimension of power aligning with the temporality of sensemaking components. 
Crozier & Friedberg, (1977) suggest that power games are used by actors to manipulate 
other actors within the power structure. This assertion is extended by Drori & Ellis (2011) 
237 
 
that sensegiving can be used by actors via power games for the sake of construction of 
meaning that may influence others. As already stated, my research adds to this literature 
through the suggestion that various forms of sensegiving can be aligned to the 
dimensions of power as outlined by Lukes (1974).  
 
Sensemaking components 
Dimension of 
power 
Decision-making potential 
Sensebreaking 1 Decision-making 
Senseforcing and 
sensefreezing 
1 & 2 
Decision-making and no 
decision making, including 
coercion, influence, authority 
and force 
Sensehiding 1, 2 & 3 
The dimension that can avert 
potential decisions reaching 
the decision-making stage 
 
      Table 7.1: Encapsulated sensemaking, power and decision-making 
I also considered the role of the Chair in mediating to restrain faultlines from 
strengthening and in turn promoting encapsulated sensemaking, and in controlling the 
use of power games by powerful actors. The following Table 7.2 represents the 
relationship between decision-making, the role of the Chair and sensemaking type. 
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Episode 
(Sensemaking 
type) 
Decision 
Mediation strength of the 
Chair 
Evidence of 
power games 
Drugtech (1) 
(Open 
sensemaking) 
Consensual Strong Not observed 
Pharmadev (1)  
Consensual Strong 
  
(Open 
sensemaking) 
Not observed 
Medco (1) (Open 
sensemaking/ 
Encapsulated 
sensemaking) 
Forced 
Strong to weak (moving from 
open to encapsulated 
sensemaking) 
None to 
multiple (>5) 
Drugtech (2) 
(Encapsulated 
sensemaking) 
Forced Weak Multiple (>5) 
Medco (2) 
(Encapsulated 
sensemaking) 
No decision Weak Multiple (>5) 
Pharmadev (2) 
(Encapsulated 
sensemaking) 
No decision Weak Multiple (>5) 
 
  Table 7.2:  Decision-making and the role of the Chair in mediation and power 
My inductive analysis suggest the following propositions, which need to be further 
considered in both larger samples and other contexts. The first proposition relates to the 
relationship between types of sensemaking and the likelihood of outcomes in the form of 
decisions made or indecision or decisions delayed. 
P1:  Encapsulated sensemaking: 
(a) Reduces the likelihood of swift, consensual decision-making 
(b) Increases the likelihood of forced decision-making, indecision 
and no decision 
Open sensemaking: 
(c) Reduces the likelihood of forced decision-making, indecision 
and no decision 
(d) Increases the likelihood of swift, consensual decision-making 
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My empirical data further suggests the Chair may have a conscious mediation effect on 
the sensemaking process to affect differing outcomes, in the form of decision or 
indecision enabling boards to become more effective in driving the strategy of the 
businesses they purportedly direct, through the board. This leads to the next two 
propositions: 
            P2:   If sensemaking components are progressively engaged as 
negative sensegiving initiatives, the Chair needs to restore order 
through strong mediation. 
P3:  There is more chance the Chair can influence proceedings in 
open sensemaking opposed to encapsulated sensemaking, 
especially if he is a strong mediator. 
Finally, I link the use of power play by powerful actors with sensemaking as already 
discussed: 
 P4:   Powerful actors, who can pursue their intentions without the 
consent of other venture stakeholders, are less likely to receive 
sense from others than their less powerful counterparts during 
periods of encapsulated sensemaking. 
  P5:    Powerful actors are more likely to receive sense from their less       
powerful counterparts during periods of open sensemaking. 
I finally present the following consolidated sensemaking model in entrepreneurial 
ventures, as figure 7.4 below.  In doing so, I relate faultline activation and strength to the 
promotion of sensemaking type and likelihood of decision-making; with consideration of 
the mediation skills of the Chair and his control of power game initiatives. This model 
pulls together the findings from all three of my empirical Chapters, and indicates the 
relationship of the components from the sensemaking trigger to the likelihood of a 
consensual decision. If a sensemaking trigger activates and strengthens a faultline, the 
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likelihood is encapsulated sensemaking will be the engaged process of the board 
directors, unless the Chair is able to mediate towards open sensemaking. If the Chair 
can sustain open sensemaking or abort power game initiatives, there is a greater 
likelihood of an outcome in the form of a consensual decision. 
  Progression of time and sensereceiving – open sensemaking phases 
 
      Progression of time and senseblocking – encapsulated sensemaking phases 
Figure 7.4: Consolidated sensemaking model in entrepreneurial ventures 
 
7.4      Practical insights 
“Success is not final, failure is not fatal; 
It is the courage to continue that counts”  
Winston Churchill   
For the practitioner, hopefully the following practical insights will be useful in averting 
potential failure: 
Firstly, concerted effort is needed to achieve open sensemaking in venture capital 
backed entrepreneurial ventures, where numerous narratives of the problem and differing 
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options of putative solutions are available to the board. Without active participation of the 
Chair in securing an environment of trust and free and frank debate, the default position 
in such contested sensemaking episodes appears to be that decisions, following adverse 
deviations, are unlikely to be swift and consensual. Such a concerted effort should be the 
role of all directors, as all directors have a legal responsibility to further the best interests 
of the company and it’s shareholders as a whole.  
Secondly, the Chair can only assist in leading this effort if s/he is cognisant of open and 
encapsulated sensemaking, and the use of power game initiatives. The Chair needs to 
be aware specifically of sensebreaking as the data from my study indicates the potential 
of a strong Chair being able to mediate the board back to open sensemaking. If the actors 
are still accommodating (as seen in open sensemaking) prior to potential mistrust of 
board directors by other board directors, when there are numerous accounts of the 
sensemaking episode, encapsulated sensemaking may be avoided.  
Thirdly, board composition matters and the value of allocentric board members is of value 
when the same actor can view a sensemaking episode through differing lenses. The 
presence of allocentric board members can weaken faultlines and generate a greater 
likelihood of consensual decision-making. Insufficient thought and design is frequently 
given to board composition. The social, economic and cultural capital of individual board 
members, along with their ability to exhibit an allocentric view is important; maybe a 
director is a trained medical doctor with a commercial training, who can view challenges 
through a medical or a commercial lens. This ability allows individual board members to 
align with more than one subgroup of directors, which allows for the expression of a 
problem in differing language and through a different professional lens (i.e. a medical 
doctor expressing a problem in commercial terms, without the use of medical terms, and 
also expressing the same problem in medical terms, without the use of commercial terms 
to board directors). One subgroup of directors may make sense of problems and 
242 
 
solutions through a technical lens, whilst a second subgroup may make sense 
commercially of the same problems and solutions. An allocentric director may be able to 
explain the problem and putative solutions to either subgroup, in their own language and 
professional etiquette, which is beneficial in the pursuit of a consensual decision.    
Finally, investors and investor directors need to provide transparent advice to boards 
mitigating the risk of investor directors using power game initiatives to meet their own 
agenda. If investor directors resort to power game initiatives, the Chair should inform the 
investors of the entrepreneurial venture, and explain that such activity is not beneficial to 
reaching swift consensual decisions and increase the risk of venture failure. 
The above findings have been suggested to several serving Chairs; the findings resonate 
with their experience and accord with their understanding of their problems on boards. 
7.5    Further work 
This study has limitations, due to being both contextually limited to entrepreneurial 
ventures and in employing qualitative research to deal with the research questions. 
Further contexts such as business angel investing and representation of angel investors 
on the entrepreneurial venture board need to be examined in order to ascertain whether 
generalization is possible. This study is limited to two subgroups, with the Chair belonging 
to either subgroup or outside both subgroups. Further subgroups need to be considered 
with larger numbers. The boards of the entrepreneurial ventures in my study all consist 
of a Chair and a CEO, which is traditional in European biotechnology companies. In the 
USA, the Chair and CEO often are the same person, and this could affect the 
interpretation of my study results, if attempting to apply the findings to American 
biotechnology companies. My study is limited to the consideration of three case studies 
in the same industry, which allows for comparison of patterns, at the expense of a more 
quantitative study with greater numbers of case studies from more industries. In the 
consideration of faultlines, I limit my analysis to the use of Bourdieu’s theory of practice, 
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and it’s forms of capital. There may be alternate ways of considering faultline composition 
and subgroup formation. I have only considered limited influences on the sensemaking 
process in this context, relating to mediation by the Chair, particularly in controlling the 
input of powerful actors. These limitations pave the way for future work. I consider such 
further work by considering antecedents, the process of sensemaking and the outcomes 
in the form of decision-making. 
7.5.1        Antecedents to sensemaking 
Sensegiving and sensebreaking residuals have been identified as important 
determinants in employee sensemaking (Mantere, Schildt & Sillince 2012 193). 
Sensemaking and sensegiving residuals (the historical recollection by actors of the use 
of prior sensemaking and sensegiving) need to be further understood as antecedents to 
future sensemaking and sensegiving. Mantere, Schildt & Sillince (2012) call for further 
research on the acceptance and rejection of symbolic management, where sensegiving 
residuals “may provide a cognitive explanation for the outcomes of sequential strategic 
changes, such as poor performance of firms that conduct multiple acquisitions in a short 
time span” (192-193).  
The relationship between group (board), subgroup and individual actor contribution to 
faultlines is still evolving. Most research is in the form of theoretical contributions and 
further empirical studies (similar to this study) would assist future theorizing especially as 
sensemaking is contextual and faultlines need to be observed also in context when the 
relationship to sensemaking is considered. The recent work of Healey, Vuori & 
Hodgkinson (2015) builds on the idea of faultlines in a theoretical context. Several of the 
cases used in this paper to illustrate their theorizing are centred around a team’s cognitive 
composition where a subgroup of members possess negative implicit attitudes and a 
subgroup possess positive implicit attitudes. Future research may consider team 
members’ spread more evenly and how much reflexive discordance is required to 
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attenuate reflective concordance and to undermine team performance. In terms of future 
work on faultlines, many of the suggestions proffered by Thatcher & Patel (2012) have 
not yet been fulfilled. They suggest that “experimental and field studies to assess 
sensemaking in groups with faultlines are encouraged” (993). My study is a limited 
empirical study which hopefully will pave the way for others to follow, as both 
sensemaking and faultline theory is not fully developed and further empirical studies 
should inform the theorizing. Triggers that activate faultlines need further investigating as 
they can be activated with little regard to sensemaking processes, although it is 
acknowledged from this study that certain types of sensemaking (encapsulated from this 
study) cause activated faultlines to strengthen and although I have demonstrated that 
capital and disposition act as building blocks to faultlines, I have not considered how and 
when faultlines are triggered. 
In the assembly of subgroups whilst the actors attempt to sensemake, faultline formation 
is influenced and affected, both in terms of activation and strength. This study adds to 
this literature and has proffered relationships between sensemaking type and faultline 
activation and strength. Further work is also needed to understand the impact of positive 
and negative effects from the strengthening of faultlines. This would enhance the faultline 
literature that considers effects and triggers (e.g. Chrobot-Mason et al., 2009; Jehn & 
Bezrukova, 2010; Thatcher & Patel, 2012).  
In contrast to the findings of Lau & Murnighan (1998), where they suggest that shorter 
sensemaking processes may be promoted by strong and clear faultlines, I find that in the 
context of entrepreneurial ventures that the activation of strong faultlines are more likely 
to extend the duration of sensemaking processes due to a greater chance of 
encapsulated as opposed to open sensemaking. I suggest the presence of strong 
activated faultlines promoted by encapsulated sensemaking may prohibit the reversal of 
the process to open sensemaking, which assists the debate where Lim et al. suggest 
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that faultline strength will impact on a new venture team’s interaction processes (2013 
53).  
7.5.2         The sensemaking process 
Further work is needed to further elaborate the phases of both encapsulated and open 
sensemaking in this context and other contexts. More detail and understanding of each 
phase will inform the Chair so he can lead the board direction and understand the board 
dynamics assisting in more timely consensual decisions. This in turn should assist the 
aversion of failure when board dynamics play their part in being part of the problem and 
not the solution. My empirical data suggests the Chair can have a conscious mediation 
effect on the sensemaking process to affect differing outcomes, in the form of decision 
or indecision enabling boards to become more effective in driving the strategy of the 
businesses they purportedly direct, through the board. The findings of this study may be 
of use in promoting the leadership skills of the Chair of the board within entrepreneurial 
ventures. Knowledge of the composition and existence of faultline potential, and when 
faultlines are likely to strengthen, may assist the Chair in leading the board to make swift 
consensual decisions through open sensemaking. It may also help the Chair to steer the 
board away from the activation of strong competing subgroups of directors expressed 
through the activation of active and strong faultlines promoted by encapsulated 
sensemaking, which could lead to potentially irreversible encapsulated sensemaking with 
resultant delayed decision-making or no decision-making.  
7.5.3             Influences on decision-making 
There is an indication from the data that if the phase of encapsulated sensemaking does 
not extend beyond sensebreaking, there is the possibility with strong mediation from the 
Chair that encapsulated sensemaking can revert to open sensemaking. However further 
work is needed on this important mediation effect and the extent the Chair can be 
effective in mediation. 
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Drori & Ellis (2011) call for further research that “may look at power games as informal 
mechanisms used to erode structures of control by bypassing or ignoring managerial 
decisions or curtailing managerial action” (15). This study has gone some way in 
suggesting how sensegiving through power game initiatives contributes to ambiguity and 
how individual actors and subgroups of actors sensemake in that environment and some 
way in demonstrating how capital comes into play during encapsulated sensemaking. As 
this study looks at one industry only, further empirical contexts are needed to assist in 
generalizing the theory that actors could use sensegiving to better understand the 
mechanisms of power game initiatives as strategies for attempting to influence during 
sensemaking.  
Although emotions and attitudes are outside the scope of this thesis, further work is 
needed in this important area: “Perhaps the most worrying concern is the blatant 
conspiracy of silence that can plague a board and the need to work through the spread 
of emotions that bedevil open discussion. This is prised open by an act of courage, more 
often than that initiated by the Chair” (Nada & Kakabadse, 2013   375-376). 
Although sensemaking may never completely end, it does reach temporary resting points 
and Weick links such temporary resting points to reaching plausible accounts (Weick, 
1995) and hence reducing equivocality. Such a position explains and personally 
resonates with observations from my study, where such temporary resting points are 
evidenced and may play a key role in determining when an account is deemed plausible. 
However, plausibility is not well scoped and the putative link between reaching plausible 
accounts during sensemaking and emotions needs further elaboration. 
7.6     Concluding comments 
Overall, I believe this thesis informs both theory and practice, concerning sensemaking 
in entrepreneurial ventures. More empirical studies are called for to critique the theory, 
which in turn assists to promote best practice in the board room. As observed in my study, 
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the constitution of the board and its subgroups need careful consideration, especially the 
appointment of the Chair, who needs to balance the views of all directors in leading the 
board to consensual decisions. In guiding the board to a healthy balance of debate and 
critique, power game initiatives need to be avoided and open sensemaking should be 
encouraged, which may be the difference between terminal failure or achieving success. 
I believe further consideration of board dynamics needs to be elevated up the research 
agenda to bridge the chasm between theory and practice in this critical area of business 
and management. 
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Appendix 1  
Glossary of significant terms 
SENSEMAKING TERMINOLOGY 
Sensemaking trigger and episode (Definitions used throughout this thesis) 
A process prompted by violated expectations (Sensemaking trigger), that involves 
attending to bracketing cues in the environment, creating intersubjective meaning 
through cycles of interpretation and action and thereby enacting a more ordered 
environment from which further cues can be drawn (Sensemaking episode) (Maitlis & 
Christianson, 2014 11). 
Open sensemaking 
Open sensemaking occurs where there is little or no evidence of encapsulation (see 
below), where subgroups of actors interact freely with other subgroups in their search for 
meaning. The widely-held view that sensemaking is social, retrospective, grounded in 
identity, ongoing, enacted and seeking to reach plausible accounts (Weick, 1995) are 
characteristics which are all observed in open sensemaking.  
Encapsulated sensemaking 
Encapsulation is typically defined as “the process whereby group members are kept 
separate from non-members” (Pratt, 2000 473). When sensemaking is encapsulated, 
members engage with other members in the same subgroup to construct frameworks 
that they use to understand social stimuli. Social encapsulation follows directly on from 
the creation of strong in-group bonds as members come to spend increasing amounts of 
time in the presence of like-minded others at functions or at meetings (Pratt, 2000). Such 
encapsulation can provide protection by buffering members from other members who do 
not join or attack their sensemaking of the environment (Griel & Ruby, 1983).  
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Sensemaking components defined in the literature are as follows: 
Sensemaking 
component 
Definition 
    
Sensebreaking The destruction or breaking down of meaning (Pratt, 2000   464)  
    
Sensedemanding 
Strenuous efforts to acquire and process information so as to 
establish “a workable level of uncertainty” and equivocality 
(Weick, 1969   40; Vlaar, van Fenema, & Tiwari, 2008   240) 
    
Sense 
exchanging 
Different conceptions of organization are negotiated to socially 
construct the identity of an organization (Ran & Golden, 2011   
421) 
    
Sensegiving 
Attempting to influence the sensemaking and meaning 
construction of others toward a preferred redefinition of 
organizational reality (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991   442) 
    
Sensehiding 
Discourse can be mobilizing in terms of promoting a specific 
kind of thinking and action or manipulative in terms of hiding 
particular ideas (Vaara & Monin, 2010 6) or silencing alternative 
senses of integration or marginalization of particular voices 
(Monin et al., 2013   262) 
    
Sense 
specification 
Specification of explicit or implicit norms, coining of principles, 
exemplary decisions and actions, symbolization, and 
quantification (Monin et al., 2013   262) 
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Sensemaking components defined from my empirical studies are as follows: 
Within encapsulated sensemaking 
Sensefreezing 
I have sought to define this component from observations emerging from the data as 
“Sensegiving efforts which knowingly or unknowingly prevent sensemaking and/or the 
search for meaning and associated action” 
Senseforcing 
I have sought to define this component from observations emerging from the data as 
“Sensegiving efforts involving the use of power to influence the sensemaking of others” 
Senseblocking  
Defined from the empirical data as “the use of collective sensegiving initiatives that are 
observed in encapsulated sensemaking inhibiting the restoration of order”. The absence 
of senseblocking is sensereceiving, which is observed during open sensemaking. 
 
Within open sensemaking 
Accommodating phase 
Unfettered debate between subgroups to understand the challenge and scope of the 
problem 
Comprehending phase 
Seeking an understanding of the component parts of the solution 
Accepting phase 
Agreement on the execution of an outcome through suggesting, discarding and 
reconciling information 
Positioning phase 
Debate in working towards a consensual solution and board resolution. 
274 
 
 
OUTCOMES FROM THE SENSEMAKING PROCESS 
The specific sense or nonsense and the restored organisational activities, or 
further interrupted activities that ensue. The specific sense generated is seen 
as a springboard for the actions actors take to reinstate an interrupted activity 
(Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015 S15).   
 
Outcomes stem from either a unitary or multiple accounts as defined: 
Unitary Account: Unitary accounts result from a systematic and controlled approach by 
giving and gathering constructions of the issue, which allowed them {in this study, the 
directors} to guide the numerous and varied views of multiple stakeholders into a single 
collective account. The new accounts generated through these processes tended to be 
cumulative and dense as leaders built upon, rather than tore down the accounts (Maitlis, 
2005 36).  
 
Multiple Accounts: Multiple accounts accumulate over time as stakeholders put forth 
more diverse accounts of situations that no one works to integrate. The multiple new 
accounts each of which tends to be quite narrow represent the construction of a single 
group {in this study, the board} (Maitlis, 2005 38-39). 
 
Decision-making 
Consensual decision 
A decision arrived at by agreement with all board members 
Forced decision 
A decision arrived at through some directors not agreeing with the decision but 
did not have the power, influence or willingness to overturn the decision 
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Indecision/no decision 
The inability of the board to reach a decision  
 
 
OTHER IMPORTANT DEFINITIONS USED IN THIS STUDY 
Adverse deviation 
When external investors buy equity in a business, the entrepreneurial managers often 
have to provide assurances by warranting certain statements, i.e. that the intellectual 
property is owned by the company or certain financial statements are reasonably stated, 
resulting in a warranted business plan. Although there were many minor deviations, 
adverse deviations in the context of this study are events triggered by a serious diversion 
from plan that may, if not acted on, result in the terminal failure of the entrepreneurial 
venture. Such a trigger is identifiable by the investor directors and often definitions of 
adverse deviations are defined in the subscription agreement. Examples may be 20% 
drop in sales target or missing the profit target by 10% in the year end audited accounts, 
but specific to each venture. 
 
Dominant frame 
An agreed narrative that “shapes how the problem and solution are defined, and thus 
which strategic choice is made; conversely where no frames resonate enough to mobilize 
action around it, frames remained divergent, activities unresolved and the decision 
deferred” (Kaplan, 2008 736). 
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Bourdieu’s form of Capital 
Bourdeiu’s forms of capital are defined (Bourdieu, 1986) as follows: 
Economic Capital 
Economic capital is expressed as power through property rights. Within the context of 
entrepreneurial ventures, economic capital is often expressed by the degree to which an 
actor has rights of control through equity ownership, or through the representation of an 
owner. Actors’ ownership of other investments also adds to economic capital.  
Cultural Capital 
Cultural capital is expressed as the area of expertise possessed by each actor. Within 
the context of entrepreneurial ventures, actors” educational background and their 
experience in the position that they have taken in the entrepreneurial venture are of 
relevance. Additional experience that may assist in understanding the roles of other 
actors is also considered. 
Social Capital 
Social capital is expressed as the quality of relationships that span the different domains 
of expertise. The diversity of social capital enables actors to appreciate other actors’ 
perspectives. 
 
Dispositions 
Dispositions are enduring ways of observing and believing and exist mainly at the 
unconscious level (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Influences are filtered through the 
actor’s social positions, including dispositions in the form of egocentric or role-centric 
behaviour, or behaviour that results in a disposition to think about others and to behave 
in relation to them, which is viewed as allocentrism (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).  
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Allocentrism 
Allocentrism is the movement away from the natural egocentrism of the individual and 
results in a disposition to think about others and to behave in relation to them.  
Allocentrism manifests itself in terms of movement from self-centred to decentered states 
on social, affective, moral, relational and cognitive dimensions (Thornberry, 1997). 
 
APPENDIX 2 
This appendix includes the final interview protocol and a sample interview transcript, 
where permission has been given by the interviewee for inclusion in the thesis, but with 
names of individuals and companies changed or removed. 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
1. All data will be anonymised, kept confidential and pooled. The purpose of the 
research to be communicated to the interviewee. 
2. Obtain the permission of the interviewee to perform the interview and subsequent 
pooled use of the data. 
INTERVIEW OUTLINE  
IDENTIFICATION OF FAILURE (ADVERSE EVENT TRIGGER) 
Have you been able to identify one or more failure events from the history of the 
company? 
 Why do you deem that event a failure event? 
 Did others deem the event a failure event? 
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 What was the % equity split of the company? 
 What was the board constitution? 
Was there a subscription agreement in place with consent required from investors 
for specific activity? 
If so, were the consents onerous and unduly restrictive on the executive directors 
operating the company? 
If represented on the board, was/were the investor director/s helpful ? 
If represented on the board, did the investor director/s always act in the best 
interests of all shareholders at all times? 
Could the failure event be identified as an adverse deviation from a warranted 
business plan? 
 What triggered the identification of the failure event? 
 Was the failure event isolated or part of a larger number of failure events? 
 Was there a stream of potential antecedents to the failure event? 
 Did the flow of action become less intelligible before or during the failure event? 
 What was the magnitude of the failure event? 
 
EXAMINATION OF THE FAILURE EVENT (ADVERSE EVENT) 
Would you tell the story of events that led to the failure and subsequent events 
post failure that relate to the failure? 
279 
 
Was blame and/or praise attributed to any party involved? 
Did the power dynamics between varying parties affect the failure? 
How did the board members relate to each other and to management? 
Did such power dynamics change during and/or after the failure? 
Did key people take ownership of the failure during or after the failure? 
Were roles and responsibilities clear throughout the event? 
What attributes/disabilities were demonstrated by varying parties? (i.e. tenacity, 
overconfidence, perseverance etc.) 
Were narrated versions of the failure aligned across all parties? 
Was denial of the event apparent among any of the parties? 
Did this failure event predate further failure events that may have been associated 
with this event? 
 
RECTIFICATION OF THE FAILURE EVENT 
 What steps were taken to correct the failure? 
 Were any lessons learnt from the failure? 
Was anything done differently due to the failure? 
 Were any changes embraced by all parties? 
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Were new objectives/goals set or were the original objectives/goals still in place 
after the failure? 
Were tools available to assist failure leading to success i.e. product reproofing, 
therapeutic area re-designation, dose ranging change etc? 
 
Sample Interview Transcript WS650038  March 17th, 2012 
So this is xxxx. xxxx it’s fair to say that you are a seasoned executive within the 
life science industry. Just to state before we commence the interview that the 
interview is being conducted under the ethics of the University of Warwick, no 
confidential information you give me will be used.  I am only looking for themes 
and I shall pool the date with other data. Is that an acceptable ethical stance to take 
for this interview? 
Yes that’s fine. 
So first of all have you been able to identify a failure event within the history of a 
life science company that you have been involved with? 
Yes  
Could you add a little bit of colour to the event? 
So it was the failure of a phase three clinical trial of the lead compound.  So basically the 
clinical trial failed to reach its statistically relevant end point that resulted in the company 
shutting down their research operations making the majority of the staff redundant and 
just turned it into a shell company. 
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And it’s pretty obvious why that’s deemed a failure event, but did all parties deem 
this a failure event or were there any people that deemed it not such? 
No, I think it was very clear that the compound was the lead compound, and there wasn’t 
a later stage of development that was significant as far as the investors were concerned.  
The clinical trial was pretty definitive. It gave us results so yes, I think it was agreed that 
it was obvious that all parties agreed it was a failure event, as defined as an adverse 
deviation from plan. 
What was the % equity split of the company? 
The management team held between 20 and 25%, the University 30% and the investors 
in total the balance. 
What was the board constitution? 
Three members of the management team, two investor directors and an independent 
Chair. 
Was there a subscription agreement in place with consent required from investors 
for specific activity? 
Yes, there was a lengthy subscription agreement, that once signed, no-one ever referred 
to. 
If so, were the consents onerous and unduly restrictive on the executive directors 
operating the company? 
Absolutely, we could not spend more than £10,000 capital for example, and could not 
sign any contracts, whether deemed material or otherwise. 
If represented on the board, was/were the investor director/s helpful ? 
282 
 
If they got their own way, otherwise they would play all sorts of tricks. 
If represented on the board, did the investor director/s always act in the best 
interests of all shareholders at all times? 
No, I actually think it is almost impossible; certainly improbable that investor directors 
always act in the best interest of all shareholders at all times. They are appointed by the 
investor and hence I am sure that is where their first loyalty lies. 
So the failure event was obviously an adverse deviation from a warranted business 
plan by definition. But what triggered the identification of the event, was it purely 
the un-blinding of data?  
Yes it was the results of the study, the un-blinding of the data and the analysis of the 
results. 
And this event was isolated and wasn’t part of a larger number of events. Could 
you say something about whether it was unexpected then? 
I think it was always accepted that there was a level of risk involved in pushing the product 
forward, so I think the level of risk was probably viewed differently by different people in 
the organisation. But I think there was always a level of risk associated with the product 
in a clinical trial 
Just going back to when the results were un-blinded, did the flow of action become 
less intelligible after this event or was it still a company where intelligible or 
intelligent flow of action occurred? Was there a change in the flow of action at all?  
I don’t know if there was a plan for failure. There probably was at the highest level of the 
company, but that certainly wasn’t visible to the senior management team that I was a 
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part of, it wasn’t visible. But I think there was a clear plan that was followed. There were 
discussions with investors, discussions with potential partners, and there was a clear 
plan that was followed.   
So this was a phase three clinical trial. One would expect that certainly there would 
be a view that there was an acceptable risk at this stage for the compound to be 
developed? 
Yes, but I think the risk profile is different for a biotech company with a single product or 
with a lead product, compared with  other companies who have multiple products in  their 
portfolio. There is maybe a higher level of risk which was acceptable in that situation. 
And do you think that’s accepted by the investors in this industry as a norm or do 
you think there is further education to be done? 
I think the investors do realise that biotech’s are a high risk but also a high return concept. 
I think they are fairly accepting of that. 
Was the fallout of this failure event quite severe in monetary terms, emotional 
terms or in any other aspect?  
Yes, it was quite severe for the whole company because basically every member of staff 
was made redundant so it had a huge impact on the company and the staff. 
Just around the redundancy event, was that done as one procedure or was it done 
by several cuts? In other words, was it just done as one process, or did it take a 
number of months, and it was done through several different processes? 
It was one clear process, because of the number of staff involved; it took three to four 
months before the first people were actually leaving the company, and three to four 
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months following the announcement.  So it took a period of time to be completed but it 
was one defined process.  
And was any blame or praise attributed to any party involved? 
There were certainly requests made concerning the running of the clinical trial, the 
management and the monitoring of the clinical trial to ensure that it had been done 
properly, that it had been designed properly and that no errors had occurred in that 
process. There was an external independent review and nothing untoward was found, 
the trial was managed and run correctly.  So I think people were praised because of the 
way the trial had been run and managed and it was clear that the failure was because of 
the compounds lack of efficacy rather than any management failure.   
Did you see any change in power dynamics moving through the process, between 
investors and yourselves, or within the management team or from any other 
external source? 
Yes, I think following the event, the CEO and the executive directors were very much out 
of the driving seat, and before the event, the CEO and the executive directors were very 
much leading the company and had very clear leadership. After the event, things did 
change and the investors were getting more involved and it seemed to be them that were 
calling the shots more than the executive team.  
And during this time did the board members relate to each other and to 
management in a cohesive way, or did you feel that that change in power dynamic 
affected the way the management acted to staff? 
285 
 
I think probably there was a change because it was felt by the staff that the senior 
management were no longer in control, they had lost some of their power to a certain 
extent.   
So that affected to some extent influencing skills and the direction and operational 
way of managing the company?  
Yes, I think staff had lost some confidence in the leadership team.  
Did the power dynamics change after the failure? Was there a stage where 
everybody knew the writing was on the wall so effectively there came a day when 
it was almost accepted, how did that play out? 
Yes, I think once the results had been viewed and it was clear what the plan was there 
was just an acceptance that it was going to happen. There was nothing that  could be 
done to stop the redundancies and close down operations, so there was just  acceptance 
of that.  
Did key people take ownership of the failure during or after the failure? 
I am not sure I could say they took ownership of it.  They certainly accepted that people 
accepted responsibility because it’s not correct to say that any one person was 
responsible, but they accepted the process.      
And were roles and responsibilities clear throughout the event? 
Yes, I think it was clear what people had to do, what the responsibilities were and they 
carried them out. 
What attributes were demonstrated by varying parties? 
I think that the management team was certainly sympathetic to the workforce. 
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And how was that demonstrated? 
I think by trying to put procedures in place to assist the workforce to find alternative 
employment, so that people were aware of what other positions were available. Where 
possible, if contracts were extended from other companies, these contracts were offered 
to people in the team.  And I think support in looking for other positions was a key part of 
this sympathy. 
And were narrated versions of this failure by aligned across all parties? In other 
words if I had the privilege of speaking to all parties, from your point of view, would 
you deem that they would all give the same version of events? 
I don’t know. I think some parties may give different versions of events, and some people 
may have felt probably more anxious about the failure. I think some people in the 
organisation were fully aware of the level of risk involved and others may not have been. 
Was there any denial, or would you deem that there would be any denial of the 
event at any time among any of the parties? 
No, I think it was pretty clear what had happened and what the result was.  
Could you just paint a picture of this company in terms of whether it was a floated 
company, what the board looked like, that kind of colour around it, then I can link 
it with other examples of the same type of company? 
It was a company that was a spin out from the University, the CEO was a professor from 
the University, and there were executive directors who did have significant experience of 
the pharmaceutical industry. The non-executives, there was certainly a good proportion 
of the non-executives who were experienced in pharma development.  
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And was this a quoted company on the UK markets or did it have any US 
shareholders? 
Yes, it was on the London stock exchange and no US shareholders as far as I recollect. 
And in terms of board constitution, one would imagine as it was a public company 
that the board would be non-executive who were the great and the good of the 
industry and the rest were management, is that true? 
That’s correct, yes. 
In terms of this event, it was a terminal event. Do you think any lessons were learnt 
from it? 
I think certainly the individuals will have learnt a lesson, so in other positions and in other 
companies, they can use these lessons about levels of acceptable risk in moving 
products forward. 
And do you think these people when they move to other companies, would they 
do anything differently due to that learning? 
I think depending on the type of company yes, the level of risk involved in development 
and the level of acceptable risk in changes depending on the type of company profile. 
Can you think of maybe one or two examples of the type of thing that might have 
been done differently due to this experience? 
I think there are some key decision points where it has been agreed up front on earlier 
trials and maybe some harder decisions: whether to go into development earlier may 
have been taken. 
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So when you say harder, you are alluding to the fact that maybe within the industry 
it might be useful to terminate trials earlier which are deemed too high a risk, 
opposed to continuing to inject the money into other projects in the same 
company. Would that be fair, something like that? 
Yes,  and I think having agreed success and failure criteria upfront and sticking to those 
criteria would probably help a lot as well.  
That’s very interesting, do you think that is quite easy to define upfront? 
I don’t think it’s easy, but I think it’s possible to do.  
So do you think there is a need because of the higher risk in these type of 
companies to do more contingency planning, or do you think in a way it’s just a 
fact of life of these type of companies? 
Yes, I think it is a fact of life, but I think it’s very difficult to have detailed planning in place 
and detailed planning available to the whole organisation where that plan is basically that 
we are closing down the organisation and we are making everyone redundant. That is 
not a plan you can share with the whole organisation.  
Are there any tools available to assist failure leading to success,  and you have 
just alluded to one, can you possibly add a little bit of colour as to what your 
thoughts are on that? 
Sorry? 
Could there be any tools available to companies to assist failure either leading to 
success, for example product reproofing, therapeutic re-designation, those kind 
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of things; and from your experiential viewpoint, what tools could be available in 
this instance that would have given the company more chance to survive? 
I think probably trying to get as much information as possible earlier on in the 
development programme. Having more commercial awareness of what would be 
acceptable or what would be an acceptable product to profile.  
If this was a large blue chip pharma, they would have a lot of staff and a lot of 
resource to do these types of things. But I guess with smaller companies they are 
certainly resource limited. Do you think that’s quite a challenge to actually do what 
you suggest with the resources they tend to have, or do you think it’s something 
that should be insisted on? 
I think that is a challenge, it’s a lack of specialist resource which is available within the 
company which is always an issue.  
Is there anything else you want to add in relation to what’s been said? 
No 
INTERVIEW FINISHES   
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